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ABSTRACT 
The tanker Exxon Valdez and cruise ship Empress of the North were each involved in a major 
incident involving poor decision making by the junior officer on watch, resulting in the 
grounding of their vessels.  The purpose of this hermeneutic phenomenological qualitative study 
was to describe the decision-making process of 15 maritime junior watch officers in a high-
resolution simulation in adverse-condition scenarios.  Data collection utilized observations, 
interviews and a self-efficacy assessment.  For data analysis I used the constant comparative 
method applied to the data, developing codes, which were analyzed and reduced to 3 key 
themes: (a) the Decision-Making Process, (b) Factors in Decision Making, and (c) Motivations 
and Solutions to Decision Making.  The findings suggested that working or short-term memory; 
emotional intelligence; self-efficacy; and skills, rules and knowledge were major factors of how 
successfully novice decision makers made their decisions.  At least 2 of these factors are within 
the affective domain.  The results indicated that maritime educators who utilize teaching aids and 
methods that stimulate the affective domain as early as possible in the education process will be 
promoting growth in the decision-making skills of students.  The results also indicated that 
implementation of a mentoring program within the maritime industry and making it a part of the 
normal practice for new officers will continue to foster strong decision-making skills.  To that 
end, curriculum for leadership and managerial skills courses required in maritime education 
should include benefits of a mentoring program and how such a program should be implemented.  
Keywords:  maritime junior watch officers, novice decision making, self-efficacy, 
emotional intelligence, working memory, maritime education, affective learning objectives, 
mentoring. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
Overview 
John Konrad (2007), an experienced deck officer, posed some poignant questions in a 
blog comparing the groundings of the Exxon Valdez and the Empress of the North.  Konrad 
pondered: 
• Did the mate attempt to contact the captain when he first sensed trouble and if not 
why was the captain not on the bridge at the time of the grounding? 
• Was the mate experienced in this turn and if not why the captain did not wake up for 
the maneuver? (para. 9) 
According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 1990) investigation, fatigue was 
the major contributing factor in the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.  However, Konrad (2007), 
like many other experienced deck officers, wondered why no one inquired more deeply into the 
problem resulting from the decision that was made by the third officer.  “Maybe if the journalists 
and public had determined the true cause of the Exxon Valdez different regulations would have 
been in place and the Empress of the North incident would not have happened” (Konrad, 2007, 
para. 10).  
Gladwell (2008) suggested that for anyone to become an expert at anything would take 
10,000 hours or 10 years of experience in a particular field.  Numerous studies have been 
conducted on experienced decision makers and how they rely on their previous knowledge and 
experience to formulate a good decision (Brezovic, Klein, & Thordsen, 1987; Calderwood & 
Macgregor, 1989; Dane, Pratt, & Rockmann, 2012; Dhillon, 2007; Feltz & Hepler, 2012a; Feltz 
& Hepler, 2012b; Hall, 2010; Hoy & Tarter, 2010; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein, Calderwood, 
& Macgregor, 1989; Nara, 2010; Randel & Pugh, 1996; Watson, 2010; Wiggins & Boliwerk, 
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2006).  However, at the time of this study, there was a paucity of studies that focused on the 
novice or inexperienced decision makers in an unfamiliar, complex, and time-critical situation 
(Amel, 1995; Chalko, Ebright, Patterson, & Urden, 2004; Gillespie & Paterson, 2009; Hoffman, 
Aitken, & Duffield, 2009; Kosowski & Roberts, 2003).  Furthermore, there were no empirical 
studies exploring decisions made by novice individuals in the maritime domain.  This study 
focused on and described the experiences of junior deck watch officers with less than two years 
of experience performing as the sole decision maker in a high-resolution, full bridge simulator. 
Background 
Cargo and passengers are typically transported by one of four methods: (a) by trucks or 
buses on roads; (b) by rail; (c) by air on passenger or cargo planes; and (d) by water on passenger 
or cargo ships (Dhillon, 2007).  The focus of this study was on waterborne transportation, better 
known as the commercial maritime industry.  Establishing an understanding of the organization 
of the maritime industry, personnel, and vessels provides essential background information for 
this study.  
The maritime industry is broken down into three major categories.  The first category is 
dockside or logistic operations of the loading or unloading of passenger or cargo ships.  These 
operations include occupations such as longshoremen, truck drivers, and rail services.  The 
second category is shipyards operations, where ships are built and repaired (Dhillon, 2007).  The 
third part of this industry is shipboard operations, which was the focus of this study.  Vessel 
operations vary depending on the occupation or service provided by the vessel and on the size of 
the vessel.  This category includes a variety of ships from as small as 12-foot harbor tugs, to as 
large as 6000-passenger cruise ships, 18,000-unit capacity container ships, or 1600-foot super 
tankers (Greenman, 2013).  
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Most ships have three major personnel departments: (a) the engineering department that 
operates and repairs the ship’s machinery; (b) the steward department where meals are cooked 
for passengers and crew; and (c) the deck department, which is responsible for the overall 
operations and safe navigation of the ship (Meurn, 2014).  The ship’s master, also known as the 
ship’s captain, is the person who has the overall responsibility for the vessel.  Those who are 
immediately under the captain in the deck department are known as the deck officers or mates 
(Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel, & Baldauf, 2012).  The senior deck officer is known as the chief 
mate or first officer and is considered second in command.  If in the event the captain is 
incapacitated and unable to perform his or her duties, then the chief mate will become the 
shipmaster.  Under the chief mate is the second officer or mate who is recognized as the ship’s 
navigator and is responsible to the captain for the planning and execution of the ship’s navigation 
and route.  Finally, the most junior officer is the third officer or mate whose primary 
responsibility is to the chief mate for the maintenance and care of the ship’s lifesaving gear 
(Meurn, 2014).  All three deck officers are the actual watchstanders and the primary decision 
makers when the captain is not on the bridge (Hayler, 1989; Meurn, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs et 
al., 2012).  
The lowest members of the deck hierarchy are the individuals who are unlicensed 
deckhands.  These members of the deck department are the able seamen, who are considered 
skilled workers, and the ordinary seamen who are known as the unskilled workers.  The 
seamen’s foreman on deck is the ship’s boson, who is a seasoned and experienced senior able 
seaman.  While the ship is at sea, the able seamen stand watch as the ship’s helmsman, and if 
required, the ordinary seaman may stand a watch on the bridge as the ship’s lookout (Hayler, 
1989; Meurn, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012).   
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In addition to the organization of the industry and personnel, the organization of the 
vessels is important to understand.  The bridge of most commercial ships has numerous 
computerized displays and controls that can make the bridge of the ship as complex as a cockpit 
of a modern day passenger plane.  The purpose behind these various displays and controls is to 
assist the deck officer in the safe operation of the vessel and to safely navigate the vessel in a 
variety of weather and traffic conditions (Meurn, 2014).  In spite of all the available technology, 
training, and regulations, groundings and collisions, otherwise known as maritime incidents, 
continue to occur (Giziakis, Goulielmos, & Lathouraki, 2012; Hetherington, Flin, & Mearns, 
2006; UK P&I Club, 1990; UK P&I Club, 1996). 
Several research studies (Dhillon, 2007; Giziakis et al., 2012; Grech, Horberry, & 
Koester, 2008; Hetherington et al., 2006; Lin, 2006; Rothblum, 2000; UK P&I Club, 1996; 
Wang & Zhang, 2000) have suggested that an estimated 80% of maritime incidents are attributed 
to human error.  An analysis by Giziakis et al. (2012) proposed that, despite the development of 
international standards in maritime education and assessment, the numbers of marine incidents 
attributed to the human element have not declined.  Researchers (Grech et al., 2008; Lin, 2006; 
Rothblum, 2000; Wang & Zhang, 2000) have identified several factors pertaining to the human 
element that could be causes of maritime casualties including (a) lack of training, (b) lack of 
experience overall or with the particular vessel, (c) fatigue, (d) stress, and (e) excessive 
workload.  These danger factors are important to consider when assigning personnel to standing 
watch, whether on the bridge or in the engine room. 
The ship’s bridge is the command and control center of the vessel.  When a ship is at sea, 
the bridge is operated 24 hours a day with a sole officer on watch.  A watch, also referred to as 
standing a watch, watchstanding, or watchkeeping, is a nautical term that involves a group of 
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qualified personnel performing a duty at an assigned place and controlling the operations of a 
ship during a specified time period.  A typical seagoing vessel has qualified personnel 
performing a watch on the bridge and in the engine room.  A bridge watch usually consists of a 
lookout, a helmsman, and an officer, who are responsible for the safe navigation of the ship 
(Hayler, 1989; Meurn, 2014).  The term safe navigation means keeping the vessel on a planned 
course and away from dangers, such as collision with other vessels.  Engineering watchstanders 
on the other hand, ensure the continuous operation of the mechanical and electrical power of the 
vessel (Hayler, 1989; Meurn, 2014).  
Those who serve as deck watch officers are the decision makers during their watch.  If 
necessary, the officer on watch seeks assistance from the captain.  Of these watch officers, the 
second and third mates often have less than five years of decision-making experience at sea.  
This inexperience is caused by the fact that the sea time requirement for promotion from third 
mate to second mate is one year and from second mate to chief mate is one year (Requirements 
for Officer Endorsements, 2014).  For the purpose of this study, officers with less than two 
years’ sea experience are considered inexperienced and are referred to as junior watch officers. 
Failing to make the right critical decision in a timely manner may result in serious 
consequences for both the vessel and the crew, and has been the focus of investigations 
conducted by the NTSB.  The board focused on two major incidents that involved the 
questionable decisions of two junior officers.  Because of the junior officers’ poor decision 
making, the tanker Exxon Valdez (NTSB, 1990) and the cruise ship Empress of the North 
(NTSB, 2008) both ran aground and, in the case of the Exxon Valdez, caused a major 
environmental disaster occurred (Grech et al., 2008; Konrad, 2007; Lin, 2006; Rothblum, 2000; 
Wang & Zhang, 2000). 
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Situation to Self 
I have been part of the maritime industry for over 30 years, and during this period, I have 
acquired a Master’s degree in Professional Counseling.  This educational background provides 
me new opportunities to explore human behaviors and interactions.  This knowledge has been an 
asset when it comes to educating mariners, especially those who are struggling with difficult and 
unfamiliar concepts.  As a counselor and educator, it is natural for me to get close to individuals 
in their environments and study their behaviors.  Such individuals studying to become officers 
are educated and trained to make critical decisions, and it is this common experience and the 
phenomenon of decision making that draws me to this area of research.  My goal is to improve 
education for newly minted officers, thereby potentially reducing maritime incidents.  
Research was conducted using a qualitative, hermeneutic phenomenological approach.  
The interpretive framework was based upon social constructivism and a philosophical belief 
system of epistemological research (Creswell, 2013; van Manen, 1990).  Through hermeneutic 
phenomenology, the research design put participants in a common scenario to include decision 
making in the maritime domain while experiencing a complex, ill-defined, time-critical situation, 
and later inquired into the meaning of the descriptions of their experiences.  The experiences of 
the participants are subjective in that it is their understanding of the events.  My job was to 
extrapolate meaning from these descriptions and create themes or a story of the collective 
experiences (Creswell, 2013; van Manen, 1990). 
The study’s orientation was an epistemological, philosophical assumption.  An 
epistemological, philosophical method requires the researcher to get as close as possible to the 
participants in order to assemble evidence based upon the participants’ experiences.  Therefore, I 
tried to learn what the individuals understood about their experiences. (Belbase, 2011; Creswell, 
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2013; Levering, 2006). 
Problem Statement 
The problem is human error accounts for as much as 80% of maritime incidents.  There is 
a need for both the maritime industry and education to seek ways to reduce these incidents.  
Reducing maritime incidents, will save lives, the environment, and help the industry in reducing 
the costs in doing business (Dhillon, 2007; Grech et al., 2008; Hetherington et al., 2006; Lin, 
2006; Rothblum, 2000; UK P&I Club, 1996; Wang & Zhang, 2000).  Of the maritime incidents 
attributed to human error, 44% were ascribed to the ship’s crew.  Furthermore, of the ship’s 
crew, deck officers were responsible for 25% of those incidents (UK P&I Club, 1996).  The data 
was similar to the findings by Giziakis et al. (2012), who found that 32% of incidents were 
caused by the ship’s officers and 16% by the ship’s crew for a total of 48%.  The UK P&I Club 
(1996) reported that 20% of second officers had less than five years of sea time experience.  
Additionally, of those second officers, 70% had less than five years in their present rank.  
Another report by the UK P&I Club (1990) focusing on major claims that were paid out, 
suggested that pertaining to maritime collisions, the seniority of the bridge officers played an 
important factor in the collision of the vessel.  The report indicated that the captain was only 
involved in 33% of the incidents while the second officer was twice as likely to be involved in 
the collision of the vessel (UK P&I Club, 1990).  The report recommended that the industry 
seriously reexamine the training process of junior officers, specifically second officers.  Oddly, 
the UK P&I Club reports do not address third officers, even though they make up one third of the 
bridge watch officers’ team.  It was the intent of this study to examine the decision-making 
process of all bridge officers with less than two years of sea-going experience.  
Investigation teams cited various reasons for the human-error-related incidents.  Yet, 
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none of these investigative teams went into the deeper question concerning why the poor critical 
decisions were made (Giziakis et al., 2012; Konrad, 2007).  Currently, empirical research on 
shipboard operations has come from outside the United States.  This lack of research warrants 
that decision-making studies related to the maritime domain should be conducted in the United 
States (U.S.), where there are numerous studies investigating and pertaining to unfamiliar, 
complex, and time-critical decision making in nuclear reactor operators (Lina, Shiangb, 
Chuangb, & Lioud, 2014), sports players (Feltz & Hepler, 2012a; Feltz & Hepler, 2012b;), 
medical care (Chalko et al., 2004; Gillespie & Paterson, 2009; Hoffman et al., 2009; Kosowski & 
Roberts, 2003;), the military (Azuma, Daily, & Furmanski; 2006, Brezovic et al., 1987; Klein, 
1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989), firefighting (Hall, 2010; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein 
et al., 1989; Useem, Cook, & Sutton, 2005), and aviation (Amel, 1995; Dhillon, 2007; Klein, 
1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989; Nara, 2010; Prince, Hanel, & Salas, 1993; Wiggins & 
Boliwerk, 2006).  Unfortunately, there has been little empirical research on maritime decision 
making (Hockey, Healey, Crawshaw, Wastell, & Sauer, 2003; Lin, 2006) and none on novice 
decision makers, such as junior deck officers who are in environments that are unfamiliar, 
complex, and time-critical. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to describe the decision-making process 
of maritime junior watch officers navigating a vessel in adverse situations on a high-resolution, 
full mission bridge simulator.  By understanding the underlying reasoning behind the decision-
making process, maritime educators may devise new teaching methods to reduce the tendency 
toward poor decision making, which often results in maritime incidents.  Some research has 
suggested that self-efficacy plays a role in the decision-making process (Boscardin, O’Sullivan, 
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Plant, Sliwka, & van Schaik, 2011; Feltz & Helper, 2012a; Feltz & Hepler, 2012b).  Bandura 
(1977) defined self-efficacy as a level of confidence that an individual has in his or her ability to 
execute certain courses of action or achieve specific outcomes.  Additionally, the purpose of this 
study was to explore the role of self-efficacy of the participants’ performances in the simulator 
by what they described about their experiences and their decisions. 
Significance of the Study 
Because most decision-making theories are based upon prior experiences in making good 
decisions, this study adds to the body of knowledge regarding novice decision making in an 
isolated environment (Chalko et al., 2004; Feltz & Hepler, 2012a; Feltz & Hepler, 2012b; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Hoy & Tarter, 2010; Klein, 2008; Klein, personal 
communication, March 14, 2014).  It is important to know how novice decision makers describe 
their decision-making experiences in unfamiliar, ill-defined, and time-critical environments.  The 
themes developed from this research have contributed to improved procedures and curriculum in 
maritime education, fostering new decision-making methods.  In addition, this study has 
implications in other fields that employ novice decision makers in isolated environments that are 
unfamiliar, complex, and time-critical (Grech et al., 2008). 
Maritime education can glean valuable information from the insights and reflections of 
junior officers.  This information can be utilized for developing or adapting education techniques 
and curriculum, specifically with the use of simulated experiences, targeted to reduce errors in 
decision-making.  Furthermore, these simulated experiences assist junior deck officers in gaining 
critical experience prior to standing their next watch on the bridge.  Additionally, the maritime 
community benefits from this study through a reduction in the human error percentage factor 
resulting from inexperienced deck officers, which in turn leads to a reduction in costs of 
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shipboard operations, decreases chances of damage to the environment, and saves lives (Dhillon, 
2007; Giziakis et al., 2012; Grech et al., 2008; Lin, 2006; Rothblum, 2000; UK P&I Club, 1996; 
Wang & Zhang, 2000). 
Research Questions 
The phenomenon in focus for this study was the critical decision making of junior deck 
officers with less than two years of experience.  Given a special situation and environment, an 
inquiry was made based upon the participants’ understanding and descriptions of their decisions 
(Creswell, 2013; Levering, 2006).  Furthermore, the study examined factors and motivations of 
the decision-making process of junior officers.   
This qualitative hermeneutic phenomenological study was guided by the following three 
research questions (RQ): 
RQ1: While navigating their vessel, how do maritime junior watch officers describe their 
decision-making process in an adverse situation?  This was the main question of the study.  The 
phenomenon being studied was how the participants described their experience with the 
situations presented and how well they understood the reasons for their decision making within 
an adverse, simulated environment (Gillespie & Paterson, 2009). 
RQ2: What factors do participants identify as affecting (positively or negatively) their 
critical decision-making process?  A decision made, whether good or bad, by a novice decision 
maker reveals insights into the process used to come to the decision (e.g. intellect, epiphany, 
imagination, or dumb luck).  The participants described their thoughts and subsequent actions 
which led to a particular decision (Klein et al., 1989). 
RQ3: What motivated the participant’s decision when choosing one solution over 
another?  This question is an adaptation of the Critical Decision Model by Klein et al. (1989), 
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developed as a structured interview method for eliciting expert knowledge.  When novice 
decision makers have made a decision, why did they choose one option over another or what 
motivated one decision over another (Klein et al., 1989)? 
Research Plan 
The international community recognizes that human error is one of the primary reasons 
for maritime incidents.  Both international and federal laws have been made to enforce safety 
management systems and require education and hands-on training; nevertheless, there is little 
evidence that these laws have brought about positive changes in the number of maritime 
incidents (Giziakis et al., 2012).  This study has the potential to shed light into a portion of the 
transportation industry that currently has a scant amount of empirical research.  It would be 
impossible to study all of the issues regarding the human elements; therefore, this investigation 
focused on a small segment of the industry with the greatest potential for incidents, the junior 
officer (UK P&I Club, 1996).  The study was hermeneutic phenomenology conducted from an 
epistemology assumption and social constructivism framework describing the decision making 
of junior officers.  
Creswell (2013) discussed two types of phenomenological research primarily used by 
researchers: transcendental phenomenology, which is purely descriptive; and hermeneutic 
phenomenology, which is considered interpretive.  Van Manen (2011), discussing Martin 
Heidegger, a disciple of Husserl, considered that all description is interpretive or that every form 
of human awareness is interpretive.  Hans-Georg Gadamer, (van Manen, 2011) a student of 
Heidegger, explored the role of language, the nature of questioning, and the phenomenology of 
human conversation.  He also studied the significance of prejudice and tradition in the project of 
human understanding (Moustakas, 1994; van Manen, 2011). 
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According to van Manen (2011), Paul Ricoeur did not subscribe to the transparency of 
the self-reflective cogito of Husserl.  Ricoeur argued that meanings are not given directly to us, 
and that we must therefore make a hermeneutic deviation through the symbolic apparatus of the 
culture.  His hermeneutic phenomenology identified “how human meanings are deposited and 
mediated through myth, religion, art, and language” (van Manen, 2011, para. 3).  
According to Moustakas (1994), hermeneutic phenomenology is concerned with 
understanding the contexts in which the researcher aims to create a rich and deep account of a 
phenomenon through intuition.  This study focused on uncovering and amplifying the data while 
avoiding prior knowledge.  Research often reveals details that have seemingly trivial aspects 
within experience and thus may be taken for granted.  The goal was to create meaning and 
achieve a sense of understanding of decision making.  Moustakas stated, “In the hermeneutic 
circle, prejudgments are corrected in view of the text, the understanding of which leads to new 
prejudgments.  The prejudgments that lead to pre-understanding are constantly ‘at stake;’ their 
surrender could also be called a transformation” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 10).  As the researcher, I 
reflected deeply on what the texts of the field had to say.  I poured over the texts to become 
immersed within the dialogue.  It is the goal of hermeneutic phenomenology research not to 
clone the texts for the reader, but to invite the reader to enter the world that the texts have 
developed before them (Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994; van Manen, 1990). 
Belbase (2011), in discussing constructivist epistemological assumption, considered: (a) 
the individual actively constructs knowledge, (b) knowledge and the individual are inter-
connected and the world is subjective, and (c) knowledge is built upon our personal experiences.  
Mental construction continues to change over time, due to the process of adapting new 
knowledge and individual gains through experience.  Therefore, constructivist epistemology 
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considers that knowledge is self-adaptive and based upon new experiences.  Consequently, what 
one person knows of an event might be very different from what another person knows about the 
same event at the same time and in the same context (Belbase, 2011). 
Because the participants’ experiences were subjective, this study sought to discover a 
pattern of meaning of those experiences; therefore, the study framework was social 
constructivism (Creswell, 2013).  The framework of social constructivism seeks to understand 
the world around us.  Belbase (2011), in discussing social constructivism, proposed that 
scientific knowledge begins with personal constructs of the individual researcher in a raw form. 
In other words, personal biases are also a part of the research.  This raw knowledge is then 
brought to the scientific community where it may be discussed among members of the 
community through publications, oral presentations, and group discussions.  It is in the scientific 
community where this processed information becomes new knowledge (Belbase, 2011). 
Delimitations and Limitations 
Delimitations 
This research utilized a simulated environment rather than a real-life experience.  
Certainly, being at sea could present greater distractions than what could actually be simulated, 
such as fatigue and walking on an unstable platform; however, the simulation allowed the 
participants to reenact hazardous conditions without risk of any real harm (Emad, 2011; Emad & 
Roth, 2008; Grech et al., 2008; Hall, 2010; Lin, 2006).  In the decision-making scenarios, the 
officer of the watch was assigned both a helmsman to steer the ship and a radar operator to assist 
the officer on watch in monitoring traffic.  A potential limitation to the study could have 
occurred if one of the two individuals assigned to the officer on watch failed to obey orders.  
However, it was the responsibility of the officer on watch to catch their mistakes and take 
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appropriate action as part of the decision-making process.   
Because the participants were using a simulator as part of their task, a concern could have 
been that the participants’ performance was impacted because they were conscious that they 
were being observed.  However, measures were be taken to reduce the likelihood that participant 
performance was affected.  For example, the instructor was located in a separate control room, 
conducting the observations of the participants through the instructor monitors.  The camera in 
the simulator was located in the overhead ceiling and was inconspicuous.  Furthermore, the 
participants had already participated in simulation exercises four times before the study 
commenced.  Therefore, even though the participants were aware that they were being observed 
by their instructor, that knowledge was no longer novel.  Likewise, my research observations 
were conducted from the instructor’s control station and I was not visible to the participants until 
I approached them about volunteering to participate in a study. 
In addition, this study utilized select participants from the U.S.  The demographics of the 
study were limited to new junior officers in the U.S.  The demographic numbers were drawn 
from public records posted on the web by the seven maritime universities, six of which are state 
owned: Maine Maritime Academy, Massachusetts Maritime Academy, State University of New 
York Maritime College, Great Lakes Maritime Academy, Texas Maritime Academy, and 
California Maritime Academy.  The one that is federally owned is the U.S. Merchant Marine 
Academy (“United States Merchant Marine,” 2014).  
Limitations 
The maritime domain is a truly globalized industry.  Worldwide commercial shipping has 
a diversity of officers and crews, with most of the officers coming from Europe and the crews, 
which are sometimes unlicensed, often coming from South and Southeast Asia (UK P&I, 1996).  
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This study utilized U.S. mariners from both genders and from various ethnic backgrounds.  
However, it is impossible to determine if this is an accurate sampling of the broader mariner 
population, because the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) does not keep records of that type of 
information (Dutra, personal communication, March, 14, 2014).  Therefore, caution must be 
taken in generalizing the results of this study to a broader population, indicating the need for 
further research. 
Definitions 
1. Deck department – Deck department refers to the department aboard a ship responsible for 
navigation, cargo, command, and control functions (Merchant Mariner Credential, 46 C.F.R. 
Part 10, 2014). 
2. Decision making – Decision making means applying logical and sound judgment based on 
the information available (United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, 1998). 
3. Expert – Expert refers to individuals who have over 10 years of experience and would be 
recognized as having achieved proficiency in their domain (Gladwell, 2008; Klein et al., 
1989). 
4. Human error – Human error means either the failure to carry out a specific task or the 
performance of a forbidden action that could lead to the disruption of scheduled operations or 
result in damage to property or equipment (Dhillon, 2007).   
5. Marine casualty – Marine casualty refers to an event, or a sequence of events, which have 
occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship, that have resulted in any of the 
following: 
a. The death of, or serious injury to, a person; 
b. The loss of a person from a ship; 
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c. The loss, presumed loss, or abandonment of a ship; 
d. Material damage to a ship; 
e. The stranding or disabling of a ship, or the involvement of a ship in a collision; 
f. Material damage to marine infrastructure external to a ship, that could seriously 
endanger the safety of the ship, another ship, or an individual;  
g. Severe damage to the environment, or the potential for severe damage to the 
environment, brought about by the damage of a ship. 
However, a marine casualty does not include a deliberate act or omission, with the intention 
to cause harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the environment (International 
Maritime Organization [IMO], 2008). 
6. Marine incident – Marine incident refers to an event, or sequence of events, other than a 
marine casualty, which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship that 
endangered, or, if not corrected, would endanger the safety of the ship, its occupants or any 
other person or the environment.  However, a marine incident does not include a deliberate 
act or omission, with the intent to cause harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the 
environment (IMO, 2008). 
7. Master or Captain – Master or captain refers to the officer having command of a vessel 
(Merchant Mariner Credential, 46 C.F.R. Part 10, 2014). 
8. Mate or Deck Officer – Mate or deck officer refers to a qualified officer in the deck 
department other than the master (Merchant Mariner Credential, 46 C.F.R. Part 10, 2014). 
9. Novice – Novice is a term that is used strictly in the relative sense to a person who has had 
significantly less experience than the experts (Klein et al., 1989).  
10. Officer in charge of a navigational watch (OICNW) – OICNW refers to a deck officer 
30 
 
qualified at the operational level (Merchant Mariner Credential, 46 C.F.R. Part 10, 2014). 
11. Operational level – Operational level means the level of responsibility associated with: 
a. Serving as officer in charge of a navigational or engineering watch, or as designated 
duty engineer for periodically unmanned machinery spaces, or as radio operator 
onboard a seagoing ship; and 
b. Maintaining direct control over the performance of all functions within the designated 
area of responsibility in accordance with proper procedures and under the direction of 
an individual serving in the management level for that area of responsibility 
(Merchant Mariner Credential, 46 C.F.R. Part 10, 2014). 
12. Seafarer or Mariner – Seafarer or mariner means any person who is employed or engaged in 
any capacity on board a ship (IMO, 2008). 
13. Situation or situational awareness (SA) – Situation or SA means the ability to identify, 
process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening to the 
team in regard to the mission.  More simply, it is individuals knowing what is going on 
around them (United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, 1998). 
Summary 
In as much as 80% of maritime incidents, human error has been suggested to be the 
primary cause.  Of that number, 25% are attributed to deck officers and watchstanders, of whom 
one third are considered junior and inexperienced decision makers.  It was the purpose of this 
study to describe the decision-making process of these junior officers.  By examining that 
process, this study has implications for those who conduct education and training for these 
junior officers.  This study has implications in future designs for ships’ bridges and for policy 
makers responsible for the policies and procedures pertaining to manning and watchstanding.  
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This chapter presented the problem and purpose statements, as well as the significance of the 
study.  Furthermore it presented the research questions and plan for this study.  The next chapter 
will review the body of literature related to this study.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Overview 
New deck officers may have sea-time experience, but they do not have the experience of 
time on their side when it comes to making critical and time-sensitive decisions.  This chapter 
examined the literature on decision making as it relates to the real or natural world and to 
maritime education.  The goal of the study was not just to describe the novice or junior officers’ 
decision-making process, but to ultimately develop training and education methods to assist 
these new officers in their future endeavors as responsible and safe watchstanders.  To that end, 
an examination of various theories was needed for establishing a theoretical framework for this 
study.  Theories related to the following topics were explored: memory; skills, rules and 
knowledge; and various aspects of decision making. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study focused on junior officer decision making.  No one is quite sure what a person 
is thinking when coming to one conclusion or another.  Because the mind is where decisions are 
formulated, understanding how memory affects a person’s ability to arrive at a particular 
decision is necessary, and related memory theory was examined.  Exploring various decision-
making theories, including how one’s emotions are a part of a person’s decision making, is also 
important to this study and therefore was examined.  Finally, recent research particular to 
decision making in the maritime was examined. 
Short-Term Memory, Working Memory, and Intelligence 
Theories of memory and how it affects both learning and making decisions were 
important for this study.  Novice decision makers may be hampered by the limitation of their 
brains’ ability to process multiple tasks.  These limitations could be further exasperated when 
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conditions become time sensitive and complex.  Miller (1994) proposed that an average person 
can hold between five and nine objects in immediate memory.   By conducting an analysis on 
several studies that used various stimuli such as pitch, loudness, taste, points of lines, and points 
of squares, Miller concluded that in a one-dimensional absolute-judgment task, a person can 
perform at almost perfect recollection up to five or six different stimuli, but recollection declines 
as the number of different stimuli is increased.  Miller stated: 
You may have noticed that I have been careful to say that this magical number seven 
applies to one-dimensional judgments.  Everyday experience teaches us that we can 
identify accurately any one of several hundred faces, any one of several thousand words, 
any one of several thousand objects, etc. (p. 346) 
Miller (1994) went on to point out techniques to increase one’s immediate memory span 
by making relative judgments rather than absolute ones.  In cases where making relative 
judgments is not possible, Miller recommended increasing the number of dimensions on which 
the stimuli differs, or arranging the task in such a way that a person makes a sequence of several 
absolute judgments in a row.  Miller stated that, “Since the memory span is a fixed number of 
chunks, we can increase the number of bits of information that it contains simply by building 
larger and larger chunks, each chunk containing more information than before” (p. 349). 
Short-term memory is used to retain information for a short period of time; therefore, a 
person can think about or manipulate that information for only a short period of time.  Several 
studies (Dang, Braeken, Ferrer, & Liu, 2012; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; 
Gozzi & Papagno, 2007) suggested that short-term memory (STM) and working memory (WM) 
are one in the same, and a relationship exists between general fluid intelligence (gF) to both 
STM and WM.  Engle et al. (1999) conducted research to determine if STM and WM were 
34 
 
indeed different constructs, and if there was a three-way relationship between STM, WM, and 
gF.  Research by Engle et al., as well as by Dang et al. (2012) and Gozzi and Papagno (2007), 
suggested that studies have provided insufficient definitions to both WM and STM.  Engle et al. 
defined STM “as completely and purely a subset of the WM system” (p. 311).  Meanwhile, 
Engle et al. asserted that WM “reflects the amount of activation that can be applied to memory 
representations that are currently active to either bring them into focus or maintain them in focus 
or possibly, in the case of suppression, to dampen them from focus” (p. 312).  Furthermore, 
Engle et al. defined gF as: 
…the ability to solve novel problems and adapt to new situations and is thought to be 
nonverbal and relatively culture free.  Crystallized intelligence, gC, alternatively refers to 
acquired skills and knowledge and depends on educational and cultural background.  
Tests that measure gF include, but are not limited to, matrices and figural analyses… (p. 
313) 
In the discussion, Engle et al. (1999) implied that STM manages the phonological loop, 
which maintains and manipulates verbal information, while WM performs better with the 
visuospatial sketchpad, which deals with visuospatial information.  The results of their findings 
supported the notion that WM and STM should be considered distinct, but highly related.  Engle 
et al. stated STM relies on central executive-based controlled processing and, although WM does 
rely on the same memory system, STM is a sub-subsystem of WM.  WM requires more demands 
on the central executive or controlled-attention component than does STM.  In the second part of 
the study investigating relationships between STM, WM, and gF, Engle et al. offered that WM 
showed a strong connection to gF, but STM did not.  The data indicated the relationship of WM 
and gF is driven by the central executive component (Engle et al., 1999).  What this means for 
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novice decision makers is that WM should predict performance on a wide variety of cognitive 
tasks.  
Gozzi and Papagno (2007) conducted a study involving decision making and WM with a 
goal to investigate the role of the phonological loop in decision making.  The authors recognized 
that “verbal WM was active during the visual reasoning process as the articulatory suppression 
caused interference when problems were presented in graphical form” (Gozzi & Papagno, 2007, 
p. 117).  The test involved a gambling task being administered to one group with a phonological 
loop impaired due to a brain injury and a control group with fully intact brain functions (Gozzi & 
Papagno, 2007).  Findings suggested that the phonological loop does not play a pivotal role in 
decision making and the selection phonological loop did not affect the participants’ choices or 
the efficiency of their decision making while performing the gambling task (Gozzi & Papagno, 
2007).   
When conducting the memory load conditions of the test, both groups in Gozzi and 
Papagno (2007) showed a decline in performance; however, each group adapted different 
strategies to deal with the task.  The study used three decks of cards from which the control and 
impaired groups were to select to maximize their winnings.  One deck was considered a bad 
selection, one deck was neutral, and the third deck was considered the good selection.  Although 
both groups did make selections from all three decks, the impaired group picked the good 
selection deck less often than the control group.  When implementing the WM load condition in 
the gambling task, which involved a good deck and a bad deck, the control the group was able to 
determine which deck was bad, whereas participants in the memory-impaired group were 
uncertain about which deck was good or bad.  This suggests that the participants in the memory-
impaired group used consciously accessible knowledge to perform the task.  Therefore, the 
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impaired group was unable to learn new strategies because they were using additional executive 
functions to maintain concurrent memory load (Gozzi & Papagno, 2007). 
Martinez et al. (2011) researched the relationship between gF and STM in updating and 
processing speed in WM.  One of their findings proposed that STM, WM, and executive 
updating is hardly distinguishable from gF, and another finding showed a very high relationship 
between gF and memory span.  Finally, there was a highly significant correlation among STM, 
WM, updating, and gF (Martinez et al., 2011).  To improve memory Martinez et al. stated that 
research showed “that fluid intelligence can be improved by training aimed at increasing 
memory span” (p. 476). 
Research conducted by Dang et al. (2012) explored a debated topic on the nature of 
working memory and whether or not it was based in the unitary system providing general 
purpose resources or a more differentiated system with domain specific sub-components.  The 
unitary system proposes that working memory is used to measure general intelligence (g) or 
general fluid intelligence (gF) of a single pool of general purpose WM resources.  Dang et al. 
suggested that WM and g are closely related to higher cognition constructs and may be identical.  
The differentiation perspective proposed that:  
… distinct and separable spatial and verbal systems serve as ‘slaves’ for a central control 
structure called ‘central executive.’  The visuo‐spatial sketchpad is the slave system 
responsible for generating and maintaining visuo‐spatial information and mental imagery.  
The second slave system is the phonological or articulatory loop which is specialized in 
the maintenance of speech based verbal information. (Dang et al., 2012, p.500) 
Dang et al. (2012) demonstrated that gF was more strongly correlated with visuo-spatial 
WM than with verbal-numerical WM, and vice versa for gC.  Additionally, the findings 
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suggested that patterns of relationships support the argument that WM is not a simple unitary 
system; rather it can be differentiated in domain-specific components which are visuo-spatial 
WM and verbal-numerical WM (Dang et al., 2012).  The results showed a strong correlation 
between visuo-spatial working memory and general fluid intelligence rather than gC, and vice 
versa for verbal-numerical WM.  Therefore, it was possible to focus training on content-specific 
memory components.  Dang et al. suggested, “This route sounds more promising than when WM 
would only be a unitary resource system, and should be beneficial to certain jobs such as in air 
traffic control” (p. 506). 
Skills, Rules and Knowledge 
In addition to theories on memory, the inter-relationships of skills, rules and knowledge 
are important to this study.  For example, with mariners, the deck officer interfaces with the 
various complex displays and equipment on the bridge.  Human operators are not passive input-
output devices; instead, they are people who actively seek and select relevant information for 
decision making.  In other words, humans are goal-oriented creatures.  In the emerging field of 
man-machine interface, engineers have formulated a theoretical framework to explain human 
behavior.   
Rasmussen (1983) created the Skill, Rule, and Knowledge-based Behaviors (SRK) model 
to describe human behavior during a variety of events, from everyday routine activities to 
situations that are unexpected and novel.  This model is used in multiple domains to analyze 
human interaction with systems by not only observing their overt and covert processes, but by 
measuring the degree a person’s attention and conscious thought are given to specific activities 
(Rasmussen, 1983). 
Skill-based behaviors are considered acts or activities that utilize a sensory input and 
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response.  These behaviors are usually unconscious, routine activities that have been well 
rehearsed.  Occasionally, the behavior or performance of an action is corrected through feedback 
from sensory input, which results in the development of unconscious, smooth, and deliberately 
improved behavior (Rasmussen, 1983).  An example of a skill-based behavior is when a deck 
officer is maintaining a plotted course or manipulating the controls on autopilot or on radar.  
In contrast to skill-based behaviors, rule-based behaviors generally involve behaviors that 
are guided through such things as rules, procedures, official guidelines, and instructions.  This 
goal-oriented activity occurs when a given event happens and a corresponding action is executed.  
For a person to perform an appropriate action, the rule could be implied if no explicit rule is 
found (Rasmussen, 1983).  An illustration of a rule-based behavior is when a deck officer 
encounters another vessel head-on; the rules of the road require that both vessels should pass on 
each other’s portside (left side of the ship).  
When a person encounters an unfamiliar environment where no known rules apply, the 
resulting reaction would be described as the use of knowledge-based behaviors.  To solve the 
problem, a mental model is created through a process of selection of different plans or 
objectives, followed by the testing of the effect of those plans or objectives through trial and 
error, and finally the review and assessment of the situation before further steps are taken.  
Knowledge-based behaviors have a tendency to be measured and cognitively challenging 
(Rasmussen, 1983).  A deck officer would experience this behavior if the same vessel 
encountered head-on goes to the starboard side (right side of the ship) instead of the 
recommended left side.  
Using the SRK framework, Lina, Shiangb, Chuangb, and Lioud (2014), studied the 
performance behaviors of the supervisor reactor operator (SRO), reactor operator (RO), and 
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assistant reactor operator (ARO) in an advanced main control room.  The findings of their 
research suggested that the ARO spent most of the time performing skill-based behaviors rather 
than rule- and knowledge-based behaviors (Lina et al., 2014).  The RO demonstrated no 
significant difference among all three behaviors, but did show a slight increase in use of rule-
based behaviors versus skill-based behaviors.  The SRO followed both the rule-based and the 
knowledge-based behaviors, which was the main source for the SRO’s problem-solving and 
decision-making cognitive workload (Lina et al., 2014).  The results of Lina et al.’s (2014) study 
seem as though they could be generalized and applied to what a deck officer on the bridge would 
experience when placed in similar situations.  For example, because both the SRO and the deck 
officer are the senior individuals on watch, when faced with an unfamiliar situation, they may 
engage in similar behavior responses.  Application of the SRK model shows how officers’ 
decisions are affected.  Therefore, examining additional theories related to decision making may 
further contribute to establishing a theoretical framework for the present study. 
Decision-Making Theory 
David Valentine Tiedeman first suggested the decision-making theory in 1963 in a 
publication of Career Development: Choice and Adjustment (Briddick & Briddick, 2008).  
Tiedeman’s theory was based upon Erikson's psychosocial theory that healthy ego development 
resulted from maintaining mastery of crises.  This allowed an individual to achieve a favorable 
view of the self, the larger world around, and eventually the world of work (Briddick & 
Briddick, 2008).  Traditional problem solving is usually done in a mechanical fashion from one 
stage to another using a set of rules such as a simplified generic four-stage approach of (a) 
defining the problem; (b) generating a course of action; (c) evaluating a proposed action; and (d) 
carrying out the action.  Although the majority of the research on problem solving uses well-
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defined goals, most real problems are ill-defined (Klein, 1998).  
Azuma, Daily, and Furmanski (2006) conducted a review of time-critical decision-
making models and cognitive processes.  Most decision-making models are based in the 
cognitive process as their underlying framework.  These theories focus on the cognitive process 
of human memory that has the capacity to encode information, store information, and retrieve 
information.  This memory has specialized subdivisions; short-term auditory working memory, 
visual iconic memory, and long-term memory.  Short-term auditory memory maintains mental 
information in a highly accessible state.  Yet, the auditory working memory has limitations of 
accessibility, specifically when the spatial, temporal, and effort-related characteristics of 
attention are also being utilized.  The short-term memory is considered a “temporary store where 
conscious, effortful (requiring attention) internal computations are performed” (Azuma et al., 
2006, p. 2). 
Azuma et al. (2006) studied eight models used by the military: (a) the OODA Loop 
model, (b) the kill chain model, (c) the triage model, (d) the SHOR model, (e) the rational 
decision-making model, (f) the control theory based model, (g) the naturalistic decision making 
model, and (h) the team-based model.  To be effective, the first model, the OODA Loop, must be 
expeditious and appropriate to the situation to achieve the desired effect.  The OODA Loop 
consists of: 
1. “Observation: take in observations of the overall situation; 
2. Orientation: make judgments of the situation to understand what it means; 
3. Decision; 
4. Action: execute and monitor the decision” (Azuma et al., 2006, p. 2). 
The benefit of the second decision-making model used by the military, the kill chain 
41 
 
model, is to reduce the time needed to complete the kill chain cycle, because if execution is too 
slow, then the kill chain will not work (Azuma et al., 2006).  The military also uses the triage 
model, which divides a problem into key questions to answer, such as goals and obstacles, 
familiarity with the situation, time, and effort required, and what is important (Azuma et al., 
2006).  This division of the problem assists the decision makers by providing relevant ways to 
think of the problem.  
A fourth model, the SHOR (Stimulus, Hypothesis, Option, and Response) model, is a 
non-linear, decision-making model (Azuma et al., 2006).  In this model, the decision maker is 
not forced to work in a particular cycle and repeat steps in a fixed order.  In contrast to the 
SHOR model, the rational decision-making model is dependent on a clear set of alternate 
choices, and their outcomes are predicted with a significant degree of confidence (Azuma et al., 
2006).  This model relies heavily on experience or past results to generate predicted outcomes.  
The rational decision-making model is objective “by establishing criteria, weighting them, and 
then choosing the best ‘score’ or highest utility” (Azuma et al., 2006, p. 4).  A variation of the 
rational decision-making model is the Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA), which 
formulates decision matrices and decision analyses (Azuma et al., 2006). 
Yet another model used by the military, the control theory based model is, in essence, 
when a decision maker reacts to signals rather than anticipating them (Azuma et al., 2006).  The 
control theory based process assumes that the environment provides some signals or information 
that must be sensed, then evaluated and compared against some desired state, so that relevance 
can be determined on whether to act or not.  In comparison to the control theory based model, the 
naturalistic model is also considered action-based, but is proactive rather than reactive (Azuma et 
al., 2006).  The assumption is that action and knowledge are linked and that knowledge results 
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from actions and then observation of the results.  There is no attempt to obtain the ideal or best 
solution; rather, if there is a mistake, the mistake can be rectified and refined later.  This model is 
different from all the other models in that it can be used on situations that are unique.  Finally, 
the team based model is less developed than the previous individual decision-making models.  
The tasks and applications require either decision making by a team or that the team members 
work in tight synchronization and interdependence (Azuma et al., 2006). 
Novice Decision Makers 
In addition to decision-making theories and models, an examination of the literature 
focusing on individuals new to the decision-making process is important to this study.  Chalko, 
Ebright, Patterson, and Urden (2004) conducted a study to identify human performance factors 
that characterized novice registered nurses.  The participants in their study were working within 
the first year after completion of a nursing program and were interviewed to examine near miss 
and adverse-event situations in acute care settings.  Chalko et al. interviewed 12 novice nurses 
using the Critical Decision Method (CDM), an interview technique based on the recognition-
primed decision-making model (Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 
1989).  Multiple discussions and reviews of cases resulted in nine themes being identified.  
Seven of the themes were present in at least seven of the eight cases, and included environmental 
and social issues, as well as novice lack of expertise.  The nine themes by Chalko et al. were: (a) 
clinically-focused critical thinking; (b) seeking assistance from experienced nurses; (c) 
knowledge of unit and workflow patterns; (d) first-time experiences; (e) time constraints; (f) 
hand-offs; (g) influence of peer pressure and social norms; (h) losing the big picture; and (i) 
novice assisting novice. 
Chalko et al. (2004) identified in each case that novice nurses reported some level of 
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critical thinking that guided their decision making and performance.  Nevertheless, the novice 
nurses’ critical thinking did not achieve a level to prevent the near-miss or adverse event, 
because of lack of adequate information to manage the total picture, time pressures that hindered 
prioritizing, or reasons suggested by the other themes identified in the cases.  In more than half 
of the cases, the nurses became so involved in trying to manage the situation that they lost the 
big picture and consequently missed important cues (Chalko et al., 2004).  These findings 
suggested that in order for novice nurses to be successful, expertise from experienced registered 
nurses should be readily available to advise and assist when the workload becomes unpredictable 
(Chalko et al., 2004).  Second, a social climate should exist with reasonable and realistic 
expectation regarding a novice nurse’s experience.  Third, the social climate should be extended 
to at least a year after the nurse’s graduation to facilitate a rapid transition in making error-free 
decisions.  There needs to be realistic expectations of novice decision-making ability during 
complex situations, and strategies to recognize and intervene when novices are at risk for error 
(Chalko et al., 2004). 
Gillespie and Paterson (2009) suggested that decision making by novice nurses has a 
tendency to be linear, based on limited knowledge and experience in the profession, and focused 
on single tasks or problems.  These novice decision makers tend to view decision making as 
responding to patient complaints and following protocols or documented care plans.  They lean 
toward doing rather than thinking and reflecting, and do not recognize or appreciate the 
relevance of deviations from the textbook in a clinical situation.  Gillespie and Patterson also 
suggested that when these novice nurses were confronted with complex or unfamiliar clinical 
situations, they frequently responded by drawing on theoretical knowledge and psychomotor 
skills.  These novices lacked confidence and relied excessively on more experienced nurses, thus 
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avoiding situations that required them to make decisions (Gillespie & Paterson, 2009). 
Gillespie and Paterson (2009) developed a framework for assisting novice nurses in 
developing their decision-making skills, and then applied the new framework in nursing 
education.  The situated clinical decision-making framework helped novice nurses reflect on the 
decisions they made in their clinical practice and develop features of expert clinicians.  The 
foundation of the decision-making framework has its basis in the situated learning theory and the 
premise that learning is social and is situated within a greater context.  Parts of Gillespie and 
Paterson’s framework include the context factors that influence clinical decision making about a 
situation as it comes into focus.  Foundational knowledge includes not just having prior 
knowledge, but acquisition of new knowledge and competencies, skills, and roles of nurses, into 
clinical decision making.  Gillespie and Paterson’s clinical decision-making process is comprised 
of: 
1. Cues in which processes are triggered by recognition of a cue from the patient; 
2. Judgment, defined as the best conclusion a nurse can reach at a point in time, given 
the information available;  
3. Decision(s) by determining a course of action, a phase that requires consideration of 
both what should be done and how that should occur; 
4. Evaluation, which assesses the outcomes as nurses consider the effectiveness of their 
decisions; and  
5. Thinking, which is considered the framework that makes a critical contribution of 
critical, systematic, creative, and anticipatory thinking to clinical decision making. 
In addition to nurses as novice decision makers, Amel (1995) conducted a two-part 
quantitative study on the decision-making processes of expert airplane pilots and on teaching 
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expert decision-making strategies to novice airplane pilots.  The purpose of Amel’s study was to 
examine the usefulness of the cognitive process theory in aviation and to link this theory to the 
training needs of pilots.  Amel’s findings suggested that the evidence is not clear regarding the 
independence of features within the decision-making situation.  However, expert decisions 
appeared to be one-dimensional in nature and cognitive categorization provided viable 
mechanisms in understanding the decision-making process.  Expert diversion decisions did not 
map equally on the risk scale, in that individuals overestimated or underestimated risk and 
assessment of consequences.  As for the novice pilot, Amel suggested, “that providing 
individuals with extra practice after demonstrated learning enhances retention especially for 
tasks which are not performed often” (p. 50). 
Still another study focusing on novice decision makers was an interpretive 
phenomenological study by Kosowski and Roberts (2003), conducted to discover, describe, and 
analyze the stories of 10 novice nurse practitioners who used intuition in clinical decision 
making.  Kosowski and Roberts considered intuition to be a component of complex judgment 
and understanding.  In the nursing field, intuition is considered a legitimate way of knowing and 
is related to empathy, nursing art, sustained nurse-patient relationships, and holism.  It is a means 
to make decisions, to act based on sudden awareness of knowledge related to previous 
experience (Kosowski & Roberts, 2003). 
From Kosowski and Roberts’s (2003) hermeneutic data analysis, six themes and 
constitutive processes were identified that had implications for nurse practitioner education and 
practice.  The first theme was Reflecting, in which the participants, while telling their stories, 
would look back and remember numerous details and a variety of dramatic sensations.  The 
second theme was Backing it Up, where the practitioners had a gut feeling but used additional 
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data to support their feeling.  The third was Knowing the Rules.  This theme was used when the 
practitioners acted on instinct but had additional information on which they still relied to follow 
the clinic’s rules and practices.  The fourth theme of Playing the Game was similar to Knowing 
the Rules except focused on how a practitioner interacts with doctors and other superiors.  This 
dynamic is important because nurses have not always been considered by physicians to have the 
same expertise as the doctor, yet it is the nurse who has frequent interaction with the patient and 
is usually the first to observe any abnormalities of a patient.  The fifth theme was Learning 
Lessons, where the participants used intuitive decision making that was either confirmed or 
obstructed by other colleagues.  The sixth theme mentioned in the results did not pertain to 
decision-making but instead focused on Taking Care, in which participants were taking personal 
care of themselves and their patients (Kosowski & Roberts, 2003).  
The study by Kosowski and Roberts (2003) focused on novice nurse practitioners with 
less than two and a half years of experience in their current positions; however, these participants 
had a mean average of 13 years of experience as registered nurses.  Nevertheless, they were 
considered novices because their roles were considered to be potential leaders, but their capacity 
for making decisions in their new positions had not fully developed (Kosowski & Roberts, 
2003).  One of the findings for education of nurse practitioners was that it should include 
experiences that provide opportunities to practice reflective dialogue, critical thinking, and 
intuitive decision making.  These important skills should be nurtured and modeled by faculty and 
clinical supervisors.  Kosowski and Roberts found that, “As their intuitive decision-making was 
repeatedly engaged and validated, their trust and confidence in intuition as a valid way of 
knowing evolved and grew stronger” (p. 68). 
Still focused on novice decision makers, an empirical descriptive study by Hoffman, 
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Aitken, and Duffield (2009) was conducted to determine if there were differences between 
novice and expert nurses in the range and type of cues selected, as well as how cues were 
clustered together when making clinical decisions while caring for post-operative patients in an 
Intensive Care Unit.  The research was part of a larger study to examine real world decision-
making processes and cues collected and used by novice and expert nurses while caring for 
patients who were being treated for post abdominal aortic aneurysm in an intensive care setting.  
The study involved four novice and four expert nurses.  The data collection used the think aloud 
process while participants cared for patients, followed by retrospective interviewing, which 
finally produced verbal protocols (Hoffman et al., 2009). 
The findings by Hoffman et al. (2009) identified several factors concerning the 
differences between expert and novice nurses.  The expert nurses appeared to use more proactive 
planning which could prevent problems, while novice nurses were more often reactive and thus 
made decisions after a problem had already occurred.  Expert nurses collected a wider range and 
twice as many cues as novice nurses and also clustered more cues together to identify patient 
status when making decisions.  Additionally, the expert nurses used more complex cue clusters 
than novice nurses.  Novices in a discipline often have a simpler depiction of situations, which 
may lead to a reliance on fewer cues, while experts collect a wider range of cues and have 
greater linkages between cues and concepts.  Experts hold chunks of domain-specific knowledge 
in the long term memory, which allows them to recognize a wide range of cues and patterns of 
cues (Hoffman et al., 2009).  
Emotions in Decision Making 
Experts and novices can also be compared in their emotions experienced during decision 
making, whether in a hospital, on a sailing vessel, or in a combat situation.  Cannon-Bowers and 
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Salas (1998) stated, “Modern combat scenarios are often characterized by rapidly evolving and 
changing conditions, severe time compression, and high degrees of ambiguity and uncertainty” 
(p.18).  They went on to state, “A variety of other stressors (both physical and psychological) 
also existed in the operational setting, not the least of which is the catastrophic costs of making 
an error, which mitigate against effective individual and group performance” (p.18).  Although 
novice decision makers such as junior officers are not usually put into modern combat 
environments, they are, nonetheless, put into situations that are just as complex, ill-defined, and 
time sensitive.  These situations could cause them significant stress when making decisions.  The 
question then becomes to what degree do emotions affect rational thought in a person’s decision 
making when decisions are made in difficult situations? 
Most of the research in decision making has focused on the cognitive and behavioral 
aspects (Kong-Hee, 2012; Lakomski & Evers, 2010).  Lakomski and Evers (2010) wrote a 
conceptual paper contending that emotions have a central role to play in rational decision making 
based upon recent research in neuroanatomy.  The theory of emotional decision does not focus 
on decisions as being emotional in themselves, rather that emotions have a proper place in the 
decision-making process.  Emotions are a source of motivation; emotions affect what a person 
regards as desirable.  The problem with emotions is that they fluctuate and change with each 
passing experience.  Emotions can render values inconsistent.  If individuals are given a situation 
with all alternatives equal, they may select a choice based upon how strongly they feel about the 
object or situation.  Life has a tendency to inflate emotions (Lakomski & Evers, 2010). 
Lakomski and Evers (2010) cited the neuroscience case study of Phineas Gage, who lived 
despite having a rod accidently blown through his lower jaw and out the top of his head.  After 
the accident, Gage was not the same man as before.  His personality changed, which made him 
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indifferent to others.  He showed no regard for social conventions and displayed poor decision-
making behaviors.  The damage was done to his ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is the 
underbelly of the frontal lobe directly behind the eyebrows.  The role of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex is to inhibit emotional responses and aid in the process of decision making.  
The same behaviors were also found in other patients with brain damage in the same area.  These 
individuals were impulsive.  They did not learn from their mistakes and made decisions that were 
not considered to be in their best interests.  Lakomski and Evers reported that neuroscientific 
evidence indicated the necessity of emotion in the process of reasoning and decision making, and 
when emotion was absent, rationality had been shown to break down.  Their findings suggested 
that the theory of emotional decisions was biologically more realistic than the traditional 
rationalist-cognitive model (Lakomski & Evers, 2010). 
Kong-Hee’s proposed affect and cognitive functions of strategic decision maker.  
Kong-Hee (2012) posited that emotions are the black box in strategic decision making, meaning 
they are considered the human mental functions that are a very complex integrative system of 
cognitive computation and affective perception.  Furthermore, he proposed a theoretical model to 
address how emotions affect the cognitive functions of strategic decision making.  Behavioral 
decision theorists have suggested that positive feelings lead to favorable evaluation of a situation 
or object, and negative feelings lead to unfavorable evaluations.  When it comes to an 
unconscious or automatic response to stimuli, emotions play an essential role within cognition.  
When formulating theory on emotions and strategic decision making, Kong-Hee considered 
“emotions as transient feelings or affective responses to an event, object, or person” (p.106).  
Kong-Hee differentiated between emotions and temperament such as happiness or grumpiness.   
Kong-Hee also differentiated emotions from moods, which are the presence or absence of a 
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feeling concerning an event or object.  Kong-Hee stated, “The structure of emotion is 
conceptualized fairly broadly but consistently: emotions as being characterized by a two-
dimensional structure (pleasant/positive to unpleasant/negative; activated/engaged to 
deactivated/disengaged).” (p. 106). 
The model that Kong-Hee (2012) proposed was the Affect and Cognitive Functions of 
Strategic Decision-Maker Mechanism, which consists of the following: 
1. Cognitive assimilation: The decision maker’s mental representation of strategic 
environment, such as mentally labeling a threat or opportunity; 
2. Emotional experience: The decision maker’s automatic and unconscious emotional 
experience, such as the intensity of positive and negative affectivity; 
3. Cognitive complexity: Mental capacity in perceiving options and processing 
information; 
4. Cognitive simplification behavior: Behavior in strategic information searching and 
processing, which includes anchoring, analogy, and referencing;  
5. Strategic decision comprehensiveness: The extent to which individual decision 
makers are exhaustive and inclusive in information processing, which may be 
considered analytical comprehensiveness, or integrative comprehensiveness. (Kong-
Hee, 2012. p. 107) 
Cognitive assimilation presupposes that a person’s decision-making experience, 
regardless of whether it comes from an external or internal environment, labels the experience as 
positive, such as an opportunity, or as negative, as in a threat.  Cognitive complexity assumes 
that cognitive assimilation has a tendency to increase cognitive simplification which reduces 
decision comprehensiveness.  Cognitive complexity moderates relationships between the 
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affective experience and the cognitive simplification.  This complexity suggests that “a decision 
maker with limited cognitive resources would be expected to engage in less analytical 
complexity under condition of emotional states” (Kong-Hee, 2012, p. 110).  From a training 
point of view, Kong-Hee suggested that it would be necessary to incorporate ways to reduce the 
emotional impact on decision making.  Simulation training would be useful by indirectly 
exposing diverse strategic circumstances to trainees in order to help them manage their emotions 
and mitigate the influence of emotions on their decision making (Kong-Hee, 2012). 
Goleman’s theory on emotional intelligence.  Emotions can get in the way of the 
working memory, which in turn, affects the ability to make decisions.  If a deck officer is fearful 
or anxious, then the potential for delayed decision-making or indecision is greater.  As such, 
especially in time-critical situations, the results could be disastrous.  Daniel Goleman (1995) 
devised a mixed model on Emotional Intelligence (EI) to explain and categorize people’s ability 
to recognize their own emotions, as well as the emotions of others, through a wide arrangement 
of competencies and skills.  According to Goleman, once individuals recognize weakness in 
areas of emotional competencies and skills, they can adopt strategies which assist them to 
improve their overall EI.  Goleman’s model featured five distinct constructs: 
1. Knowing one’s emotions; 
2. Managing emotions; 
3. Motivating oneself; 
4. Recognizing emotions in others; 
5. Handling relationships. 
Goleman’s (1995) first construct, knowing one’s emotions, means possessing self-
awareness of mood and the thoughts of moods.  To know one’s emotions means that in the midst 
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of turmoil, a person can internally step back and reflect on one’s behavior.  A person’s 
personality traits and past experiences typically determine where a person falls on the emotional 
awareness spectrum.  On one end of the spectrum are individuals who become so overwhelmed 
by their emotions that they may feel helpless and out of control.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, there are those individuals who are completely unaware of what they feel and who 
seem to lack passion about anything or anyone (Goleman, 1995). 
In his second construct, managing emotions, Goleman (1995) referred to a person’s 
ability to appropriately handle one’s emotions.  Life has its shares of joy, excitement, anger, 
sadness, and anxiety.  As a norm, the expression of extreme and intense feelings is rare.  
However, when these intense feelings overwhelm a person, how successfully that person handles 
these emotions determines how quickly a person returns to a normal emotional state (Goleman, 
1995).  Unexpected events can create what is called an emotional hijacking, in which intense or 
extreme emotions overwhelm a normal emotional response.  For example, when a driver is 
suddenly cut off by another driver on the highway, the first driver may experience a sudden 
increase in the degree of anger and anxiety.  The problem then becomes multiplied if not 
stemmed soon.  Due to the increase flood of hormone levels in the brain, such as cortisol and 
catecholamines, the persistent anxiety does not have time to settle down immediately, which 
continues to add to the previous hormone levels in place, thus creating an out-of-control event or 
cognitive incapacitation.  Catecholamines suppress activity in the frontal part of the brain that is 
concerned with STM, concentration, inhibition, and rational thought.  If faced with a similar 
instance of emotional hijacking, a mariner would need to engage in methods to decrease his or 
her emotional state such as taking deep breaths and muscle relaxation, going for a walk, or 
picking up the phone and asking the captain for help (Goleman, 1995).   
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Goleman’s (1995) third construct, motivating oneself, is being able to direct one’s 
emotions to be moving towards the mastery of a goal.  Individuals who are successful at this skill 
are more likely to be effective and highly productive in whatever they pursue.  There are those 
individuals who when taking a test, develop test anxiety.  This emotion paralyzes the brain.  
When emotions overwhelm concentration, the cognitive processes of WM are overwhelmed, 
which basically means a person cannot think effectively, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
success.  Conversely, the emotions of enthusiasm and self-confidence can enhance success.  Self-
confidence can be considered a feeling of one’s ability to achieve a goal (Goleman, 1995).  Self-
confidence is sometimes confused with self-efficacy in decision making, but Bandura (1997) 
suggested that there is a difference between self-confidence and self-efficacy:  
…the construct of self-efficacy differs from the colloquial term ‘confidence.’  Confidence 
is a nonspecific term that refers to strength of belief but does not necessarily specify what 
the certainty is about.  I can be supremely confident that I will fail at an endeavor.  
Perceived self-efficacy refers to belief in one's agentive capabilities that one can produce 
given levels of attainment.  A self-efficacy belief, therefore, includes both an affirmation 
of a capability level and the strength of that belief.  Confidence is a catchword rather than 
a construct embedded in a theoretical system. (p. 382) 
Goleman’s (1995) fourth construct, recognizing emotions in others, is the ability to 
recognize emotional upset in others and to demonstrate empathy for those individuals based on 
their emotions.  For example, researchers studying infants observed that they seem to share an 
emotional relationship with each other when they are hurt or sad (Geangu, Benga, Stahl, & 
Striano, 2011; Goleman, 1995; McGaha, Cummings, Lippard, & Dallas, 2011; Miller, 2011; 
Wittmer, 2012).  Specifically, one infant will mimic or respond similarly to another infant who is 
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crying.  Additionally, it has been observed that toddlers react empathetically when seeing 
another toddler in pain and will attempt to soothe the other’s pain or fears (Geangu et al., 2011; 
Goleman, 1995; McGaha et al., 2011; Miller, 2011; Wittmer, 2012).  Despite the existence of 
empathetic tendencies in young children, there are some adults who are devoid of empathy, 
which may result in the demonstration of sociopathic tendencies or the performance of acts of 
cruelty without remorse, and would make these individuals undesirable leaders.  Those adults 
with appropriate empathetic skills are better attuned to subtle social signals and emotional cues, 
which generally results in the making of a more caring professional or teacher (Goleman, 1995). 
Goleman’s (1995) final construct, handling relationships, is the ability to recognize other 
people’s emotions and manage them.  People who are adept in this skill make good leaders, and 
are usually popular.  Those who are not attuned to this skill are considered socially inept, 
awkward, and sometimes strange.  Being able to recognize and manage the emotions of others 
would be a valuable tool for the junior officer who works with a small team of people.  By being 
sensitive to verbal and nonverbal cues, the officer is able to recognize emotions in others and 
manage them to produce a successful outcome (Goleman, 1995).  
Self-Efficacy and Decision Making 
Moving from emotions in general, to a more specific examination of self-efficacy and its 
impact on decision making warrants a closer look at Bandura’s (1997) work and at the social 
cognitive theory.  The social cognitive theory has as one of its tenets the concept by Albert 
Bandura of self-efficacy (Miller, 2011; Ponton & Rhea, 2006).  Self-efficacy is defined as a 
person’s belief in his or her ability to succeed in specific situations.  It is believed that people 
generally avoid a task when their self-efficacy is low.  When self-efficacy is considered high, 
individuals believe they can achieve the task (Bandura, 2006).  Studies have observed that people 
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with low self-efficacy can become erratic and unpredictable when engaging in a task (Brown, 
1999; Bruce, Sachin, Srivastava, & Stellern, 2007; Ely & Sitzmann, 2011).  
People have little incentive to act or persevere in the face of difficulties unless they 
believe their actions will produce the desired effect.  Other reasons that serve as guides or 
motivators are rooted in the core belief that people have the power to effect change by their 
actions.  According to Bandura (2006), self-efficacy is the key to personal change and resource 
development.  Efficacy has an impact on cognitive, affective, motivational, and decision-making 
processes.  Self-efficacy determines whether an individual will think optimistically or 
pessimistically in self-enhancing or debilitating ways (Bandura, 2006). 
Feltz and Hepler (2012a) examined the relationship between self-efficacy and decision-
making speed and accuracy on a simulated sport task.  Their study was based on previous 
research that supported the link between self-efficacy and physical performance in sports.  They 
predicted that decision-making self-efficacy would significantly influence decisions with regard 
to speed and accuracy after controlling for past performances.  Their findings concluded that 
self-efficacy was a significant constant predictor of decision-making speed and that self-efficacy 
was beyond the influence of past performance (Feltz & Hepler, 2012a).  
Feltz and Hepler (2012b) also conducted research on heuristic, time-sensitive decision 
making and self-efficacy on the sports field.  Their findings suggested that when people made 
time-sensitive decisions, those decisions were not random but purposeful.  The study went on to 
suggest that self-efficacy was a significant and positive predictor of the time needed to make 
their first decision.  “In other words, participants with low self-efficacy took longer to make their 
decisions than those confident in their decision-making capabilities” (Feltz & Hepler, 2012b, p. 
160).  They recognized that their study had implications for pressure, dynamic conditions, and 
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risk allowance situations outside of the sports domain.  Feltz and Hepler suggested the medical 
field as an example where doctors and nurses with intuitive expertise perform better than other 
doctors and nurses of similar levels of experience (Feltz & Hepler, 2012b). 
Boscardin, O’Sullivan, Plant, Sliwka, and van Schaik (2011) conducted an analysis on 
four factors: (a) situation awareness (SA); (b) team management; (c) environment management; 
and (d) decision making.  Their findings suggested a positive correlation between self-efficacy in 
SA, environment management and overall performance of crisis resource management skills in 
residential doctors (Boscardin et al., 2011).  Nevertheless, they went on to say:  “We found 
correlation with performance for self-efficacy in situation awareness and environment 
management, but not for team management and decision making” (Boscardin et al., 2011, p. 
587).  Therefore, it is clear that self-efficacy assists with SA and environmental management but 
does not necessarily affect successful decision making.  The results of Bascardin et al.’s study 
would suggest that a deck officer with good self-efficacy could manage a complex and time 
pressured situation, but may not necessarily make a good or right decision.  
Heuristic Decision Making 
Self-efficacy is well defined and may be a factor in decision making.  Other decision-
making theories, such as natural decision making, also have well-defined characteristics like the 
Recognition Primed Decision model (RPD), which will be discussed later in this chapter.  In 
contrast, another type of decision-making theory, heuristic decision making, is lesser defined as a 
theory since because heuristic means to discover.  Heuristic decision making is a process, 
conscious or unconscious, that ignores some of the information, with the goal of making 
decisions quickly, frugally, and more accurately than other more complex methods (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011; Hoy & Tarter, 2010).  The term heuristic has its origins in ancient Greek, 
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meaning serving to find out or discover.  It can also be translated as looking around to guide the 
search for information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  The term frugal indicates the number 
of cues by which a heuristic search is measured.  Making a correct heuristic decision fast and 
frugally is only possible if one’s core capacities of experiences, knowledge, and skills are already 
in place.  
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) conducted a review of the four classes of heuristic 
methods.  The first class is recognition-based decisions, which is a class of heuristics that bases 
judgments on recognition of information only, ignoring other cues.  This includes fluency 
heuristic theory, which states that if both alternatives are recognized but one is recognized faster, 
then it is assumed that this alternative has the higher value with respect to the criterion.  The 
second class is the one-reason decision, which bases the judgment solely on one good reason, 
while ignoring all other cues (Hoy & Tarter, 2010).  One example described some police 
officers, professional burglars, and lay people who determined which of two residential 
properties was more likely to be burglarized.  The lay people needed to explore all the 
information while the two expert groups knew what was relevant, which was consistent with 
findings of the literature on expertise (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).   
The third class of heuristic decision making gives weight to all cues or alternatives 
equally.  For example, take-the-first heuristic means to choose the first alternative that comes to 
mind.  The trade-offs is a method of heuristics that differentiates all cues or alternatives equally 
and consequently makes some trade-offs.  The tallying method weights all cues equally, is 
simply counting the number of cues and favoring one alternative over another (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011).  Finally the fourth class of heuristic decision making relies on social 
information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).   
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At some point, heuristics became associated with errors, contrasted with logical and 
statistical rules, giving heuristics a negative connotation.  However, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
(2011) believed that “decisions by individuals and institutions, including business, medical, and 
legal decision-making, showed that heuristics can often be more accurate than complex ‘rational’ 
strategies” (p. 473) .  One of the key points was that “with sufficient experience, people learn to 
select proper heuristics from their adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 474).  
Although Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier discussed four classes of heuristic decision making, this 
type of decision making relies on one’s core capacities of experiences, knowledge, and skills 
already being in place (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  Junior officers have yet to develop 
these abilities.  Nevertheless, the intent of this chapter was to review the current literature on 
decision making in environments that are time sensitive, complex and ill defined. 
Wiggins and Boliwerk (2006) conducted a quantitative research project on the impact of 
heuristic-based approaches on the acquisition of task-related information in the selection of an 
optimal alternative during simulated in-flight decision making.  Their research cited a study by 
Prince, Hanel, and Salas (1993), which concluded that the differences between the heuristic 
strategies used by experienced versus those used by inexperienced pilots.  They found that pilots’ 
experience within an environment could alter the nature of their decision-making. 
Prince et al.’s (1993) study consisted of two stages.  The first stage provided participants 
with an opportunity to utilize each of three information acquisition strategies during a simulated 
in-flight decision-related task.  The intent of this stage was to establish a process of 
familiarization, rather than a process of training, which would allow participants using each of 
the information acquisition strategies to develop some degree of knowledge and skill pertaining 
to the performance of the activity (Wiggins & Boliwerk, 2006).  The second stage of the study 
59 
 
was to identify the extent to which pilot experience, license category, and performance during 
the familiarization scenarios predicted the selection of the optimal option in the choice scenario 
(Prince et al., 1993).  In addition, the second stage identified the extent to which pilot experience 
and their subjective perceptions of the strategies engaged during the familiarization scenarios 
predicted the selection of a particular strategy during the choice scenario (Wiggins & Boliwerk, 
2006). 
The participants consisted of 58 pilots, 47 men and 11 women (Prince et al., 1993).  They 
ranged between the ages of 18 and 66 years, with a mean age of 28 (SD = 12.23) years (Prince et 
al., 1993).  All of the pilots held a minimum of a private pilot's license.  Their mean total flying 
experience was 1150.65 hours (SD = 3806.17 hours); their mean time as pilot in command was 
997.38 hours (SD = 3735.59), and in the past 90 days they had a mean of 41.73 hours (SD = 
54.15 hours) flight experience (Wiggins & Boliwerk, 2006).  The findings suggested that task-
oriented experience, rather than information-acquisition strategies, predicted the selection of the 
optimal alternative.  Additionally, of the three strategies available, most participants preferred 
the elimination-by-aspects information-acquisition strategy.  The pilots preferred one particular 
approach to information acquisition.  In addition, the researchers also found that task-oriented 
experience, rather than the process of information acquisition, predicted task accuracy during the 
decision-making task (Wiggins & Boliwerk, 2006).  Wiggins and Boliwerk (2006) suggested that 
future research should examine “the impact of time constraints and increases in workload on the 
selection of optimal alternatives and will broaden the research into different domains, including 
medicine and policing” (p. 745). 
Naturalistic Decision Making 
Heuristic decision making is not the sole theory of decision making.  There have been 
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many traditional decision-making theories such as Mental Accounting, Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT), Elimination by Aspects (EBA), and Satisficing (Azuma et al., 2006; Grech, 
Horberry, & Koester, 2008).  Nevertheless, according to Grech et al. (2008) those theories have 
very little ecological validity or no real-world application.  One theory that has been studied for 
real world application is the naturalistic decision-making model (NDM).  This theory has been 
used and studied by the military, NASA, fire departments, healthcare providers, and the aviation 
field (Brezovic, Klein, & Thordsen, 1987; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989).  
The NDM theory considers how proficiently experienced individuals deal with ill-
structured issues in emergent situations, which are often in fast-paced environments, and how 
effective their decisions and consequences are to them and to their organizations (Klein, 1998).  
The foundation of the NDM theory for interpreting the on-the-spot decision-making process is 
the RPD model (Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989).  The RPD proposes that people 
can make quick, effective decisions when faced with difficult situations and choose the best 
solution from the wealth of practical knowledge they have acquired from their experience in the 
past (Nara, 2010).  RPD reveals a critical difference between experts and novices when they are 
presented with recurring situations.  Experienced officers, for example, should be able to come 
up with quicker decisions because the scenario may match a classical situation they have 
previously encountered (Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989).  
Nara (2010) used a qualitative research case study to examine the NDM theory and meta-
cognition.  Nara also employed the CDM interview technique.  The CDM is a type of structured 
interview technique used to obtain information from an expert decision maker while performing 
a task that is unusual, non-routine, during difficult situations otherwise known as critical 
incidents.  The findings suggested that the RPD model in the NDM theory was valuable for 
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interpreting the process of on-the-spot decision making of airline professionals.  The data 
showed that the decision-making styles followed the RPD model completely and that simulation 
exercise was an effective training method (Nara, 2010). 
A final finding in Nara’s (2010) study suggested that future training should strive to 
create more difficult conditions and stressful situations for on-the-spot decision making to 
encourage problem solving.  Nara also recommended that students should deal with two different 
problems simultaneously and solve those two problems in a very short time.  This type of 
training should improve a student’s intuition for problem solving onboard the aircraft (Nara, 
2010).  The study recognized the need for future research on how people experience their 
decision making, particularly “how a person reflects on the problem and other solutions while 
dealing with the problem” (Nara, 2010, p. 5).  
One specific application of the NDM theory surfaced in a fire situation.  Useem, Cook, 
and Sutton (2005) conducted a study that dissected the under-stress decision-making process of 
those in leadership positions with regard to a fire that took place on July 5-6, 1996, at Storm 
King Mountain, in the South Canyon, Montana.  The analysis considered 10 significant decisions 
that the incident commander, Donald Mackey, made.  Mackey parachuted into a fire zone as a 
crew member, and became the jumper-in-charge.  Then overnight, he assumed the duties of the 
multi-crew, firefighting incident commander.  The previous incident commander Butch Blanco, 
was the experienced incident commander, but he left the mountain on the night of July 5th.   
Blanco did not reestablish his authority when he returned the next day.  Tom Shepard, another 
experienced incident commander, arrived the following day but he neither took charge nor 
checked to determine who actually was in charge.   
As a result of this situation, 14 firefighters lost their lives (Useem et al., 2005).  It was 
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later discovered that five of the 10 decisions that had been made were optimal.  The others were 
considered less than optimal, suggesting that Mackey was underprepared and working under 
acute stress, while there was ongoing ambiguity of who was in authority.  Experienced incident 
commanders draw upon intuition that is built upon their lengthy experiences as practiced 
commanders and the feedback from what they have learned from those experiences.  This means 
that new firefighters striving to gain experience need to attend leadership training, take 
leadership assignments, and go on staff rides to help accelerate their acquisition of knowledge 
and experience (Useem et al., 2005). 
As a result of the South Canyon Mountain incident, federal laws were changed to set 
policy and procedure for establishing resources, training, and chain of command when directed 
to deal with multiple agencies.  An 80-hour Fire Leadership Development Program was 
established.  The curriculum included SA, decision making with an emphasis in managing 
personal stress, recognition of the error chain and interrupting that chain.  The training included 
field work review with an onsite walk through at the original site where the students develop an 
emotional connection and apperception for what previously happened.  The authors suggested 
that connecting with an event that arouses emotions, vividly and specifically, will have a greater 
impact on an individual's memory than an average event.  This emotion-arousing event will be 
more informative of one's future decisions (Useem et al., 2005). 
Experienced incident commanders understand the importance of SA, which is critical for 
effective and safe management of resources in dynamic, time-sensitive, and complex 
environments.  Incident commanders’ trainings are being adapted to focus on proper decision 
making and proper incident mitigation techniques, with the goals of reducing the risk to 
firefighters and decreasing municipal liability (Hall, 2010).  Computer-based simulations are 
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used to create realistic and dynamic virtual environments where the trainee can gain knowledge 
and experience without the associated safety hazards of live-fire incidents.  Hall (2010) 
conducted  a study to establish a statistical correlation between a computer-based simulation 
training program and increases in the decision making efficiency or accuracy of fire ground 
incident commanders using a  nonequivalent (pre-test and post-test) control-group design (Hall, 
2010).  Hall’s findings offered evidence for a positive correlation between the computer-based 
simulation training programs and the efficiency and accuracy of decision making of fire ground 
incident commanders in the simulated environment. 
Hall (2010) incorporated into his research the theory of NDM theory, which suggested a 
correlation between knowledge and experience gained from actual emergencies and that of 
realistic and dynamic simulations.  Experienced commanders look for familiar patterns to 
determine their initial goals, based upon past experiences in similar situations.  NDM strategies 
differ from traditional decision-making theory, because the traditional decision maker evaluates 
alternatives, while the naturalistic decision maker uses the initial information obtained through 
assessment processes and on-going situation awareness to achieve the most desirable option 
(Hall, 2010). 
NDM has been utilized and empirically studied by the Department of Defense, because it 
addresses decision making in an ill-defined, complex and time-sensitive situation.  Theories of 
decision making such as heuristics and NDM have primarily focused on individuals who have 
previous experiences from which to draw inferences in order to make what they believe is the 
correct or best decision.  The studies that have addressed novice decision makers were from the 
medical domain.  In most of those studies, the novice was under the instruction or supervision of 
an experienced decision maker.  Research conducted on emotional intelligence and self-efficacy 
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could potentially affect a junior officer’s decision making, but these topics have not been studied 
in the maritime domain.  The current study focused on a domain in which very little empirical 
research has been conducted.  This research examined novice decision makers when they make 
time-sensitive, critical decisions without the assistance of an immediate supervisor.  This study 
sought to shed additional light into a field of decision making and into a domain that would 
benefit from identifying what could be done to improve education and safety in shipboard 
operations. 
Related Literature 
The majority of decision-making studies have focused on areas outside the commercial 
maritime domain.  Studies that have been conducted in the maritime domain have focused on 
experienced decision-makers’ performance, the effectiveness of simulators, stress level of 
watchstanders, and the status of maritime education throughout the world.  This section discusses 
decision making and the differences between novice and expert decision makers.  Then, it 
reviews maritime literature as it relates to the research and maritime education. 
Black, Krieshok, and McKay (2009) conducted a literature review on current vocational 
decision making.  They observed that there was a paradigm shift in the field of vocational 
decision making.  Career decision making, which was primarily based on matching a person to a 
career, evolved into individuals adapting their career decisions based upon a changing global 
market.  Their focus was the application of judgment and decision making on an individual’s 
decision, primarily comparing the two-system models of decisional thought process of the role of 
non-conscious intuitive processes in decision making and a rational conscious process (Black et 
al., 2009).  
Black et al. (2009) concluded that both rational and intuitive processes seem dialectically 
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intertwined in effective decision making and that they were kept in check by the person’s 
occupational engagement, which means taking part in behaviors that contribute to the career 
decision.  However, making a decision from exclusively a rational or intuitive process may not 
be successful.   Black et al. proceeded to suggest decision making is not an exclusively rational 
practice, and that direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes is limited.  
Individuals rarely have all the relevant information when making a rational decision.  Because of 
its bias and ignoring the intuitive solution, the conscious rational thought would tend to over-
reach its bounds leading to a decision less suited to the given problem scenario.  Black et al. went 
on to state, “Clearly, there are many conditions under which conscious processing can lead to 
poor choices" (p. 282). 
In another area of decision-making research, Watson (2010) conducted a qualitative study 
using a grounded theory that studied secondary students’ decision-making processes and their 
perceptions of the relevance and reliability of those decisions.  The findings suggested that 
students consider reliability of a decision as directly related to how reliable their source of 
information was.  The metadata results indicated that the participants made pre-relevance 
judgments of information sources that were based on their preconceptions of the usefulness of 
that information.  In addition, Watson found that relevance decisions had a snowballing effect, in 
which one piece of relevant information led to another.  However, constantly looking back on 
previous decisions can lead to a maladaptive problem solving strategy.  Nevertheless, to the 
decision maker, a maladaptive problem-solving strategy may lead to a more acceptable outcome.  
One of the key findings of Watson’s study suggested, “The comparison of information in one 
source with that in another forms part of naturalistic decision-making and should be encouraged 
in information evaluation” (p. 12). 
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Differences Between Experienced and Novice Decision Makers 
A review of the literature identified some common themes about experienced or expert 
decision makers.  Experienced problem solvers are able to distinguish genuine anomalies from 
transient ones.  They can use mental simulation; however, it takes a fair amount of experience to 
contrast meaningful scenarios.  Experienced decision makers also develop new insights to a 
situation by drawing on prior experience and lessons learned from their mistakes.  They have an 
extensive bank or history of experiences from which to draw.  They are able to use leverage 
points, which are fragmented sequences or kernels of ideas, which allow them to formulate new 
solutions (Dane, Pratt, & Rockmann, 2012; Hall, 2010; Hoy & Tarter, 2010; Klein, 1998; Klein, 
2008; Klein et al., 1989; Randel & Pugh, 1996). 
A skilled decision maker knows how to depend on intuition.  Klein (1998) defined 
intuition as, “the use of experience to recognize key patterns in the dynamics of the situation” (p. 
31).  Experts are able to improvise, generate counter facts, explanations, and predictions that are 
inconsistent with the situation.  An experienced person: 
• Has learned not to over rely on the data;  
• Knows the limitations of existing skills and abilities;  
• Can perceive the invisible to seek fine discrimination, patterns;  
• Looks for cues, alternative perspectives, or missing events; and  
• Is able to envision the past, the future, and the process of managing decision making 
(Dane et al., 2012; Hall, 2010; Hoy & Tarter, 2010; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein 
et al., 1989; Randel & Pugh, 1996).  
The literature also described some common characteristics of novice or inexperienced 
decision makers.  Because of their of lack experience, they have a difficult time maintaining the 
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big picture and situation awareness when situations become complex, ill-defined, and time 
sensitive. Novice decision makers: 
• Cycle through different possibilities; 
• Are not able to detect patterns and anomalies;  
• Usually use the first course of action that they believe will work;  
• Have a tendency to use trial and error through their imagination (Brezovic et al., 
1987; Chalko et al., 2004; Dane et al., 2012; Gillespie & Paterson, 2009; Hall, 2010; 
Hoffman et al., 2009; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989; Kosowski & 
Roberts, 2003). 
Studies in Maritime Decision Making 
Chauvin, Clostermann, and Hoc (2008) conducted a quantitative study of 90 cadet 
officers in their sixth year of training at a French maritime academy.  The goal was to study the 
impact of SA in the decision-making process.  The study was conducted in six phases that 
included the use of a questionnaire and a bridge simulator.  The participants were briefed on the 
activities and were given short scenarios.  Then at specific points, the simulation was paused and 
the cadets were required to fill out the questionnaire (Chauvin et al., 2008). 
The findings in their Level 1 SA (perception of the elements in the environment) showed 
to be of lesser importance in decision making, and the statistical results did not provide any 
information that could explain the trainees’ decisions (Chauvin et al., 2008).  With Levels 2 and 
3 SA, the results suggested that 55% performed a maneuver that was against regulations, and 
34% did so in an unsafe manner.  Chauvin et al. (2008) also discovered that four different 
participant profiles had emerged.  The main difference between the profiles depended on: 
1. The distance at which they decided to change course; 
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2. The direction of this maneuver (port/left or starboard/right); 
3. The way in which they interpreted the other vessel’s intentions (is it going to change 
course?); 
4. Whether the trainees referred to the rules.  
Chauvin et al. (2008) suggested that the information from their study should inform 
maritime educators to rethink the training course.  They recommended putting more stress on 
recognizing prototypical situations, to acquire expertise through exercises that must allow them 
to define cue patterns, and to build schemata (Chauvin et al., 2008).  Chauvin et al. in discussing 
the limitations of their study, stated, 
This study is obviously incomplete because it was not possible to question the trainees 
several times on their SA.  It does, however, point out the importance, in the analysis of a 
situation and the decision making process, of the interpretation of the rules, the 
interpretation of the other vessel’s intentions, and the evaluation of an external risk. (p. 
20) 
Lin (2006) researched the decision-making process of senior officers when maneuvering 
the ship and whether or not they obeyed the rules of the regulations, and what were the reasons 
for navigational faults.  He wanted to know why a ship officer’s behavior contravenes the 
regulations, resulting in a collision.  The maritime goal is to stay out of the way of an 
approaching ship as far as possible. Therefore, if there are any failures by human actions or 
ship’s equipment, the possibility of a collision increases significantly due to late avoiding action 
(Lin, 2006). 
The participants were 40 qualified ship officers, including 10 master mariners, seven 
chief mates, and 23 senior mates (Lin, 2006).  Gender and nationality were not specified.  This 
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study ascertained that, although no collisions occurred, 17.5% of the total tracks in good 
visibility exercises had a Closest Point of Approach (CPA) of less than 0.2 miles, which were 
classified as near misses (Lin, 2006).  
Lin (2006) made several points in his conclusion.  One of the points he observed was, 
“…how ship officers make their decision to avoid collision is related to their personal 
characteristics” (p. 230).  Even when the officers had sufficient sea room, there were no 
obstacles within a large safety margin and early action or a large change of course was possible, 
subjects decided to avoid action, resulting in a CPA of less than one mile in all the exercises.  
Lin asked the following question: 
So why did their behavior contravene the regulations, resulting in a collision?  There 
must be an underlying reason why so many make these errors.  Besides, in addition to 
these incidents because of noncompliance with the regulations that resulted in a collision, 
obviously many more resulted in near misses. (p. 227) 
He then answered his question as follows:  
But some ship officers did not realize the regulations very well resulting in improper, and 
in some cases illegal behaviors.  Sometimes their behavior was illegal due to lack of 
discipline and care.  Some officers disobeyed regulations simply because in certain 
situations they considered the expediency of their action and disregarded the 
maneuvering behavior of the other mariners. (Lin, 2006, p.230) 
Lin’s (2006) research studied the decision making of experienced senior officers. His 
conclusion suggested that these officers made inappropriate maneuvers because of insufficient 
training, lack of discipline, or a blatant disregard of the rules.  Lin’s study with experienced 
officer decision making differs from this study, which focused on inexperienced junior officer 
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decision making.  One of the goals of this study was to reduce or prevent those behaviors 
displayed by the senior officers in Lin’s study.  
Fukushi et al. (2009) conducted a quantitative experimental research study measuring a 
ship navigator’s stress based on salivary amylase activity (SAA).  The study’s goals were (a) to 
confirm the efficiency of SAA index for the professional mates using a ship handling simulator 
and a real ship, and (b) to evaluate the cadet’s and the instructor’s stress using the SAA index 
together to confirm whether the SAA value is an efficient index for on-board training evaluation 
using a real ship.  
The participants were cadets who were senior students at Kobe University, Japan.  The 
subjects included 26 mates and 22 cadets.  No gender or race was given.  Fukushi et al.’s (2009) 
findings suggested that the SAA value increased in response to stressful situations during safe 
navigation.  Regardless, some captains showed little change at leaving a port.  Fukushi et al. also 
concluded that the cadets and mates demonstrated stress at the same time.  Fukushi et al. stated: 
The officer was under stress during the cadet’s real ship practice to keep safe navigation, 
and the cadet was also under stress during his responsibility for safe navigation while 
learning new and difficult navigational methods.  Perhaps, we can evaluate the cadet’s 
stress level by comparing it with the measured stress of the mate (instructor). (p. 302) 
Maritime education and training.  Prior to 1978, all standards of education and training 
were set by individual nations regardless of any existing practices in other countries.  In fact, 
many poor nations did not have any requirements for certification and education with regard to 
obtaining a license or rating.  This lack created situations for ship owners to hire mariners from 
poorer countries for lower wages in order to operate their vessels at a lower overall cost.  In turn, 
this cost-saving practice usually resulted in serious incidents that caused numerous deaths, loss 
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of cargo, and damage to the environment.  As a consequence of financial losses, many insurance 
and indemnity organizations demanded that nations set standards for certifying and educating 
mariners (Giziakis, Goulielmos, & Lathouraki, 2012; Sampson, 2004). 
The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, which became the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1982, under the aegis of the United Nations, set up 
a committee to establish international standards for mariner training and certification.  The 1978 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW) set minimum standards relating to training, certification, and watchkeeping for 
seafarers, which countries are obliged to meet or exceed.  The 1978 convention came into effect 
in 1984.  In 1995, an IMO committee, responding to criticism of both its ineffectiveness in 
training and its many vague phrases that could be misinterpreted by various countries, made 
major revisions to the original Convention.  In addition, the STCW 1995 amendments entered 
into effect in 1997 (Emad & Roth, 2008; Giziakis et al., 2012; Sampson, 2004; Wang & Zhang, 
2000).  Finally, to keep up with the latest technologies and developments in training, a second 
major revision took place in June 2010.  The Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention and 
Code included such changes as improved procedures to prevent fraudulent practices associated 
with certificates of competency, and procedures that strengthen the evaluation process, along 
with new requirements for training in leadership and teamwork (IMO, 2011; Implementation of 
the Amendments, 2013).   
It is the understanding of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) that STCW is a 
competency-based system.  This system achieves it goals by differing combinations of exposure 
to training and self-study.  Mariners may independently achieve their competencies while on 
board vessels; however, onboard assessments do not contain a training component beyond the 
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feedback needed by the new officers (Implementation of the Amendments, 2013). 
This increase in On the Job Training (OJT), permitted as an alternative to previously 
implemented policy on classroom training, has raised concerns in the industry because of 
possible degradation of the competence and proficiency of United States (U.S.) mariners.   
Furthermore, OJT may not always be practical for many vessels because of companies’ minimal 
manning practices/trends, and because senior officers or assessors may not have time to provide 
more OJT (Emad & Roth, 2008; Wang & Zhang, 2000).  The intent of the new regulations was 
to include in-service training and formal training (Implementation of the Amendments, 2013). 
The Coast Guard recognized concerns raised by public comments that shipboard factors, 
including reduced manning, higher mariner workload, and mariner fatigue issues, could make it a 
challenge for seafarers onboard vessels to train others.  The Coast Guard also recognized that not 
all STCW competencies, individual knowledge, understanding and proficiencies must be 
accomplished as part of structured training because there are areas where in-service experience 
may fulfill the competency requirement.  For these reasons, the Coast Guard reviewed the tables 
of competencies and identified the training topics that must be accomplished as part of approved 
formal training (Implementation of the Amendments, 2013. para 77872). 
The 46 CFR §11.309 (2014) required training for new officers in areas such as terrestrial 
and coastal navigation, electronic navigation, meteorology, cargo handling and stowage, 
stability, shiphandling and most importantly bridge resource management, leadership and 
teamwork, and watchkeeping.  The leadership and watchkeeping requirement usually requires 
three to four weeks of classroom instruction (Requirements for Officer Endorsements, 46 C.F.R. 
Part 11, 2014).  Even with all the required training and assessments, it has yet to be determined if 
this is enough for junior officers to be prepared to stand a bridge watch as the solitary officer and 
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decision maker on the bridge of a modern ship. 
Current research in maritime education.  Hontved, and Arnseth (2013) conducted a 
qualitative study using students training in a ship simulator.  The study examined issues 
concerning learning opportunities present while participating in professional practices and 
whether such practices may be simulated in sensible ways.  A group of students, together with a 
professional maritime pilot, enacted professional roles and simulated scenarios for learning to 
navigate.  They questioned how students’ enactment of professional roles and construction of 
relevant activity contexts in a ship simulator environment offered opportunities for learning and 
instruction (Hontvedt & Arnseth, 2013). 
This research was conducted at a Norwegian university and the participants were 
mariners in a nautical studies bachelor’s degree program.  The findings of the research 
demonstrated that structuring exchanges in the form of enacting professional roles and 
responding to a simulated activity scenario affected opportunities for the students to learn.  It was 
also shown that managing a credible role-play takes considerable effort and could come into 
conflict with other objectives for training, such as instruction and asking for help.  Hontvedt and 
Arnseth (2013) concluded, “This analysis has made salient some of the complexities of 
simulating, which may be useful for further research and developmental work on creating 
scenarios, considering fidelity, or facilitating simulator training in general” (p. 110). 
The study did posit itself in the socio-cultural learning perspective to examine not just the 
benefit of use of simulators in education, but also the provision of better learning opportunities in 
professional practices.  By using role-playing, members were given the chance to learn about 
themselves and the other professionals with whom they worked or interacted.  Role-playing in a 
simulator gave the participants opportunities to enact behaviors and actions that would otherwise 
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not be safe or appropriate onboard a real vessel.  This furnished the participants an occasion to 
play what if while learning from their failures and successes (Hontvedt & Arnseth, 2013).  
In another study looking at training, Emad and Roth (2008) conducted a qualitative case 
study on training and assessments in the maritime domain.  The study focused on a Canadian 
maritime institute for individuals moving from a formal education setting to an everyday work 
setting.  The study discussed the state of maritime education and training based on the STCW as 
amended in 1995.  Due to the human element in marine incidents, the standards were revised 
from the original 1978 standards to a new set of standards to be implemented in 1995 (IMO, 
1996).  These revised standards required new officers to demonstrate competencies prescribed in 
the STCW convention (Emad & Roth, 2008).   
The Emad and Roth (2008) study also reviewed why some members of the maritime 
industry attended college and why some did not.  While college education provided students a 
theoretical background and the knowledge base required to work onboard ships, it was not 
mandated to meet the required competencies and exams.  Still, some mariners find that they 
preferred to take college courses, because the exams involve difficult concepts such as 
mathematical calculation (Emad & Roth, 2008). 
Summary 
New junior officers should have been taught situation awareness in their watchkeeping 
classes.  However, situation awareness is a process that, according to Grech et al. (2008), 
involves a feedback loop with a sequence of perception, comprehension, and execution that 
drives the feedback loop.  Officers on watch must first be able to perceive the condition of all the 
vessels around them, the relationship of their vessel to any hazards, their vessel's operational 
condition, and the comprehension of those perceptions and executions of actions to avoid the 
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hazard or collision.  This process is an ongoing cycle of reassessing the situation and the 
environment.  New officers may not have the experience to recognize and react to a developing 
situation in a timely manner.  Recognizing shortcomings in human behavior and applying them 
to new or revised educational techniques may assist in reducing the high incidence of marine 
casualties (Emad & Roth, 2008; Giziakis et al., 2012; Iordanoaia, 2010; Wang & Zhang, 2000).  
Current theories with both heuristic and naturalistic decision making, as well as intuition 
all depend on experienced decision makers (Azuma et al., 2006; Dane et al., 2012; Hall, 2010; 
Hoy & Tarter, 2010; Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1989; Randel & Pugh, 1996).  
Because there are currently no studies to describe or understand the meaning in the decision 
making of junior officers, this would suggest a gap in the literature and need for further research.  
Conducting a study describing and understanding the decision making of these novice decision 
makers contributes knowledge and has implications for maritime educators and the maritime 
industry as a whole for maritime safety.  This chapter reviewed the literature essential for 
establishing a theoretical framework for this study.  The next chapter will describe the methods 
used to conduct the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS  
Overview 
This study is an inquiry into the decision-making process of inexperienced junior officers 
in a maritime simulator under adverse conditions, and how they describe their experiences.  The 
methods used, including observations and interviews, are common to hermeneutic 
phenomenological research (van Manen, 1990).  Once the data was gathered, it was analyzed for 
meaning and emerging themes (Cresswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994; van Manen, 1990).  The 
General Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (GSE) was included in the study to deepen and enrich the 
data for further description of the participants' experiences. 
Design 
This research was oriented towards individuals with a common experience, specifically 
deck officers who must make key decisions for the ongoing safe operation on their vessel.  This 
qualitative study employed hermeneutic phenomenology which included interpretation of the 
text of the interviews.  Hermeneutics is the art of reading a text so that the intention and meaning 
behind what is presented are fully understood (van Manen, 1990).  This description of 
experiences and their underlying dynamics, or structures that account for the experiences, 
provides a central theme that enables the reader to understand the substance and essence of the 
experience (Moustakas, 1994; van Manen, 1990).  
The philosophical assumption of the study was based upon an epistemological 
assumption, which suggests the researcher get close to the participants and gather data.  The data 
collected from the participants was considered subjective.  Therefore, given a special situation 
and environment, observation and inquiry was made based upon the description of the 
participants’ experience regarding how and why their decisions were made.  The experiences of 
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the participants were subjective, and this study sought to develop a theory or pattern of meaning 
from those experiences (Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994).  Furthermore, the study’s 
interpretive framework was social constructivism.  The objective was to understand and describe 
the decision making of junior officers.  Individuals had their own interpretation of the events, 
and because the participants' points of view were subjective, the goal was to generate a theme or 
identify a pattern within these interpretations (Creswell, 2013). 
Research Questions 
RQ1: While navigating their vessel, how do maritime junior watch officers describe their 
decision making process in an adverse situation?  
RQ2: What factors do participants identify as affecting (positively or negatively) their critical 
decision-making process? 
RQ3: What motivated the participant’s decision when choosing one solution over another?  
Setting 
This study was a field study conducted at a northeastern state-owned maritime academy 
that provides maritime education for individuals from around the globe seeking to enter the 
maritime profession and for professional mariners seeking to advance their careers.  The 
pseudonym of North East Maritime Academy was used to protect the identity and locale of the 
setting.  The university offers undergraduate and graduate degree programs as well as United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) approved courses (United States Coast Guard, 2014a).  The research 
required a facility with a state-of-the-art, high fidelity, full mission, ship-handling simulator 
using Transas NTPRO 5000 simulation software on Windows® 7 platforms.  To ensure the 
trustworthiness of this study, it was necessary that the research be conducted at a site having 
state-of-the-art equipment similar to the training facility where I work and with which I am 
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familiar. 
The state maritime academy’s organizational structure is similar to most universities.  It 
includes a president, provost and vice president for academic affairs, and department heads.  The 
exception is that students are organized into a pseudo-military structure consisting of cadets 
(students), a commandant (head) of cadets, and the organization of cadets into battalions, 
companies, and platoons.  The university has an enrollment of over 1,850 students, including 
1,250 members of the Regiment of Cadets.  
This study involved participants enrolled in an undergraduate course NAUT 416, which 
falls under the marine transportation department.  The chairperson of the department granted 
permission to conduct the study, to observe the participants from the control room, and to ask the 
participants if they wished to volunteer to be interviewed.  Many of the faculty were interested in 
the study and were willing to assist as needed. 
Participants 
 A study by Giziakis, Goulielmos, and Lathouraki (2012) identified that the majority of 
maritime incidents are due to the deck officer on the bridge.  The USCG (2005) determined that 
there are 204,835 mariners in the United States.  Of these, only 5,107 are considered junior 
watch officers.  These officers, whether coming up through the ranks or graduating from a 
maritime university, have minimal experience and possess only a few of the necessary skills for 
engaging in a decision-making position such as standing a bridge watch.  The data for this study 
was collected from 15 participants, who were junior watch officers attending the North East 
Maritime Academy.  Cresswell (2013) indicated acceptable sample sizes for this research design 
ranges from three to 15 individuals.  The maximum variation sampling method of the school’s 
population was used for this study.  Participants were recruited from students participating in 
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NAUT 416 who were in the process of completing their Officer-in-Charge of a Navigation 
Watch (OICNW) assessments (United States Coast Guard, 2014b; Servidio, 2014).  Upon 
completion of their class, the mariners were approached and asked if they would like to 
participate in this study.  The selection was based upon various U.S. maritime universities' 
demographics of deck officers and students.  Participation was voluntary. 
The USCG stated that they do not track the demographics of their maritime population 
(Dutra, L. M., personal communication, March 14, 2014).  The demographics for this study came 
from Collegedata.com, which lists demographics data for most universities and colleges in the 
U.S.  When reviewing the demographics of maritime universities, a cross-section of the maritime 
population was determined.  The population of the North East Maritime Academy is made up of 
89.3% males and 10.7% females, with ethnic representations of 4.4% Asian/Pacific, 0.1% 
Indian/Alaskan, 9.2% Hispanics, 4% Black, 74.1% Caucasians, and 7.9% unknown or did not 
report (“United States Merchant Marine,” 2014).  The participants were students attending 
classes at the North East Maritime Academy who were preparing for, or had already tested for 
third officer.  The goal was to understand the experiences of 15 participants, an appropriate 
sample size for phenomenology according to Cresswell (2013).  Of those participants, there were 
14 males and one female.  The ethnicity of the participants was one Asian/Pacific, two Black, 
and 12 Caucasians.  The participants came from a variety of social-economic backgrounds and 
cultures.  It took three weeks to collect data from a sufficient number of participants for this 
study. 
Procedures 
The first step in this study was to secure Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from 
Liberty University and the participating academy (see Appendix A).  Upon approval, the 
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research was conducted at the appropriate time in the maritime course, when the participants 
were conducting Puget Sound Exercises 2 and 3 (see Appendix B).  The participants were 
exposed to over 11 simulations in this class.  Because the intent of the study was to observe and 
describe novice decision makers, I chose to observe the behaviors in the earlier simulation 
exercises.  Frequent exposure to problem solving scenarios would create in the participants a 
behavior to treat simulation like a game rather than a possible real life experience, perhaps 
affecting the results, so earlier experiences were chosen.     
Knowing the technical requirements for the setting of this study, a colleague 
recommended the chosen site.  I contacted the North East Maritime Academy and provided 
copies of all necessary documents to the administration, department chair, and instructors.  With 
permission from all these, I conducted a passive observation of the class’s simulation exercises 
from an observation booth, to prevent the presence of a stranger influencing students’ behaviors 
during the simulation exercises.  At this point I had no direct interaction with the students.  I 
utilized the Observational Protocol Form (see Appendix C) to note significant events such as 
collisions or groundings, along with personal thoughts, opinions, and student activity.  Specific 
activity notes focused on decisions that were made or were neglected to be made, and verbal and 
non-verbal activity.  After the simulation exercise, as arranged with the academy, I approached 
the students and requested volunteers to be interviewed.  The gift of a $20 Visa card was offered 
to each interviewee.  
I selected 15 participants from among those who volunteered.  Every effort was made to 
have a cross section of volunteers utilizing the maximum variation sampling method of the 
school’s population (Maykut & Morehouse, 2000; “SUNY Maritime Academy,” 2014).  I 
explained both the purpose of the research and the consent form provided to each participant and 
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clarified information to address any questions posed.  When the participants signed the form 
indicating both consent to participate and understanding of monetary compensation (see 
Appendix D), the GSE was administered (see Appendix E).  Self-efficacy is a person’s belief in 
one’s own ability to succeed in specific situations; therefore, the GSE was used to identify 
whether or not there was a connection between the participant’s performance, self-efficacy, and 
decision making as suggested by previous research (Bandura, 2006; Brown, 1999; Bruce, Sachin, 
Srivastava, & Stellern, 2007; Ely & Sitzmann, 2011).   
Finally, I interviewed each participant in person, using the questions listed in Appendix 
F.  The interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed by a professional transcriptionist.  
During the interviews, I used a journal to record personal thoughts and opinions (see Appendix 
G).  The use of the journal was to help me maintain a distance from the participants’ experience, 
to remain as transparent as possible, and to set aside the researcher’s own “prejudgments, biases, 
and preconceived ideas about things” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 85).  
For data analysis I used a coding method of the statements that were analyzed and 
reduced to key themes.  All data and files were stored on a password-protected computer.  Files 
were encrypted, backed-up, and stored in a securely locked file cabinet in the researcher’s office.  
They will remain secured until they are destroyed following the culmination of the dissertation 
and the time required by the IRB. 
The Researcher's Role 
The researcher was the vice president of academics at a southeastern Virginia maritime 
training facility, which is unaffiliated with the research site for this study, and had served over 40 
years in both the Navy and the commercial maritime industry.  For more than 12 years, I have 
taught mariners at all levels of experience.  During this time my interest in human behavior and 
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particularly the decision-making process has grown.  Having been involved with students for 
many years, helping them achieve and exceed their expected levels of proficiency was a role that 
I sought to achieve.  I believe that positive interactions with my students could have lasting, far-
reaching implications. 
My professional responsibilities as vice president included directing and assisting in the 
creation of new courses and programs and maintaining accreditation of the school and of select 
programs.  With 95% of the school's curriculum requiring USCG certification, the continual 
recognition of this organization is of utmost importance.  Additional responsibilities involved 
maintaining the integrity of the curriculum and ensuring instructor certification while providing 
ongoing instructor education.  My administrative duties also included working with other entities 
for recognition and accreditations including the American Council on Education (ACE) and an 
international organization, Det Norske Veritas (DNV).  Interaction with students was limited as 
my primary interactions revolved around staff, instructors, and organizations outside of the 
school. 
While still employed at sea and during my time off, I earned a Master of Arts degree in 
professional counseling.  It was during my internship and interactions with clients that my 
understanding of peoples’ non-verbal communication deepened.  While I was teaching full time, 
it became obvious when students were struggling with a subject area or were stressed during a 
simulation exercise.  The most frequent student behaviors that I observed included failing to 
notify the captain when it was appropriate, or just freezing up.  I never fully understood why this 
was happening.  What is now apparent to me is that many incidents involving junior officers 
occurred because they repeatedly failed to notify the captain and made wrong decisions 
autonomously. 
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While operating a vessel, I have never made a critical decision which adversely affected 
the safety of that vessel or the lives of crew members or passengers onboard.  However, like 
most people, I have made errors in judgment.  Because of these experiences, I am better able to 
understand the thinking and the emotions that many students describe.  These experiences were 
important as I inquired into the phenomenon of new officers’ decision making and how they 
described their experiences.  I was able to take their experiences and formulate them into 
identifiable themes and patterns.  From there, as an educator, I was able to articulate the meaning 
to my peers for further discussions and transfer this understanding for possible realignment or 
revisions to the curriculum for the benefit of future students.  Due to my position and the 
potential influence and relationship with students, the study was conducted at another school 
located in a state different from my own.  This school had no affiliation with my place of 
employment.  Being an invited guest of the maritime academy, I had no influence or relationship 
with any of the participants.  
Data Collection 
Observations 
The researcher did not participate as an instructor during the simulated activities central 
to this study.  Instead I was an observer in the simulator control room, taking reflective notes 
using an observational protocol (see Appendix C).  By using passive observations of the 
participants, I reduced the possibility of participants reacting in a certain way or changing their 
behavior due to awareness of being observed.  The exercises occurred on a pre-determined 
schedule, and the instructor notified the researcher when the students would be in the simulator.  
The instructor did inform the students that there was an inconspicuous camera mounted in the 
rear portion of the simulator, permitting the instructor to view participants’ performance during 
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their first simulation exercise.  Prior to the study, the participants had already participated in two 
exercises in the simulator.  It was usually by this period that the participants were accustomed to 
and complacent about being observed.  The instructor took notes of participants' errors of 
judgment and whether they were committed by omission or by commission.  The determination 
of the effectiveness of participants during their assessment was subjective.  The instructor 
recorded the events for later debriefing in the classroom.  The researcher was a passive observer 
at the simulation control station, where there were displays with video and audio feeds from the 
simulation bridges.  I made notes focusing on those errors of judgment and concurrent behaviors, 
whether verbal or non-verbal that were made throughout the exercise. 
Decision-Making Performance Task 
The normal procedure for the simulator activities was for the instructor to brief the 
student on the simulator controls and to discuss the requirements as set forth in the assessment.  
The visual system of the simulator produced a seascape of 240 degrees in a horizontal view and 
40 degrees in a vertical view.  Visualization of the ship’s simulator-produced movement led to 
physical reactions mimicking those seen with true ship motion, including body swaying, and 
even vertigo (seasickness) among students.  The simulated bridge had consoles, controls, and 
displays replicating the equipment used on actual vessels.  The bridge team consisted of a mate, a 
navigator, a radar operator, and a helmsman.  For this study, the observations focused solely on 
the mate on watch, and did not focus on the navigator, radar operator, or the helmsman  
Some students were assigned both Exercise 2 and Exercise 3 from the course syllabus 
(see Appendix B).  Although there was a navigator, radar operator, and the helmsman on the 
bridge, I observed the lone officer on watch making decisions on the safe navigation of the 
vessel.  This junior officer was in control of the vessel for one hour.  During the students’ time in 
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the simulator, the course instructor evaluated activity as each student encountered various events 
including estimating times of arrival, safe navigation of a the channel, giving helm orders to the 
helmsman, coordinating traffic avoidance with the radar operator, and maintaining awareness of 
changing weather conditions.  The instructor’s assessment of the student’s success was 
subjective.  However, if the student failed to follow the captain's standing orders, failed to 
communicate or used inappropriate communication, or caused a critical incident such as a 
collision or grounding, such events caused a student to fail the exercise.  Even with a critical 
incident of a grounding or collision, the student could still pass the assessment if the student used 
the checklist for dealing with the emergency. 
Surveys/Questionnaires 
After selecting participants from those students who volunteered and obtaining their 
informed consent, I provided a copy of the GSE (see Appendix E) for each participant to 
complete.  The questionnaire was used for descriptive purposes to examine if high self-efficacy 
or low self-efficacy had some influence on the participants’ decision making while engaged in 
the simulation.   Previous literature (Bandura, 2006; Brown, 1999; Bruce et al., 2007; Ely & 
Sitzmann, 2011; Lanigan, 2008; Norton, 2013) suggested that low self-efficacy could result in a 
failure to act or in an increased reaction time needed in a given situation. 
The GSE is a self-reporting measure that was created to assess a general sense of 
perceived self-efficacy with the aim of predicting ability to cope with daily complexities and 
adapting behavior after experiencing various kinds of stressful life events (Schwarzer, 2008).  
The scoring of the responses was made on a four-point Likert-type scale.  The scoring range was 
from 10 to 40 points.  The responses were calculated from a sum score with 30 points being the 
cut-off score used to establish low self-efficacy.  Schwarzer (2008) stated that on average, the 
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time required to complete the GSE was four minutes.  
Schwarzer (2011) reported a correlation between self-efficacy and other personality traits 
such as failure of action orientation (r = 0.43), decision or action orientation (r = 0.49), and hope 
for success (r = 0.46).  The sample was derived from 180 university students.  The correlations 
were considered highly significant.  Test items referred to successful coping and implied an 
internal-stable attribution of success.  The test samples came from 23 nations.  Cronbach’s alphas 
ranged from .76 to .90, with the majority in the high .80s (Schwarzer, 2008).  Schwarzer (2008) 
indicated that the scale is unidimensional, and the “Criterion-related validity is documented in 
numerous correlation studies where positive coefficients were found with favorable emotions, 
dispositional optimism, and work satisfaction” (para 10).  Schwarzer (2011) stated:  
You do not need our explicit permission to utilize the scale in your research studies. We 
hereby grant you permission to use and reproduce the General Self-Efficacy Scale for 
your study, given that appropriate recognition of the source of the scale is made in the 
write up of your study. (p. 1) 
The GSE score reflected whether or not an individual had good self-efficacy.  According 
to Bandura (2006), those participants with a high self-efficacy would believe that they could 
perform their duties and make appropriate decisions regardless of the circumstance.  The reverse 
should also be true; if participants score low on the scale, then this suggests they have low self-
efficacy and may not make decisions as effectively or efficiently (Bandura, 2006; Brown, 1999; 
Bruce et al., 2007; Ely & Sitzmann, 2011; Norton, 2013).  Therefore, junior officers may not feel 
confident about their performance or decisions if their GSE score was below 30.  The goal of this 
research was to use the observations of the participants in the simulator, the GSE score, and the 
interview descriptions to examine consistency between actual performance and their perception 
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of their self-efficacy (Lanigan, 2008).  Additionally, the GSE score was used to enhance those 
parts that were revealed from the interviews about how the participants described their 
expediencies, thoughts, feelings, and decisions that were made.   
Interviews 
Upon completion of the simulator class, I contacted all potential participants in person 
and asked them if they would be interested in participating.  For those who agreed, a time and 
place was arranged for the interviews.  The participants were asked to read and sign a consent 
form before any interview was conducted.  The interviews were audiotaped and transcribed 
verbatim by a professional transcriber for later analysis by the researcher.  Open-ended 
interviews, lasting between 30 and 120 minutes, utilizing the following questions, were 
conducted with the participants (see Appendix F):  
1. Describe your experience in the simulator scenarios?  
2. Describe how you felt about the decision(s) you made in the simulator.  
3. What rule or procedure was in your thought process that led you to a particular 
decision?  
4. How confident were you in your decision making and why? 
5. Referring to other traffic that they made a maneuver for: Was the other ship’s action 
correct under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS)? If you disagree with what the other ship did, why do you think they did 
it?  
6. What alternatives did you have? 
7. If you missed a piece of useful information, why?  
8. Would you do it differently if faced with the same situation again? If so, what would 
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you do and why?  
9. What do you think it means to miss a critical decision?  
10. What factors do you think contribute to a good or bad decision? 
11. Why do you think officers on the bridge make good or bad decisions? 
12. What do you think would help you make better decisions?  
I developed the interview questions to specifically elicit information related to the three 
research questions guiding this study.  Before conducting the interviews, I asked three 
individuals to review the list of questions, to avoid having questions that seemed biased or 
leading, and for feedback that the wording would elicit the information intended, enhancing 
reliability.  The three people reviewing the questions were the chair of my dissertation 
committee, the research consultant assigned to this study, both familiar with sound research 
practices, and a colleague in the maritime field, familiar with the issues being explored in this 
study.  As listed in Appendix F, questions one and two were related to RQ1 in that the participant 
was describing the experience in both thoughts and feelings.  Questions three, six, seven, nine, 
10 and 12 were related to RQ2.  Because the decision had the potential of being correct, the 
researcher was seeking what the participants understood about the events that made their 
decision legitimate.  Questions four, five, eight and 11 were related to RQ3 because they delved 
further into how the participants saw themselves and how they could have done better.  
Reflection allowed the students to review the events to ascertain what they could have done 
differently and how they may do better the next time.  The participants’ feedback was helpful in 
formulating improvement to the curriculum. 
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Data Analysis 
Scoring 
The initial step in data analysis was to total the scores from the GSE of the participants to 
determine either high or low self-efficacy.  According to Schwarzer (2008), a score over 30 is 
considered high self-efficacy.  The questionnaire was used to identify whether any connection 
between the participant’s performance, level of self-efficacy and decision making existed, as 
other studies suggested (Bandura, 2006; Brown, 1999; Bruce et al., 2007; Ely & Sitzmann, 2011; 
Norton 2013).  
Categorizing 
In the second step in data analysis, I categorized into themes the in-depth description of 
events from the observation.  My observation notes included information from non-verbal 
behavior; interactions with others; emotions; and statements, or lack thereof, in terms of 
communication.  These observation data included reflective notes that were used for bracketing 
the researcher’s biases from the observations.  The observations and reflective notes were 
integrated with the interview transcripts as a comparison of the participants’ description and how 
they actually performed in the simulator (Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994). 
For the next step I read the interview transcripts for overall understanding while making 
notations of every expression relevant to the experience in the process.  Then, I listed and 
identified significant statements through a process known as horizontalization of the data.  The 
significant statements were based upon how the participant had perceived the decision-making 
experience.   
Coding 
I utilized the NVIVO 10 software in assisting with the analysis of data from the 
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observations, personal notes, interviews and questionnaires.  I looked for patterns, repeated 
words or phrases or even stark contrasts, and I assigned the significant statements a heuristic 
code.  During this process, I was constantly comparing data applicable to each code noting 
emerging categories or noting new data fitting into existing categories.  Glaser (2008) identified 
this data analysis method as the constant comparative method of qualitative analysis.   
I reviewed the evaluation of the statements and the coding nine times, first creating a list 
of significant statements, and then reducing that list to eliminate overlapping significant 
statements (Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994).  Bogdan and Biklen (2007) considered analysis 
of the data a process of reduction.  The objective of the coding analysis was to come up with 30 
to 50 different codes and reduce them.  The recommended process required at least eight passes 
of analysis of the data.  The first pass was considered the excitement period.  The second through 
third passes were the enlightenment period.  The fourth through sixth passes were found to be 
when the researcher became overwhelmed with the information.  The seventh pass was identified 
as an indecisive period; however, the coding data was fixed with no more additions or 
subtractions.  The eighth and ninth passes were the analysis stage and the dissertation reporting 
phase when I was able to provide my own insights and expert opinion of the data.  Bogdan and 
Biklen suggested the following codes be used:  
1. General statements the participants make describing a subject, setting, etc.; 
2. Data that tell you how participants define the setting or topic; 
3. Ways of thinking that are not in a general way that affect all or some of the participants; 
4. The participants' understanding of objects that make up their world; 
5. Codes dealing with contradictions in the participants’ stories or information; 
6. Tactics or methods used to accomplish or resolve the issue or task; 
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7. Codes of the participants’ behavior; 
8. Words and phrases of the participants telling a sequence of events, changes over time, 
passage from one thing to another.   
The next major step was to formulate meaning from each of the significant statements 
and discern the meaning by reflecting on the verbatim statements.  I identified meaning units, 
which clustered to create themes.  These themes were verified for their essential or incidental 
nature through a process of free imaginative variation.  Then, I asked questions about the data 
such as: Was the phenomenon still the same as imagined?  If it was not, then it was deleted, or 
the theme was changed (Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994).  The final major step was to create a 
composite textural and structural description of the phenomena.  Then I developed a composite 
description of the essence of the experience that represented the group (Creswell, 2013; 
Moustakas, 1994). 
Trustworthiness 
Negative Cases and Field Notes  
To maintain trustworthiness of this study, I utilized techniques such as identifying 
negative cases and keeping field notes.  I did identify negative cases revealing contrary data, 
which alleviated the possibility of presumptions by the researcher (Creswell, 2013).  I kept field 
notes during the observations, which allowed for accurate retrieval of all information with non-
verbal behaviors, interactions, and decisions that were made (see Appendix G).  These notes 
were also used during the interviews to check for accuracy between the observer and the 
interviewee.  The notes were used during the data analysis for determining accuracy or 
contradictions between the descriptions of the participants’ experience, what was observed, and 
what the participants did or said (Creswell, 2013).  
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Bracketing 
According to Newman and Tufford (2010), “Bracketing is a method used by some 
researchers to mitigate the potential deleterious effects of unacknowledged preconceptions 
related to the research and thereby to increase the rigor of the project” (p. 81).  I did attempt to 
bracket presuppositions and experiences, which were set aside during the study (see Appendix 
G).  Setting aside particular points of view and or biases on the subject allowed me to view in a 
more objective manner the data collected.  It was important that I continued to suspend 
throughout the study my personal experiences with maritime courses and educational programs 
so that meaningful data could be collected (Chan, Fung, & Chien, 2013; Creswell, 2013; 
Newman & Tufford, 2010). 
A practice that helped bracket my biases was memoing.  Chan et al. (2013) suggested, 
“Reflexivity is the key thinking activity that helps us to identify the potential influence 
throughout the research process” (p. 3).  I wrote memos to record reflective notes that included 
comments pertaining to my feelings, perceptions, and subject matter previously learned.  
Memoing was used during the observations and the interviews (see Appendix G).  During data 
analysis, I used the memoing notes for reflection on how my perceptions and the perceptions of 
the participants compared or contrasted (Chan et al., 2013; Creswell, 2013; Newman & Tufford, 
2010).  
Triangulation  
Triangulation is a method that uses two or more methods in a study in order to create 
trustworthiness of the results (Creswell, 2013).  For this study, I triangulated information from 
the observations and field notes, the GSE scores, and the interviews to document intent and 
support the various themes.  By combining the observations, the GSE scores, and the interviews, 
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I was able to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases that come from a single method. 
Member Checking  
The participants reviewed the transcripts of their interview statements.  This provided the 
interviewees an opportunity to check statements for completeness and accuracy.  The member 
checks, therefore, helped ensure the accuracy of their statements while safeguarding that my 
personal biases were bracketed out of the data.  This process promoted the reliability of the study 
and reflected what was stated and intended.  To accurately portray the participants’ comments 
was of utmost importance.  An additional advantage to conducting member checking was that it 
gave the participants a feeling that they were also stakeholders in the study (Creswell, 2013). 
Peer Review  
Colleagues from Liberty University were asked to conduct a peer review or debrief of the 
entire process.  The research consultant, a member of the university, provided an opposing 
opinion, in which he critiqued the meanings and interpretations of the study.  This peer review 
was intended to keep the researcher honest and provided an external check of the research 
process (Creswell, 2013). 
Ethical Considerations 
Because I was the head of academics at a training center in Virginia, had I conducted the 
research at that site, participants may have voiced concern regarding whether the researcher had 
the ability to alter the grades of participants.  This predicament created a power issue.  Because 
the researcher’s position had the potential to interfere with the trustworthiness of the study, the 
research was conducted at another school site.  I was not an instructor of the selected class, 
which helped avoid the potential perception by the participants that if they did not participate in 
the study, their grades would be affected in some fashion.  Furthermore, I was not visible during 
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the simulator exercises, but as an observer remained out of sight of the participants when they 
were in the simulator control room.  In addition, I clearly explained before the interviews that 
participation in the study would not have any impact on their grades (Creswell, 2013). 
To insure confidentiality, participants’ actual names were not used.  Furthermore, all 
interviews, videos and tape recordings were kept confidential and secure.  All observational 
notes and written data were kept on a computer, which was encrypted.  The written notes were 
immediately shredded once they were transcribed electronically.  Any recorded data or personal 
information was also kept on a computer and encrypted with a password.  This information was 
backed up to a DVD and stored in a locked file cabinet (Creswell, 2013). 
Summary 
This chapter presented the identification of the participants as well as the methods used 
for data collection and analysis.  The study required a school that had both a student population 
comparable to that of the maritime industry and a state-of-the-art simulator in which to 
accurately evaluate decision making as though the experiences were happening on a real ship.  
To collect the data I utilized observations, questionnaires, and interviews with the participants.  
For data analysis I used a coding method of the statements that were analyzed and reduced to 
key themes.  To ensure the trustworthiness, the study utilized field notes, bracketing, 
triangulation, member checking, and peer review.  Finally, the participants’ private information 
and personal data were protected with the highest possible security.  In the next chapter, 
discussion will focus on the findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS  
Overview  
The research study reported here examined the problem that human error accounts for as 
much as 80% of maritime incidents.  The purpose of this study was to describe the decision-
making process of maritime junior watch officers navigating a vessel in adverse situations on a 
high-resolution, full mission bridge simulator.  This chapter presents an analysis of the 
participants.  The rest of the chapter is organized in themes derived from the three research 
questions posed in Chapter One.  It first reports how the participants described their experience 
with the situations presented and how well they understood the reasons for the decisions they 
made.  It then reports factors participants identified as affecting, either positively or negatively, 
their decision-making process.  Finally, it reports what motivated the participant’s decision when 
choosing one solution over another. 
Participants  
The following is an individual descriptive synopsis of the participants in this study (see 
Table 1).  All names provided in this study were pseudonyms assigned to protect the identity of 
the participants.  These individuals were in their senior year as a cadet at the participating 
university.  This study was conducted as part of a course that was the capstone class each 
participant had to pass prior to graduation.  The ages of the participants ranged from 21 to 26 
years.  Of those participants, there were 14 males and one female.  The ethnicity of the 
participants were: one Asian/Pacific, two Black, and 12 Caucasian.  The participants came from 
a variety of social-economic backgrounds and cultures. 
The simulator experience required the participants to safely navigate an 870-foot 
container ship with a deadweight of about 60,000 long tons through the Puget Sound passage at  
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Table 1  
Overview of the Participants 
Pseudonym Age Gender Race Home of Origin Completed  Simulation 
GSE  
Scores 
          
Alan 24 Male Caucasian Long Island, NY S 38 H 
Ben 24 Male Caucasian Long Island, NY S 36 H 
Carl 22 Male Caucasian U.S. U 31 H 
Diane 22 Female Black Jamaica U 24 L 
Edward 22 Male Caucasian U.S. U 29 L 
Frank 21 Male Caucasian Long Island, NY S 35 H 
Gary 22 Male Caucasian Pennsylvania S 34 H 
Henry 21 Male Caucasian U.S. U 28 L 
Ike 24 Male Caucasian New Jersey S 32 H 
Jason 21 Male Asian New York S 28 L 
Ken 22 Male Caucasian North Carolina U 29 L 
Lamont 22 Male Black Bahamas S 31 H 
Mark 22 Male White Long Island, NY S 30 H 
Nat 21 Male White Long Island, NY S 32 H 
Oscar 26 Male White Virginia U 28 L 
      S = Successful           U = Unsuccessful 
≥30 = 
High 
≤29 = 
Low 
Mean 22.4     31 
Mode 22     28 
Median 22     31 
 
night with heavy traffic.  Each participant served as the mate on watch with a support team of 
three other students.  The participant was either inbound from sea heading to Seattle, 
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Washington, or outbound from Seattle to sea (see Appendix B).  Each of the participants already 
had previous seagoing experience from either the school’s training ship or a private company’s 
vessel.  Ten of the 15 participants had already passed their United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
Third Officer exams.  All participants had already attended classes in radar, collision avoidance, 
and electronic chart plotting, as well as standard paper chart navigating techniques.  
Additionally, they all had received training as both helmsman and lookout, and were 
knowledgeable of maritime rules.  Because providing information on demographics was 
voluntary, three of the participants chose not to offer this specific information.  On the other 
hand, many of the participants who did not do well in the simulation experience provided a 
wealth of information into the insights of their thought process, as well as solutions they felt 
would help improve future performance. 
Alan.  At the time of study Alan was a 24-year-old white male from north central Long 
Island, New York.  He explained that he was unsure of what he wanted to do and why he was at 
a maritime university.  He left for two years and returned in the spring of 2012.  During the 
summer training cruise he was dismissed in Iceland due to a knee injury.  He returned in the fall 
and had a different outlook.  He decided an occupation in maritime industry was really what he 
wanted to pursue.  During his back-to-back summer cruises, he developed a true love for the sea 
and a greater respect for himself and for other mariners.  
In the fall of 2013, Alan became involved in the student government and decided he 
wanted to grow as a leader.  He ran for vice president in his first class year and applied to be an 
operations officer for the Regiment of Cadets.  His leadership positions motivated him to pass his 
USCG license exams the first time taken.  He graduated in May, 2015, and began working for 
Military Sealift Command.  His long-term goal was to become a Biscayne Pilot in Florida.  
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While in the simulator, his performance was outstanding; however, the instructor stated the team 
did not follow the standing orders and the vessel had crossed over to the opposite side of the 
vessel traffic scheme for 20 minutes.  
Ben.  At the time of the study, Ben was a 24-year-old white male from western Long 
Island, New York, who not only played football for the university as a tight end, but also had 
played for his high school.  In high school, he had also wrestled and played both basketball and 
baseball.  During the simulations, Ben and his team safely navigated the required passage, but 
the instructor stated that Ben failed to give proper helm orders.  
Carl.  At the time of the study, Carl was a 22-year-old white male who, prior to attending 
the university, had no maritime experience.  During his freshman summer training cruise, he 
worked on a ferryboat, and on his sophomore cruise he worked on an articulation-towing vessel, 
where he would often steer under the supervision of the captain.  On his senior cruise, he worked 
with a third mate inspecting all safety-related parts of the ship.  Carl had some trouble navigating 
the channel.  His team’s behavior appeared to be a little too relaxed.  However, during the latter 
part of his exercise, his performance improved. 
Diane.  At the time of study Diane was a 22-year old black female from the island of 
Jamaica.  In 1992, she immigrated to the United States (U.S.).  She aspired to become captain of 
a large cargo ship.  Diane is the third child of her family and is the first to attend a maritime 
college.  Diane was employed by a nonprofit organization where she was a program assistant in a 
water and environmental science department.  
Diane’s performance in the simulator was not successful.  Nevertheless, it was observed 
that, in spite of her difficulties, she notified the captain nine times, regardless of his displeasure 
with the frequent notifications.  She was one of the few participants who extensively shared 
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thoughts and feelings and gave a very full and rich description of her experiences. 
Edward.  Edward was one of the participants who chose not to share any personal 
information.  He was a 22-year-old white male.  Edward did not successfully navigate the 
channel, because his team did not have a voyage plan.  This caused them to miss their 
destination.  Instead of arriving at Seattle, they continued on toward Tacoma.  Edward did have 
good communication skills with the Vessel Traffic Service.  
Frank.  At the time of the study, Frank was a 22-year-old white male from southern 
Long Island, New York.  He enjoys wrestling and hockey.  Even though Frank safely navigated 
the channel, he and his team seemed to ignore a vessel that was coming up from behind them.  
Frank did have some trouble with proper radio communications. 
Gary.  At the time of the study, Gary was a 21-year-old white male who grew up in 
eastern Pennsylvania.  He played numerous sports, but he mostly enjoyed playing soccer.  His 
family had a boat, and their vacations centered on water activities.  This helped influence his 
decision to go to a maritime college.  He felt that his experience at the college better prepared 
him for a post-college maritime career.  Gary and his team did an outstanding job in the 
simulator.  The only problems the team encountered were related to unfamiliarity of equipment. 
Henry.  At the time of the study, Henry was a 22-year-old white male.  Henry chose not 
to disclose any background or personal information.  Even though he felt comfortable about the 
decisions he made in the simulator, he said he felt out of place in his performance because it was 
not a real ship.  Henry and his team missed their objective of entering Seattle.  They also had 
trouble with the traffic on a couple of occasions in which they had some near misses 
Ike.  At the time of the study, Ike was a 24-year-old white male from near the New Jersey 
shore.  He graduated high school in 2009 and worked as a commercial fisherman prior to 
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enrolling at the college in January of 2012.  He felt his experience at the college really helped 
shape him into a better mariner.  What he considered to be the most valuable aspects of his 
training were both a summer training cruise with a shipping company and the time spent in the 
simulators.  Overall, Ike and his team did a good job in the simulation.  The only major setback 
was that the captain had to come to the bridge to assist him in making his turn into Seattle. 
Jason.  At the time of the study, Jason was a 21-year-old Asian American who played on 
a college soccer team for four years.  Prior to college, he also played soccer for his high school in 
eastern New York.  He described that when he was on his senior summer cruise and assigned as 
Cadet Watch Officer, he made good decisions.  Jason felt that his simulator experience was not 
real enough for training.  He stated that his simulator experience was like a bunch of friends 
getting together to play a video game.  The team had trouble navigating the channel and, at one 
point, the team had doubts about the location of the port of Seattle.  Problems with navigation 
caused further communication issues with Vessel Traffic Service and his docking tug services. 
Ken.  At the time of the study, Ken was a 22-year-old white male from central North 
Carolina.  He was a linebacker for the college’s football team.  He was elected to the Football 
Leadership Council by his teammates.  He earned the Navy Level Lifting Award in the off–
season program by lifting 1290 pounds.  He also played football in high school.  Overall, his 
team successfully navigated the channel.  Ken did have some trouble with radio 
communications, but the instructor did not count that as being significant.  He did express in the 
interview a high degree of confidence going into the simulation. 
Lamont.  At the time of the study, Lamont was a 22-year-old black male from the 
Bahamas.  He played basketball in college, earning the Maritime College Outstanding Athlete 
Award for men's basketball.  In the simulator, Lamont and his team did an outstanding job safely 
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navigating the channel in the simulator.  During the interview, Lamont shared his insights about 
the success of his performance and what would help make others successful. 
Mark.  At the time of the study, Mark was a 22-year-old white male from southern Long 
Island, New York.  Because he lived by the ocean, he was always fascinated by it and often 
surfed and fished.  He often used the family boat for trips with friends.  Living by the water 
motivated him to attend a maritime college and have a maritime career.  He never regretted 
going to the maritime college and is proud to say so.  His philosophy was that without hardship 
and struggle, it is hard to be proud of what you do, and adversities will always test one’s ability 
to overcome challenges.  Mark and his team did a good job of working together in the simulator. 
Mark safely navigated the channel and had good radio communication skills. 
Nat.  At the time of the study, Nat was a 21-year-old white male from western Long 
Island, New York.  The maritime college was his first choice for school.  He played soccer for all 
four years in college.  He was vice president of the fishing club, secretary for the Maritime 
Athletic Program (MAP) club, and was also a squad leader.  He felt that he had a great time at 
school, mostly due to having a great group of friends.  He stated that he took advantage of 
everything the school had to offer.  During his summer training cruises, he had an internship at 
an oil shipping company.  He is now working for a tank barge company.  Nat took the simulation 
seriously.  He arrived 30 minutes early with his notes and charts to prepare for the exercise.  
With the exception of a couple of VHF radio communication misidentifications, he and his team 
did a very good job navigating the channel. 
Oscar.  At the time of the study, Oscar was is a 26-year-old white male from 
southeastern Virginia.  Oscar chose not to disclose anything about his background.  He did have 
some difficulty early on in the simulation.  About three fourths of the way into the exercise, his 
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performance began to improve.  As he approached Seattle, he failed to listen to his team and plan 
ahead.  A vessel to his port prevented his turn into the harbor and he overshot the Seattle harbor.   
Results  
The participants were a great source of information and insight.  I utilized the NVIVO 10 
software in assisting with the analysis of data from the observations, personal notes, 
questionnaires, and interviews.  Although the software assisted me in the analysis of the results, 
my interpretations of the results were subjective.  Prior to analyzing the data, I had a presumption 
that self-efficacy would be a factor influencing whether or not juniors would call the captain 
when needed.  From the data collected during the simulation exercises, interviews and GSE 
questionnaires, this presumption was dispelled.  Nonetheless, there were three themes that 
emerged from my interactions with the participants.  These three themes were (a) the Decision-
Making Process, (b) Factors in Decision Making, and (c) Motivations and Solutions to Decision 
Making. 
The Decision-Making Process 
In the responses to RQ1, which focused on the decision-making process, the following 
three subthemes were identified through the interviews and observations: preparation, self-
awareness, and simulated versus real world experience.  Among the interview questions listed in 
Appendix F, questions one and two were related to RQ1 in that the participant was describing the 
experience in both thoughts and feelings. 
In the interviews, the participants were identifying things they did or thought about to 
assist them in making decisions in the simulator.  One of these helps was preparation, the first 
subtheme.  For at least eight of the participants, preparation affected how decisions were made.  
There were, of course, numerous decisions to be made during the simulation.  Having some 
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prepared notes and charts helped these individuals safely navigate the channel and maintain 
focus during the unexpected situations that arose in the exercise.  
The second subtheme that emerged in the decision-making process was self-awareness.  
No individual can be certain of another person’s emotions or thoughts in a given situation.  What 
a person is thinking or feeling appears to determine how effectively that person is going to make 
a decision.  During the observation of the participants in the simulator, I noted both audible and 
visual cues that indicated whether a participant was under some degree of stress or relief in a 
situation.  In the interviews the participants described their thoughts and emotions about a 
decision before, during and after a given situation.  Goleman’s (1995) concept of self-awareness 
was used to help analyze these scenarios and the participants’ interpretations of the events.  
A high-resolution simulator is used in numerous occupations for training, educating and 
assessing a person’s level of expertise.  Simulators allow an educator to have students react to 
events and situations that would otherwise be too dangerous and costly.  No matter how detailed 
a simulation is, it is up to the individuals to allow themselves to believe the simulation reflects a 
real-world situation.  Their degree of belief seems to affect how seriously the participants take 
the decision-making process.  Simulated versus real world experience is the third subtheme used 
to describe a participant’s decision-making process. 
The three subthemes of the decision-making process theme emerged from the data 
collected.  These three subthemes were identified in the transcripts of the interviews with 
participants.  Excerpts from the interview provide evidence of the subthemes of preparation, self-
awareness, and simulation versus real world experiences.  
Preparation.  Preparation was the first subtheme identified through the interviews and 
observations.  Regardless of being a novice or expert decision maker, voyage planning is a 
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critical part of the watch officer’s success in making a safe passage.  Eight out of 15 participants 
successfully navigated their assigned voyages.  An example of the required voyage plan is in 
Appendix B, specifically in Exercises 2 and 3.  Those participants who were prepared seemed 
ready for the exercise as they executed their plan.  Those who made a successful passage 
suggested as much from their interviews, as seen in the following examples. 
Ken: 
Being prepared and knowing what to expect, you know, can lead to, like I just 
said, you know your initial voyage plan you realize that there’s a four knot current over 
here or there’s a ferry over here and you can see those situations before they even 
happen, with being prepared and uh, you know you’re instantly ready to make those 
decisions.  Being unprepared, you know as soon as those situations are presented, you 
start to question yourself or start to have to… it starts to become a thought process 
instead of, you know, second nature to you, so.  
Alan: 
Going up there alone and looking at the voyage plan and making notes, maybe 
bring a pen and paper an old pad (short laugh) and then you know, write down, hey at this 
time we’ve got this coming up, this part of the voyage plan and check the charts and just; 
it’s all about double checking your work.  Well as I said before, just understanding what 
you’re getting into.   
Lamont: 
Being prepared, knowing what you have to do, uh, being aware, um, it’s basically 
being confident basically. Even those who did not successfully navigate the required 
passage, did concur that preparation would have made a difference.  
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Diane: 
In the voyage planning, I should’ve made sure that every single point that I 
needed would’ve been completely covered and it was clear to everyone.  For example, 
my navigator couldn’t find the pilot station, so had I taken the step to find that and point 
it out, then we wouldn’t be delayed in the ETA, and maybe she would’ve been able to, 
you know, be of more use to me 
Jason: 
Yes. I would, well I would go over my information a lot more.  Take my time on 
plotting the chart, take my time reading the chart and knowing my area. And knowing as 
much information I can about the area, the traffic, all the other ships around me, what 
they’re doing, where they’re going; all that stuff. 
Mark: 
And someone who makes a bad decision, obviously they don’t know as much as 
they should and they should be more prepared.  You know maybe it’s, you know yeah 
like I said that maybe it’s just not, they're not being prepared to take the watch. 
Self-awareness of emotions.  Self-awareness was the second subtheme identified in the 
interviews and observations.  According to Goleman (1995), self-awareness is “the sense of an 
ongoing attention to an internal state” (p. 46).  When dealing with unfamiliar situations in an 
adverse condition, people experience different levels of stress.  It is this stress that can either 
hinder or excel a person to an effective outcome.  Even those who had an increased self-
awareness of emotion struggled with the simulator objective, as evidenced in the following 
excerpts from interview transcripts.  
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Alan: 
I trust my gut and not my second thoughts.  My second thoughts are usually (short 
laugh) what got me into trouble. 
Carl: 
I wasn’t sure of myself, of course, because I am somewhat new, but, um, I felt if I 
wasn’t as sure I would make a good decision.  I wouldn’t make a horrible decision, just 
feel like I did have good reasons behind what I did during some points.  
Diane: 
Well when I'm a mate I get very nervous.  For some reason I can’t - it’s not that I 
don’t know what I'm doing, but I'm always doubting what I'm supposed to do or I'm 
doubting if I'm doing, if I'm making the right decisions… And then when we were going 
in the wrong direction, oh my God, I felt, I felt like I didn’t really know what I was doing 
because I didn’t understand how we were going in the wrong direction when I personally 
plotted on the chart the waypoints and all that I needed to know was; tell me which 
direction we’re supposed to steer and since I'm not over there. 
Gary: 
I know a lot of kids that get onto the ship and it’s like they’re like a deer in the 
headlights because there hasn’t really been much experience... I think it comes down to 
the competence of the watch officer as the third mate.  I guess you know graduating in 
May, you could see some kids who have taken an easier route in school, and haven’t 
prepared as much.  And then others who, you know gone out, done internships, have 
really, are here because they want to be here.  And I think that really also plays a part on 
when you go out onto your first ship, and you know, you have that background kind of 
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already where you are confident, you have a little bit of experience to get you, you know, 
get your feet wet and stuff.  And I think it also comes down to the person itself, you know 
you have people who are just, you know you find kids that aren’t confident in 
themselves, and they’ll second guess every decision they make, whereas other kids, you 
know they can look at, or get there, feel comfortable and hold a very competent watch 
and do that while other kids are, you know they get nervous and then like it leads to the 
mistakes, and then the mistakes bigger problems where they're just, it's either, whether it's 
lack of experience or lack of self-confidence that they’re just, you know I guess shy of 
the situation.  It’s like two kind of people, either easier route, and then you have the kids 
who work hard for everything, and then it also comes down to personality  where it’s, are 
they a competent person, or are they kind of a little shy and uneasy in situations like that 
Ike: 
It’s also important to have like, and I guess it sounds corny, coping mechanisms 
you know, don’t get overwhelmed, don’t get worked up, still you know look at the 
information you have in front of you and make a new decision.  You can’t get caught up 
in the decision you didn’t make.  You just gotta be, as mates you gotta be on your feet, 
you know what I mean?… You can’t get caught up in the decision you didn’t make. You 
just gotta be, as mates you gotta be on your feet, you know what I mean? 
Oscar: 
And when I did get on there, there’s been stress and anxiety in there. Um, it 
wasn’t like: oh my gosh, oh my gosh what the heck am I going to do?  It’s more like: 
okay, this needs to get done, this also needs to get done, this needs to be done. 
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Nat: 
You know I should’ve definitely paid attention more to that and I should’ve paid 
attention, I feel to the information given to the radio… I think what would help me make 
a better decision is be a little less worked-up, more calm with it, I feel like. 
Lamont: 
Bad decisions, I feel like I said, you could get cross-minded, like you can be 
focused on one thing and then another thing might just slip your mind and you might 
forget to do it. 
Simulation versus real world.  The third subtheme identified in interviews and 
observations was simulation versus real world.  It is a common practice for schools to utilize 
simulations as an effective hands-on tool for assessing and training new ideas and concepts.  The 
most significant advantage to using simulators is that it gives an educator and students a chance 
to experience scenarios that would otherwise be considered dangerous or life-threating if 
experienced in a real world application.  Simulation comes in various formats from a desktop 
computer to a full-scale virtual reality experience.  Many transportation industries have taken 
advantage of these full-scale environments, including the aviation and the maritime 
communities.  In these full-scale, high-resolution environments, individuals can become so 
immersed in the experience that they believe they are actually in an aircraft or on a ship.  
Consequently, instructors have observed the intense stress individuals may exhibit when 
encountering an adverse situation.  
Immersion did not occur in this study.  Eight of the 15 participants felt that the unrealistic 
experience in their simulator hindered their decisions.  For example, it was observed that one of 
the two simulators did not have a back window display.  This lack of display required 
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participants to rotate a knob on the console to rotate the external view forward to look behind the 
vessel.  This action took time and may have been disorienting because the individuals looked at 
an aft view of the ship while looking forward on the bridge.  
Ike: 
The other one is like three or four small TVs you know that you do kind of get, 
you feel dated and you’re not making a real decision because you don’t feel like you’re 
immersed in the environment as much as in the other one… Yeah so that’s been my only 
bad thing I see about the simulator, that the cheesy one doesn’t feel like you really get to 
like make an actual decision because like I said; it’s just three TVs like you don’t get a 
good angle, you can’t see what’s going on behind you, you know what I mean? 
Jason: 
And on cruise I was confident in everything I did, I made perfect decisions, I 
would say.  And the simulator is a lot different than being on a real ship.  It’s a simulator, 
it’s not the real thing so it’s a lot different; it’s a lot different… It’s - on the ship it’s the 
real thing and the simulator it’s like a, I guess some people would compare it to like a 
video game.  You’re with a bunch of friends and we’re all fooling around in the 
simulator, we’re all talking to each other and not really paying attention.  And on the ship 
you’re in charge of, well on the training ship you’re in charge of hundreds of lives when 
you’re on watch 
Henry: 
I'm impartial to the simulator because yes, it’s a great experience, you get to do it, 
but at sometimes I feel like it’s very not realistic on certain situations.  You know it’s 
hard to tell with the perception of things sometimes.  And then certain things disappear, 
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where on a real ship they wouldn’t really disappear between the windows, the simulated 
windows and it’s hard to see around sometimes… Not having a natural 360 degree range 
of motion as you would on a ship or you know being able to move your position.  Having 
to use a dial to change the view of the simulator, I feel severely inhibits your ability to be 
situationally aware of what's going on while on a bridge or in that case in a simulator. 
Simulations have been around for many decades.  It is not just a tool of instruction for the 
educator, but a tool of learning for the student who takes the simulation seriously.  Not everyone 
felt that the simulation was ineffective or hindered decision making.  Some of the participants 
believed it to be an excellent training aid because it tested their skills and helped them to gain 
experience. 
Ben:  
So um, overall the experience, the simulator there's nothing like it at this school.  
You can talk in the classroom all you want about situations and scenarios, but until you 
have a helmsman, you have a navigator, you have a mate, you're looking at the radar, 
you're doing everything at once then you got the real feeling of what it's like out at sea… 
Simulators, by far, are the most helpful thing at this school besides summer sea term 
when you're standing watch. 
Ike: 
Okay.  I think the simulators are a good experience here, they’re definitely a way 
for us to, like you said, to start learning how to make decisions.  It's like, the, I feel - they 
feel real to us, to me, like you know I feel, if I were to hit something aground, although 
there’s not physical consequences to me when I’m doing it, I treat it like there is, that 
way I feel like my decisions are more lifelike, you know I don’t just treat it like a video 
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game.  I treat that like if I was on the bridge of the training ship or you know cadet 
shipping. I think they’re a good asset to the school and to us as officers and becoming 
officers… I think just practice and you know take opportunities where you can to learn 
more, and I guess broaden your horizons.  And definitely just treat everything like it’s 
real, if you go in the simulator thinking you’re playing a video game and you know; well 
if I hit something that's when I really grow.  That's how you're gonna end if that’s gonna 
be your thought when you’re out there in the real world, and you go; well it’s not my 
ship.  So I think you just gotta treat things real and take things serious, I think it’s a big 
aspect of making the right decision; you know just take it seriously 
Gary: 
I think it’s very realistic as in the controls and the tools you have available as far 
as the radar, the ECDIS [Electronic Chart Display and Information System], and that sort. 
The participants’ comments and actions related to the simulation experience revealed 
important information about the first theme identified, the decision-making process.  Within that 
theme, three subthemes emerged.  With the first subtheme of preparation, even those participants 
who were not prepared for the simulation described their need and desire to be prepared, not just 
for the simulation, but also when they actually stand watch on the bridge of a ship.  The 
subtheme self-awareness was used to understand the participants’ internal dialogue and decision 
making.  Those who were aware of their increasing emotional state had an option to either 
control their feelings or allow their feelings to overtake them.  Finally, although the simulator 
was a detailed and high-resolution depiction of the bridge of a ship, it unfortunately did not 
create enough realisms for more than half of the participants.  This perception affected the 
participant’s decision making.  Simulated versus real world experience was a subtheme that 
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helped participants describe how they felt during the decision-making process and how they 
might have made better decisions if they had the same situation in a real bridge of ship.  
Factors in Decision Making 
A second theme identified in this study, in addition to the decision-making process, is 
that of factors in decision making.  In describing the decision making of the junior officer, the 
participants acknowledged influences that either hindered or helped in their decisions and 
performance.  To answer RQ2, which focused on factors in decision making, the researcher used 
a questionnaire, interviews, and observations.  Three subthemes were identified as factors in the 
decision making process: confidence, workload, and team cooperation.  
Confidence.  The first subtheme identified related to factors in decision making was 
confidence.  All the participants had something to say about confidence regardless of whether 
they felt adequate or inadequate about their decision making or performance.  When discussing 
confidence, Bandura (1997) stated, “Confidence is a nonspecific term that refers to strength of 
belief but does not necessarily specify what the certainty is about.  I can be supremely confident 
that I will fail at an endeavor” (p. 382).  Those participants who were confident felt that 
confidence was a key factor to a successful watch, as evidenced in the following transcript 
excerpts. 
Alan: 
I was confident in my decision making because those were the first things that 
came to mind; I trust my gut and not my second thoughts. My second thoughts are 
usually (short laugh) what got me into trouble 
Ben: 
I was very confident in my decision making, I feel at least, because as you're 
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standing man on the watch, it's your word that goes; it's your watch. 
Gary: 
I was fairly confident the whole time. I usually, once I have it something decided 
and check the chart, the ECDIS and make sure there’s nothing going on, I was like I did 
everything I wanted to and going by what I had set-up on the voyage plan and the 
decisions with the traffic inbound, outbound in the traffic lanes, so I was very confident 
with the decisions I made.  Like the opening up the Closest Point of Approach (CPA), 
slowing down, you know I could have informed more people, but it was exactly what I 
wanted to do and it allowed for safe navigation of, you know, the other ships… And I 
think it also comes down to the person itself, you know you have people who are just, 
you know you find kids that aren’t confident in themselves, and they’ll second guess 
every decision they make, whereas other kids, you know they can look at, or get there, 
feel comfortable and hold a very competent watch and do that while other kids are, you 
know they get nervous and then like it leads to the mistakes, and then the mistakes - 
bigger problems where they're just, it's either, whether it's lack of experience or lack of 
self-confidence that they’re just, you know I guess shy of the situation.  It’s like two kind 
of people, either easier route, and then you have the kids who work hard for everything, 
and then it also comes down to personality where it’s, are they a competent person, or are 
they kind of a little shy and uneasy in situations like that. 
Lamont: 
I feel I was pretty confident.  I feel like if you’re on the bridge of a ship you have 
to be confident because if you’re not confident then something bad is probably going to 
happen, so I was pretty confident.  I was pretty confident because most of the things that 
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I’ve learned pretty much was in simulators head on and like rules of the road and other 
things, I'm pretty much confident about my decision and what I learned here. 
Confidence is a strength or conviction of the belief for success.  Ten of the 15 
participants expressed a certain degree of lack of confidence.  However, those who did not show 
or express confidence understood its importance. 
Diane: 
It might’ve caused me to make wrong decisions.  Like had I remained calm and 
confident and say to myself: yeah, you know what, you messed up, but you know just 
take a second and breathe and think about this.  Had I done that, I think that I would’ve 
been able to make better decisions.  I wouldn’t have to rely on, you know the captain or 
keep calling about something. 
Carl: 
I wasn’t sure of myself, of course, because I am somewhat new, but um I felt if I 
wasn’t as sure I would make a good decision.  I wouldn’t make a horrible decision, just 
feel like I did have good reasons behind what I did during some points.  And if I wasn’t 
confident then I wouldn’t act on an unconfident matter.  
Frank: 
I honestly, believe it or not, I wasn’t confident in my decisions.  Because I had 
four guys on the bridge team and I had a guy in the radar was telling me what the CPA is, 
what the time of CPA is, and I just believed him.  I didn’t go actually over to the radar. I 
mean, I did, I glanced at it and saw what he was talking about, but I should’ve looked at 
the radar, looked out the window, made sure that he exactly telling me that I agree with 
the exact information that he’s giving me, before I made that decision. 
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Lamont: 
Bad decisions, I feel like I said, you could get cross-minded, like you can be 
focused on one thing and then another thing might just slip your mind and you might 
forget to do it.  And not being confident again, it could be turned into a good or bad 
situation.  So I always feel like you got to be confident on a bridge and if you’re not 
confident you should call a captain like you should; like I said before  
During the observations, I noted that participants’ lack of confidence in a decision usually 
led to a delay or no decision whatsoever.  On the other hand, new officers did not usually express 
overconfidence in their behaviors.  Just the same, some of the interviewees brought up the 
destructive nature of overconfidence.  
Jason: 
I don’t know. I guess in some situations new officers and they’re getting a new 
job, they feel overconfident, over cocky, that they feel like they can try to do it on their 
own and they have something to prove to the crew that they’re able to do it, um all by 
themselves; I guess, I don’t know.  That’s what I think. 
Ken: 
Overconfident with like; okay, I've been here before, like I had.  I know this 
probably will work you know, and you don’t want to, you don’t want to have to call the 
captain over every instance, even if it is really the standing orders, you don’t want to have 
to keep calling down to the state room and have him get a call every five minutes in a 
narrow channel or a crowded, you know, or a crowded, congested you know lane. 
Nat: 
And then the bad decision, as I said earlier, I feel like for especially an 
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experienced mate is they get too lackadaisical with it saying, I’ve done this watch a 
million times, and they get so used to it they don’t look out for certain things that they’re 
not used to.  Like they understand that?  So I feel like, you got them happier between 
worked-up and lazy, (short laugh) you have to just a happier isn't to keep, and then I feel 
like that’s where you need to be for it. 
Workload.  The second subtheme identified related to factors in decision making was 
workload.  During the simulations, the participants encountered dense traffic situations in a 
nighttime environment.  The adverse environment, which can be even more confusing at night, 
required greater attention to safely navigate the channel, making various essential reports along 
the way, and obeying international collision avoidance regulations.  Some of the participants 
displayed a degree of tension and frustration when the simulation began to overwhelm them a 
bit.  As many as twelve participants expressed this point in their interviews. 
Frank: 
I guess because I had so many other things going on at that time, that I was like, 
you know you’re right, when I should’ve, you know, like I said, I should’ve went to the 
radar, spent the time, made sure his information is correct before I started making 
decisions because all of these decisions are based on me, not what he says. 
Jason: 
At first I felt like I was doing fine. And then, I don’t know, something happened 
and I went over to the chart and I got a little flustered and I read the wrong thing.  And 
then right then and there it just started… the error chain for me 
Henry: 
I'm not sure why it happened.  I overlooked the uh, I guess right at the end, I was 
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supposed to call 15 minutes early and I guess it was just one thing that I took - I know I 
read it, I read it over and over again before the simulation and what was supposed to 
happen, but I, I know I missed it.  I don't know why.  I guess it was just because I was 
just so busy and concerned about doing everything else right you know detail… I missed 
one detail.  And I guess that’s, you know it’s a learning experience because you're gonna 
have to learn how to be very detailed oriented… I wasn’t 100% - You know on the, one 
of them was overtaking the one vessel that I came a little too close on and that’s why; I 
was too close and I was, you know that would put me out of my comfort zone and I was 
more worried about not hitting him, and I wasn’t paying attention to everything else that, 
you know I should have called the master at that point to let him know, and I didn’t.  And 
that’s really, you know that was one of the essential things that I should have done… Uh, 
it kind of just left my mind.  I don't know.  I'm not really sure why.  I guess it was just 
because I was so focused on the one thing.  I wasn’t going through my checklist of like, 
my mental checklist of notes to do.  So I guess it's also I guess you should write things 
down as well as you know to keep yourself in check.  You know when this happens, do 
this, do this, do this because you know you weren’t, I wasn’t 100%, I was focused on one 
specific thing. 
Team cooperation. The final identified subtheme related to factors in decision making 
was team cooperation.  One of the factors required to safely navigating an adverse situation was 
to have a cooperative team to assist and provide information to the mate on watch.  From the 
observations, it appeared that eight out of 15 participant teams were effectively cooperating with 
the mate on watch.  When observing teams that were less effective in their performance, 
however, I noted problems included members who did not provide the necessary data in a timely 
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manner or who were too relaxed within the simulation exercise itself.  A few of the interviews 
provided information about why this occurred. 
Alan: 
If I were on a real bridge, I feel like I would have made much better decisions 
quicker, sooner, and much more thought out.  I also feel having less people on the bridge 
makes a huge difference.  I mean in our simulator we had what; it was one person on the 
helm, I was the mate we had a navigator and one person on radar.  And instead of 
focusing myself in on what's going on in the radar and assessing that with what's going 
outside, I have to trust somebody else's judgment  and, as well as the navigator too.  I had 
put my trust in the navigator that he would let me know as, you know the simulation 
started at 0600, at 0610 we had a course change, he didn't tell me about a second course 
change at 0615 and uh, that cost me a passing grade. (short laugh)  But again, it's no fault 
on my own, because I trusted him to make that judgment.  I feel if it were just me and the 
helmsman, I would have, you know, I would have no choice but to look at my chart, see 
what's going on, I would have made note, my own. 
Diane: 
So, for example, there was a time when the helm guy came off the helm and I had 
to say, “Go back on the helm, you’re not supposed to leave the helm at all.”  Or when I 
told my navigator before the simulator and inside the simulator, “I need this information, 
this is how you’re supposed to do it,” and then she doesn’t really follow through and so 
when I'm notified by the captain or by the pilot station about certain information that I 
need; for example, ETAs, I don’t really know what to tell them and so I have to, you 
know put them on hold and ask for that information.  But then 10 minutes later the 
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information still isn’t there because she’s doing something else.  And I know that you’re 
supposed to multitask and you know, I did ask her to take fixes and to do 
something…you know to do other things like take fixes, give me updated ETAs, which 
are the only two things I asked her to do to make sure that we’re on track. 
Frank: 
Because I had four guys on the bridge team and I had a guy in the radar was 
telling me what the CPA is, what the time of CPA is, and I just believed him.  I didn’t go 
actually over to the radar.  I mean, I did, I glanced at it and saw what he was talking 
about, but I should’ve looked at the radar, looked out the window, made sure that he 
exactly telling me that. 
Regardless, there were teams that did have good communication and teamwork.  Ken was 
a good example of the benefit of communication and teamwork.  Ken did listen to the 
recommendation of his team and he was able to complete his voyage.  
Ken: 
Oh well that’s why I think that you know, for every watch house you need to have 
that sort of, that extra little bit of, you know that loyalty or whatever it is that, you know 
because this is a pretty dynamic job.  So I mean if you get rattled, you just sort of have 
people around you that can help you make those decisions, or you just have to have that 
ability to, you know take a step back real quick and then just let your training and 
everything that you do sort of help you observe the situation and then, you know come 
back to making the best possible decisions… And just sort of, you know being involved 
in that four-man bridge team to increase your confidence and your level of comfort in 
there so, you know like I said when situations do happen or you do get rattled that you 
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can sort of dial it down, absorb everything, you know a little bit at a time to make those 
right decisions. 
Lamont: 
Um, my bridge team helped me out a lot, telling me my targets, what I have 
coming up, what light I saw on whichever side; but we use landmarks.  Like my radar 
guy, he was really good on telling me; oh, you have a target up there; you have a target 
two miles away; CPA is 0.3 miles in about ten minutes.  So I feel like my bridge team is 
my alternatives.  If I wasn’t sure, I’d ask my bridge team about something 
Oscar: 
The two guys that were with me were being very helpful.  They were notifying 
me of stuff that was going on that I probably would’ve missed, and there’s some things 
that they were notifying me of that I already knew of, but I wasn’t mad at them or 
anything.  It’s like hey, they probably didn’t think I noticed this so, it’s like okay cool, 
yeah, I know about that… And really it ended up being a team effort because a lot of my 
decisions I couldn’t have made without the information that I got from just seeing stuff 
because there’s a lot of things that’s like; okay, he’s doing this, and I noticed that before 
it even showed up on the radar, and for the ECDIS, I mean I just looked at the ECDIS to 
see where everybody was and relative to the traffic lanes.   
Oscar’s performance was not very successful in the simulator, because he missed the turn 
into Seattle.  However, he did have a good team that did a good job and had effective 
communication among them.  Oscar was very informative and descriptive about his performance 
and also in regard to his thoughts of what happen during the simulation. 
Confidence was mentioned by all of the participants in describing their success or failure 
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as a factor in their decision making.  Even those participants who felt that they had low self-
confidence realized that they could have made better decisions if their confidence had been 
higher.  Twelve participants expressed the subtheme workload as a factor that hindered their 
effectiveness as decision makers.  Eight participants showed themselves to be good examples of 
teamwork.  The subtheme team cooperation was, therefore, a factor that was observed for 
successful decisions in the simulation exercise.  
Motivations and Solutions to Decision Making 
Interviews and observations were used to examine motivations and solutions to decision 
making as posed in RQ3.  By using the interview questions listed in Appendix F, specifically 
questions four, five, eight, and 11, information needed for RQ3 was obtained.  These questions 
sought to delve further into how the participants saw themselves and how they could have 
performed better.  The following three subthemes emerged: rules; knowledge and equipment 
proficiency; and self-motivation.  The interview process allowed the participants to reflect on the 
events, to consider what they could have done differently, and to evaluate what they might do 
better in future exercises and when on the bridge of an actual vessel. 
Rules.  The first subtheme that emerged related to motivations and solutions to decision 
making was rules.  In general, whether encountering heavy traffic or making a call as prescribed 
by the standing orders, participants usually followed the guidelines and rules that they were 
taught.  According to Rasmussen (1983), rule-based behaviors generally involve behaviors that 
are guided through such things as rules, procedures, official guidelines, and instructions.  This 
goal-oriented activity was characterized by an action that was executed in a given event or 
situation.  Regardless of the participants’ understanding of the rules, the observations showed 
that 10 of the participants overlooked vessels coming up behind them.  Their focus, it appeared, 
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was forward of the bridge. 
Alan: 
It was really the standing orders that led me to most of the decisions I made. 
Ben: 
So uh, my rule of thumb; if you stick to the rules of the road, call people when 
you're supposed to, you know just do everything by the book and platform then there 
shouldn't be any problems that you shouldn't be able to overcome. 
Jason: 
With, there is one scenario in the simulator, where a ship was overtaking me on 
my port side and you just had to think about everything you learned in class, what you 
learned on the ship, all that hands-on experience, and all that knowledge from class, all 
the rules of the road; all that stuff comes into mind. 
Ike: 
Because first of all standing orders are; if we’re passing less than a half a mile 
even in a separation scheme with a vessel, captain should know. 
Mark: 
I didn’t make a whole lot of decisions, but I did try to remember some of the 
important things that were written in the standing orders, such as calling the captain when 
the CPA was within 0.5 miles.  And I did try to remember that. 
Oscar: 
We know he’s gonna be overtaking us.  So by the rules and regs we have to 
maintain course and speed.  And I also have these other guys that are closer to me that, 
I’ll most likely gonna be overtaking one, plus there’s a few ships that are doing 
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maneuvers so I have to watch out for them. 
Before any simulation exercise, students were given a set of instructions similar to those 
listed in Appendix B.  Additionally, they were exposed to the rules of the road and the captain’s 
standing order from previous classes and summer cruises.  Those who failed to follow the rules 
and guidelines realized in the interviews that this may have led to disastrous results.  
Ken:  
Well the main thing for the standing orders for to go by in this simulator is the 
half mile CPA in the narrow channels.  And if there is under a half mile CPA, you call 
the captain, being unfamiliar with those, with the standing orders for this watch. Some 
situations… or some situations uh, I just didn’t call the captain in time or didn’t 
understand the CPA limit and things like that, so. 
Mark: 
I could (short laugh) touch the ship, so that was definitely not okay.  I should have 
clarified how and how far away he should have been from me and I should have also 
waited till I was past his buoy, because I was making a maneuvering turn.  So that was 
not good.  And also I was on the, I did recognize I was on the left side of the channel.  
And I should have been on the right and maybe if I was on the right side, he might have 
been able to pass me.  And I remember in the rules you're supposed to be on, all the way 
as far as possible to the port, to the starboard side of the channel. 
Oscar: 
I don’t think I'm really afraid of calling him, it’s more like I don’t know when to 
call him because there’s probably a couple of times where I could’ve called him to the 
bridge and asked him for his advice, and that probably could’ve helped things out.  But I 
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didn’t because it didn’t really like click that it’s like; hey, maybe I should call the captain.  
That’s just something I think having a bit more experience would help out with where it’s 
like; yeah, this situation is putting me in over my head, I should probably get the captain 
or something. 
Knowledge and equipment proficiency.  The second theme that emerged related to 
motivations and solutions to decision making was knowledge and equipment proficiency.  The 
simulation was a training aid that mimicked a realistic environment as closely as possible.  In 
these simulated situations, participants were provided with a realistic scenario with the instructor 
able to train and test their decision-making participant ability in abnormal conditions and adverse 
situations.  Rasmussen (1983) suggested that knowledge-based behaviors, where no known rules 
apply to solve a problem, result in the creation of a mental model by incorporating a process to 
select different plans or objectives.  These plans and objectives are often tested through trial and 
error and are then reviewed and assessed before further steps are taken.  The novice deck officers 
used the knowledge gained from their classroom experience to assist them in making decisions in 
an unfamiliar situation.  
Ben: 
The second I walked into the simulator…The second I walked into the simulator, 
I made sure my uh, radios were on the correct stations, my courses were plotted out, my 
GPS was on because I knew the previous time we did the simulation somebody got in 
trouble because they didn't originally check if the GPS was on.  So immediately after the 
previous class I went right to my room and made a checklist about; okay, the stuff, the 
last I did wrong I have to make sure I do right because he's gonna be looking for those 
mistakes again and I want to make sure I cover those.  So I turned the GPS on, I hailed 
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ships on 13, did a monitor 16, because we were in VTS area so I put the second radio on 
14… I felt the decisions I made were correct, to my knowledge at least, and uh, (pause) 
you know using my eyes looking out the window I feel as if I did a good enough job with 
my decision making. 
Edward: 
It’s having a good knowledge of everything that’s, um, like on the bridge and 
what you can use to make the good decisions…  Getting the most out of being in school. 
(short laugh) That’s actually, I think about that a lot too.  Like a lot of people that 
graduate from here, I feel like aren’t qualified to graduate and to work on ships, and I 
don’t want to be one of those people so I’m trying to get the most out of these classes that 
we take by knowing everything I can know because to me that’s the most important 
thing.   
Lamont: 
I think they make good decisions because that’s what they’re trained to do. I mean 
they don’t want to collide with another ship.  They want to be the best seaman out there.  
They go from what they learned. 
Those who made improper decisions discussed in their interviews what when went wrong 
in their performance.  For those who struggled with successful decision making, there was 
insightful knowledge and understanding gained from what was taking place in their minds.  For 
many of those being interviewed, this was an opportunity to consider how they will do better the 
next time they are given similar experiences.  
Alan: 
Not being familiar with the equipment definitely hinders my ability to make good 
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decisions or better decisions.  Uh, (pause) being familiar with those you're working with 
definitely would help. 
Diane: 
Now what I feel like I didn’t really do so well, is provide accurate information, 
information that he needs regarding certain things.  For example, during the first four 
calls that I made about a vessel that's in our CPA, I didn’t really give him all the proper 
information.  And even if I did have the proper information, by then I was already very 
frustrated with myself so I wasn’t sure if it was the right information or I wasn’t 
delivering it in the proper way. 
Ike: 
I think we grew up, my generation you know, and I’ll be 24, so like I have like 
two or three years on the seniors that I’m with right now.  So like I did a little more 
hands-on stuff like the millennials, like you have the freshmen that are here now; the 
sophomores grew up in such a computer age, that’s what we know.  And so where the 
older mates might not know how to work the ECDIS, some of them don’t use it all the 
time; we get to, we grew up on computers, we can figure it out on our own, we don’t 
need the manual.  So I guess you just get too comfortable in the fact that you know how 
to do everything with it.  And you know like just, you are, humans are creatures of habit 
so you kind of gravitate where you’re comfortable, but you can’t do that because stuff 
fails all the time, computers fail. 
Mark: 
But the one thing that got me the most I think was talking on the radio because 
I've never really, I've never really done that before, so I really don’t know the exact 
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language to use, I don’t, I'm not experienced with you know communications as well as I 
should be.   
During the observation, 11 out of 15 participants had trouble identifying other vessels and 
reporting the location of the vessel on the VHF radio.  In the control room the instructor 
expressed disappointment to me of the student lack of proper radio etiquette.  Radio etiquette 
would have been learned and developed during the students’ summer cruises and the Global 
Maritime Distress and Safety System class.  
Self-motivation.  The final theme that emerged related to motivations and solutions to 
decision making was self-motivation.  Goleman (1995) indicated that motivating oneself is an 
emotional skill likely to help individuals to be effective and highly productive in whatever they 
pursue.  Eleven of the 15 participants discussed the importance of preparation and having a 
physical or mental checklist.  Self-motivation was a personal decision to create an environment 
of success based upon self-control and willingness to be proactive, as evidenced in the following 
transition excerpts.  
Alan: 
Going up there alone and looking at the voyage plan and making notes, maybe 
bring a pen and paper an old pad (short laugh) and then you know, write down, hey at this 
time we've got this coming up, this part of the voyage plan and check the charts and just; 
it's all about double checking your work.  Well as I said before, just understanding what 
you're getting into.  And if I were immediate coming onto a watch on a real ship, I would 
go up earlier, you know talk to the mate on watch.  I'd get a briefing from him and look at 
the next courses, the tracks, everything, and maybe walk out a couple of ETAs to be 
ahead of the game; and you know, so I know from getting on launch at such and such a 
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time I've got a course change maybe 35 minutes after that at that particular speed.  See if 
any conditions have changed.  Definitely look over weather conditions, traffic conditions 
if you're coming into traffic separations; and again, just do as much as you possibly can 
to be aware and try to organize everything so you can keep track of it all. 
Ben: 
The second I walked into the simulator… The second I walked into the simulator, 
I made sure my uh, radios were on the correct stations, my courses were plotted out, my 
GPS was on because I knew the previous time we did the simulation somebody got in 
trouble because they didn't originally check if the GPS was on.  So immediately after the 
previous class I went right to my room and made a checklist about; okay, the stuff, the 
last I did wrong I have to make sure I do right because he's gonna be looking for those 
mistakes again and I want to make sure I cover those.  So I turned the GPS on, I hailed 
ships on 13, did a monitor 16, because we were in VTS area so I put the second radio on 
14… 
They make a good decision because they have a checklist either written down or 
in their mind and that checklist also includes not only stuff that's supposed to happen, but 
maybe even it covers; okay if I do this, if this happens I have a backup plan, you know. 
Gary: 
I was happy with how the voyage plan fit with how we actually brought it into 
Seattle and how it worked and the way points, the turn, turning in the scheme, moving 
further vessels of traffic.  Um it was, I thought it went very smoothly for my first time 
running as the mate. 
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Henry: 
I would definitely, on the chart itself, I would definitely plot the chart a little bit 
more detail, giving myself better note, key notes on the chart, as well as having a list next 
to me of making sure I'm supposed to do this at this time, this at this time and this at this 
time just to keep myself in check and you know, on the safe side that everything went 
correctly.  And you know um, (pause) I would definitely be more detail oriented in 
knowing, you know I’d have to go this way, this way.  Because it was, you know it was 
really the first time that I was really running a bridge by myself.  Because even on the 
ship you know you have real mates on there.  It’s not like the simulator where captain 
normally says, he comes in and says; alright we’re starting and doesn’t give you 
anything.  You kind of have to prepare it all yourself.  So I definitely think there should 
be… I would definitely prepare myself a little bit better.  Because I didn’t know exactly 
what I was walking into and I thought I was prepared for it all and I definitely learned 
that there was a few things I needed to do. 
Ken: 
Uh just, I would say never being satisfied with training.  Honestly like this is, you 
know or making the most out of my time here and the time I'm on the training ship, 
because I mean for most of the cadets here like you know this is, and for really all watch 
officers that come out of the maritime school, you know this is the place where you're 
here to learn, you're here to, you know in an educational environment to soak up as much 
as you can, and uh you know and you’ll learn stuff in the classroom and then you try to 
apply it on the training ship; or on the simulator here which is, you know this is a pretty 
exciting class to be able to, yeah combine your navigation, your rules of the road, your 
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communications classes and be able to be a fully functioning bridge team on there, so. 
While some participants expressed the importance of preparation and self-motivation, 
others expressed the opposite.  Those interviewees who did not have a successful performance 
during their exercise expressed a desire to have been better prepared or to at least have had some 
kind of checklist.  The following transcript excerpts provide evidence of the regret of lack of 
self-motivation.  
Henry: 
I wasn’t going through my checklist of like, my mental checklist of notes to do.  
So I guess it's also I guess you should write things down as well as you know to keep 
yourself in check.  You know when this happens, do this, do this, do this because you 
know you weren’t, I wasn’t 100%, I was focused on one specific thing. 
Jason: 
Yes. I would, well I would go over my information a lot more.  Take my time on 
plotting the chart, take my time reading the chart and knowing my area.  And knowing as 
much information I can about the area, the traffic, all the other ships around me, what 
they’re doing, where they’re going; all that stuff. 
Ken: 
I would say above all preparation or lack of preparation.  Being prepared and 
knowing what to expect you know can lead to; like I just said, you know your initial 
voyage plan you realize that there’s a four knot current over here or there’s a ferry over 
here and you can see those situations before they even happen, with being prepared and 
uh, you know you're instantly ready to make those decisions.  Being unprepared, you 
know as soon as those situations are presented, you start to question yourself or start to 
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have to - it starts to become a thought process instead of, you know second nature to you, 
so. 
Within the third theme, motivations and solutions to decision making, three subthemes 
emerged: rules; knowledge and equipment proficiency; and self-motivation.  All the participants 
described their decision making as being based upon some given rule, rules of the road, or the 
captain’s standing orders.  Despite having knowledge of the rules, 10 of the participants 
overlooked traffic rules that in real life would have had disastrous effects.  During the 
participants’ four year education, they are exposed to and trained on equipment such as radar, 
VHF radio, and electronic charting displays.  Nevertheless, most of the participants struggled 
with knowledge and equipment proficiency that might have assisted them in their decision 
making.  Lacking equipment proficiency likely hindered their decision-making effectiveness.  
Finally, self-motivation is a personal desire to create an environment for success.  Eleven 
participants described the significance of needing to be more effective and productive, and by 
doing so, they understood this as a link to making better decisions.  
Summary  
Phenomenological qualitative research was used to study the decision-making process of 
inexperienced junior officers in a maritime simulator under adverse conditions, focusing 
particularly on how they described their experiences.  The utilization of the hermeneutic 
phenomenology research design allowed me to study the participants in a common experience 
that included decision making in the maritime domain, while experiencing a complex, ill-
defined, time-critical situation.  Furthermore, the design provided opportunity for inquiry into the 
meaning of the participants’ descriptions of their experiences.  
The participants were students from a northeastern maritime college.  They participated 
132 
 
in the NAUT 416 Bridge Watch Standing class, which included simulation exercises.  During the 
simulation, more than half of the participants safely navigated the channel.  However, 11 of the 
15 participants had trouble communicating on the VHF radio with the other vessels, and 
identifying the positions of those vessels.  With the purpose of addressing the elements within 
each of the three research questions, three themes were identified: (a) the decision making 
process, (b) factors in decision making, and (c) motivations, and solutions.  The discovery of 
these themes required an analysis of the observations, personal notes, and transcripts of 
interviews with the participants.  This chapter presented those results.  In the next chapter, these 
results will be discussed, conclusions drawn, and recommendations made both for the maritime 
industry and for future research.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Overview 
This study was an investigation into the decision-making process of inexperienced junior 
officers in a maritime simulator under adverse conditions, and how they described their 
experiences.  This chapter presents a discussion of the findings from Chapter Four and their 
implications.  The chapter also presents the limitations of the study, as well as suggestions for 
future research.  
Summary of Findings 
The analysis of data collected through observations and interviews revealed three main 
themes: the Decision Making Process, Factors in Decision Making, and Motivations and 
Solutions to Decision Making.  Of the three main themes, nine key points or subthemes were 
identified.  The first Research Question (RQ) required the junior watch officers to describe their 
decision-making process in an adverse situation.  The decision-making process was based on 
how well they were prepared for the exercise, how well they knew themselves and their abilities, 
and whether or not they took the simulation seriously.   
The Decision-Making Process 
Preparation. The first subtheme identified for contributing to the decision-making 
process was preparation.  Participants were required to be prepared with a voyage plan that had 
their personal notes, required calls, course and speed changes, and list of navigational aids (see 
Appendix B).  Price (2013) recommended that watch officers during their watch turnover, “must 
follow a formal checklist to avoid missing important details,” and while on watch continue to, 
“use checklists, state boards and memory aids” (p. 5).   The participants recognized the 
importance of preparing for the watch and then using a checklist, whether a mental or an actual 
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list.  Nonetheless, at least six participants were not ready for the simulation.  Each participant 
had access to the same material in Appendix B.  The reasons that were given for lack of 
preparation were that they were rushed between one group and another, the other team members 
did not prepare their part for the exercises, or they were not motivated to put any effort into 
preparing for the simulation.   
Those participants who did have a plan used it to assist them in their decision making.  
When they encountered unexpected traffic, the plan assisted those participants to know what 
radio frequency should be used to make the appropriate call, to be aware of their current location, 
and to understand what course they needed to use to get back on their original track.  The voyage 
plan is required both by most shipping companies and by the Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).  
 The voyage plan is created by the navigator, approved by the captain, and disseminated 
to the ship’s officers.  This is a comprehensive plan that takes the ship from the dock of 
departure to the dock at the arrival destination.  Each officer is responsible to know the 
information in the plan.  Additionally, while underway at sea, the mate, prior to taking over the 
watch, is required to get the current status of the engineering plant, their current location in the 
voyage, and any events expected during their watch, as well as the current meteorological 
conditions and forecast.  At least three participants recognized that regardless of the existence of 
a voyage plan, a checklist for their watch would have benefited their performance and decision 
making.  
Self-awareness.  The second subtheme identified for contributing to the decision-making 
process was self-awareness.  People with good self-awareness are cognizant of their own moods.  
This awareness allows a person in the midst of turmoil to take an internal step back and to reflect 
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on one’s behavior.  Personality traits and past experiences typically determine where people are 
on an emotional awareness range.  People can be so overwhelmed by their emotions that they 
may feel helpless and out of control.  When decisions cannot be made through rationalization or 
formal logic, these decisions are made through what Goleman (1995) calls a gut feeling, which is 
emotional wisdom that is based upon past understandings.  Even when humans do not recall a 
specific experience, the emotions associated with that experience can become an intuitive signal, 
which guides a person’s emotions in a specific direction.  Subsequently, that person can choose 
to attend to the emotion or ignore it.  Mariners on the bridge of a ship, while trying to formulate a 
decision, may use their gut feelings if nothing comes to mind when dealing with an unfamiliar 
event (Goleman, 1995). 
Self-awareness is similar to situation awareness in that they are both internal behaviors of 
the watchstanders: however, this is where the similarities end, because situation awareness is 
more global in its construct.  It is a term used in resource management that means that people 
know what is going on around them.  This type of awareness considers all the visual cues, 
displays, communications, traffic, navigation, personal availability, and capabilities of the vessel 
to prioritize and formulate a possible solution (Chauvin, Clostermann, & Hoc, 2008; United 
States Coast Guard Auxiliary, 1998).  Self-awareness describes how the person will react to the 
information that situation awareness provides.  
A voyage plan gives the participant specific information on where to go and what to 
expect during the voyage: however, it does not help with unexpected obstacles such as traffic and 
the prevailing meteorological conditions.  In the simulation, the weather conditions were 
controlled, and even though the traffic was on planned routes, what was unplanned was where 
the participants were in their voyage and how they reacted to the events that occurred during the 
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simulation.  More than two thirds of the participants were aware of the traffic around them: 
however, less than half of that traffic was observed and described.  Their interviews revealed 
some indecisiveness in the maneuvers.  Four observed maneuvers were either delayed or missed 
because of indecisiveness.  Five participants appeared to have good self-awareness, because 
when encountering unexpected traffic, they were able to communicate effectively and maneuver 
their ships for a safe passage between vessels.  
Simulated versus real world experience.  The third subtheme identified for contributing 
to the decision-making process was the extent to which the participants took the simulated 
experience seriously, as if it was a real experience.  High resolution, full-scale bridge simulators 
have been used in maritime education for over 25 years as an effective tool for training bridge 
personnel.  These simulators have been used to teach new mariners how to stand a watch at sea 
or at anchorage.  They also have been used to assess and provide experience for mariners in 
critical and adverse situations.  Simulation gives the mariner a chance to react and experience a 
scenario that would otherwise be life threatening or catastrophic to the vessel or environment.  
Seven of the 15 participants accepted the simulation as a real world experience.  Those 
who did not take the simulation seriously felt that it was too much like a video game or the 
visuals and the controls were not effective.  They explained that the simulator used was unable to 
give a proper feel for depth perception and a sensation of actual motion.  Another problem 
experienced was the limitation of the simulator’s console and equipment.  The participants 
indicated that looking aft or around obstructions required the operator to use visual controls to 
rotate the view which would not be an option in a real world scenario.  
Factors in Decision Making 
RQ2 inquired about which factors could be identified as affecting (positively or 
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negatively) the participants’ critical decision-making process.  The participants were quite 
descriptive of what influenced their decisions.  From the interviews, three subthemes were 
identified: confidence, workload, and team cooperation. 
Confidence.  The first subtheme identified as a key factor influencing decision making 
was confidence.  Bandura (1997) contrasted confidence and self-efficacy in that confidence was 
a strength of a belief rather than an affirmation of abilities and belief.  To more closely 
investigate this contrast, this study included a self-efficacy questionnaire, the results of which 
were compared with participants’ statements about confidence.  Interviews for this study 
presented confidence as a factor that was expressed by all of the participants.  Six participants 
with high self-efficacy and who expressed confidence had a successful voyage.  Two participants 
who had high self-efficacy and little or no confidence completed their voyage.  One with high 
self-efficacy expressing little self-confidence failed his voyage.  Three with low self-efficacy 
expressing their confidence failed to complete their voyage.  Two with no confidence and low 
self-efficacy failed to complete their voyage.  Only one with low self-efficacy and with high self-
confidence completed his voyage.  
Seven participants who expressed some degree of confidence did complete their voyage.  
This number does not suggest that confidence was as significant a factor in completion of the 
voyage as self-efficacy.  Nevertheless, all the participants expressed that confidence was a factor 
in their decision making.  Three of the participants who did not complete their voyage expressed 
their poor performance was due to not being confident in their decisions.  They realized that their 
lack of confidence caused them to waiver in decisions that caused them to either overlook or 
delay a critical decision. 
Workload.  A second key factor influencing decision making was workload.  Price 
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(2013) recognized the importance of effectively managing workload and suggested some tricks 
of the trade for avoiding traffic, particularly that time is of the essence and mariners should not 
waste it.  Additionally, he noted that mariners should never assume that any other vessel will 
comply with the rules and nowhere in the rules does it state that a vessel should stand into 
danger.  He considered anticipation to be the key to success.  Nevertheless, for this to occur 
would necessitate the officer on watch to be aware of the surroundings, the direction and flow of 
the traffic.  The scenario in the simulator had the participants confined to a vessel traffic 
separation scheme with defined boundaries of traffic flow in the Puget Sound.  The exercise was 
conducted at night with dense traffic.  Even for a seasoned, experienced deck officer, this 
scenario can prove to be challenging.  The mate was not only required to navigate the channel 
safely, but also to avoid traffic and make appropriate calls to other vessels and to the captain as 
required by the standing orders.  
Situation awareness required the participants to balance a multi-tasking workload by 
being aware of the traffic around them, determining if a chance of collision existed, 
communicating with other entities outside the vessel, and keeping the captain informed, as 
required by standing orders, to be able to safely navigate the channel.  With multi-tasking Miller 
(1994) suggested that the most information an average person can hold in immediate memory is 
between five and nine items, with more items being a more overwhelming workload.  Coupling 
this fact with the notion that novice decision makers did not have sufficient experience to 
prioritize the situation, some failures of decision making were to be expected.   
Twelve of the 16 participants felt that workload was a factor in whether they overlooked 
or delayed making a decision.  They described that they became focused on traffic in front of the 
ship but practically ignored those vessels that came from behind the ship.  Workload also became 
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a factor in the navigation.  When the mate was focused on traffic, in many cases navigation was 
overlooked, and turns were delayed or forgotten.  The same issue arose when calling the captain 
at specific points or responding to other vessels calling the ship.  The mate on watch often was 
preoccupied and did not seem to properly prioritize the necessary responses to the situation.  
Team Cooperation.  How well a team cooperated emerged to be another factor in the 
decision making of the junior officer.  When a team or a team member was not forthcoming in 
giving information or ignored the information, the mate on watch failed to make a good decision.  
Seven of the 15 participants had effective teams assist them in their decision making regardless 
of the success of the voyage.  Two participants who had good communication with their teams, 
but who had low self-efficacy, failed their voyage.  These participants were wavering in their 
decision making regardless of team recommendations and input.  Five participants’ teams had 
good teamwork and a successful voyage, while three teams with seemingly ineffective teamwork 
still completed their voyages.  Those three participants with poor teamwork described in the 
interview that they decided to make their own decisions in spite of the lack of information or 
communication from the other team members.  Four participants who had poor teamwork and 
failed the voyage explained their team was neither prepared, nor familiar with the equipment, or 
they just outright failed to communicate.  
Motivations and Solutions to Decision Making  
RQ3 examined the motivations and solutions of participants in their decision making.  
The observations and the interviews suggested that three subthemes motivated the participants to 
a particular solution: rules, knowledge, and self-motivation.  The three subthemes described how 
a participant decided on a solution and the motivation behind the decision. 
  
140 
 
Rules.  The primary action to solving a problem was to use some rule or guideline.  The 
use of rules was indicated by behaviors that were directly guided by procedures, official 
guidelines, instructions, and other rules.  Given an event or situation that occurred, the 
participant used a rule-based behavior and then executed an action based upon that rule or 
guideline.  This action was observed in the simulations when the participants made a collision-
avoidance maneuver or made calls as prescribed by the standing orders.  
In the interviews, the participants discussed rules affecting their decision making, such as 
the captain’s standing order and collision avoidance rules.  Even when questioning the 
participants on why they made the call to the captain knowing that they may incur the captain’s 
ire, they based their decisions on the captain’s standing orders.  When maneuvering the vessel in 
close quarters situations, all of the participants cited the collision avoidance regulation.  
Knowledge.  Another subtheme motivating participants to a solution was knowledge.  
When rules did not apply, the knowledge that they had learned in class or from other sources was 
employed.  Like rules which served as a guideline to making a decision, the participants’ 
knowledge, whether gained from classroom experiences or from the summer cruises, was a 
factor in making decisions in the simulator.  Participants understood that if a person was focused 
and dedicated to his or her studies, that person would be a better officer on the bridge.  This was 
apparent in the simulation when mates or team members failed to demonstrate their abilities or 
knowledge of navigation, collision avoidance, or radio communication.  This lack of knowledge 
of the equipment, the collision avoidance rules, or the captain’s standing orders did adversely 
affect the participant’s decision making and the success of the voyage. 
Self-Motivation.  The final subtheme contributing to overall motivation in decision 
making is that of self-motivation.  Those participants who appeared to have good self-motivation 
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had a less stressful time when they encountered unexpected traffic and events.  Goleman’s 
(1995) theory suggested that motivating oneself allows an individual to direct one’s emotions in 
order to master a goal.  A person who is successful at this skill is more likely to be effective and 
productive.  Emotions can paralyze the brain and overwhelm concentration, which in turn can 
overpower the cognitive processes of working memory, resulting in a failure to think effectively.  
Motivating oneself is immensely more than preparation, because it involves personal motivation 
in every aspect of one’s life.  More than half of the interviewees discussed the importance of a 
voyage plan and a checklist for preparation; however, two of the participants discussed self-
motivation in that preparations and getting the most out of their educational experience should 
continue throughout their maritime careers.  
Discussion 
The previous section summarized results from Chapter Four.  Because no previous study 
has been conducted with junior officer decision making, this section will focus on the 
relationship of the empirical literature reviewed under the theoretical framework from Chapter 
Two and how it relates to the findings.  This study does add to the body of knowledge of those 
researchers studying novice decision makers.  
Working Memory 
Even though short-term or working memory (WM), was not measured directly in this 
study, intense looks on the faces of the participants were evident during the simulations when 
events such as dense traffic and the operation of safe navigation were in progress.   During these 
episodes participants’ WM was processing high amounts of information, which resulted in 
decisions being delayed or overlooked.  Miller (1994) suggested that an average person could 
hold between five and nine items in immediate memory.  Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and 
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Conway (1999) suggested that novice decision makers’ WM can be predictive of performance on 
a wide variety of cognitive tasks. 
Two themes, workload and self-awareness, were identified to reflect the issue of WM 
within this study.  During the simulation, the following workload demands were made: (a) traffic 
density increased, (b) other vessels were communicating with each other, (c) the voyage plan had 
required reporting points, and (d) the standing order had equipment for specific reports to make 
to the captain or the engineers.  Nine of the 15 participants expressed their frustration with the 
workload, and six of the participants did not complete their voyage.  Many of those who did not 
complete the voyage were distracted with collision avoidance, communication, or other issues of 
navigation.  Stressful workload has been documented as one of the key reasons for maritime 
incidents (Grech, Horberry, & Koester, 2008; Lin, 2006; Rothblum, 2000; Wang & Zhang, 
2000).  Additionally, one of the components of improper self-awareness became evident when 
participants faced a stressful situation and were less able to reason because of emotional 
hijacking, which arrested the cognitive processes and potentially restricted or shut down WM 
(Goleman, 1995). 
Also related to WM, general fluid intelligence (gF) is a person’s capacity to think 
logically and solve problems in novel situations.  Utilizing gF, a person would be able to analyze 
novel problems, identify patterns and their relationships, and use logic to come to a solution 
(Engle et al., 1999).  Dang, Braeken, Ferrer, and Liu (2012) showed a strong correlation between 
visuo-spatial WM and gF.  They felt that it was possible to focus training on content-specific 
memory components.  Dang et al. stated, “This route sounds more promising than when WM 
would only be a unitary resource system, and should be beneficial to certain jobs such as in air 
traffic control” (p. 506).  This notion suggested that as the participants continue to utilize the 
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simulator (visuo-spatial) training, they could experience an increase in the capacity of the WM, 
which could improve the participants’ decision-making ability.  
Skills, Rules and Knowledge 
To describe human behavior from a variety of events such as everyday routine activities 
to situations that are unexpected and novel, Rasmussen (1983) created the skill, rule, and 
knowledge-based behaviors (SRK) model.  Skill-based behaviors are those that are usually 
unconscious, routine activities that have been well rehearsed.  Those operations performed, such 
as by the team member who served as the helmsman, would be a demonstration of routine 
behaviors that have been well rehearsed.  In this study, the participants, who were the mates on 
watch, did incorporate some well-rehearsed activities that were devolved in previous classes and 
performed during their summer cruises.  The skills of operating radar or talking on the VHF 
radio would be considered skilled behavior.  
Continuing with Rasmussen’s (1983) model, the use of rules was recognized by all of the 
participants, who also noted the rules affected their decision making.  Rasmussen explained that 
this behavior was based upon an established set of rules or guidelines.  An illustration of the use 
of rules was when the participants, in their decision making, obeyed the standing orders or 
followed collision avoidance regulations, such as the rules of the road.  Price (2013) described 
the rules of the road as, “a logical protocol designed to keep vessels apart and to provide a 
complete and sufficient framework, within which to defend yourself, your vessel and the lives of 
others”, and to “think of the COLREGS as ‘ship separation rules’” (p. 4). 
As a deviation appeared, some participants made a corrective action based upon a set of 
rules.  However, when rules no longer applied and a novel situation developed, then according to 
Rasmussen (1983), the participant used knowledge-based behaviors.  The participants who were 
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able to effectively cope with a new situation referred back to previous knowledge gained in their 
class, created a plan, and then through trial and error were able to come to a satisfactory 
conclusion.  Even though all the participants primarily used rules to avoid a collision, several 
traffic situations did not fall under the typical rules.  Nonetheless, those participants who 
successfully completed their voyage were considered to have demonstrated good, knowledge-
based behaviors, because they were able to effectively cope with new, time-sensitive, 
unpredictable, and stressful situations. 
Novice Decision Makers 
The literature pertaining to novice decision makers is sparse.  Related studies could only 
be found in the medical domain, particularly in the nursing field.  Kosowski and Roberts (2003) 
conducted an interpretive phenomenological study to discover, describe, and analyze the stories 
of 10 novice nurse practitioners who used intuition in clinical decision making.  Their study was 
not based upon real time decision making but utilized after-the-fact reflective interviews about 
the decisions the nurse practitioners made based upon intuition or their gut feelings.  Even 
though there was very little relationship to this maritime study, there were three themes 
paralleling the decision making of this study’s participants.  
The first theme in Kosowski and Robert’s (2003) study was backing it up. Essentially this 
meant that participants who had an intuitive thought tried to back up that feeling with additional 
data or cues.  Similarly, during this study’s interviews, the junior officers stated that they would 
see a situation develop and try to confirm their assessment of the situation with other team 
members or further examine their data from the radar.  
The second theme, knows the rules, indicated when the participant knew the rules yet 
took a risk in a decision (Kosowski & Roberts, 2003).  Again, during this study’s interviews, 
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most of the deck officers were well aware of the rules, yet there were a few who did take a risk in 
their maneuvers or navigation.  In half the cases the risk worked, but did not in the other half.  
One example is when Edward was the mate on a container ship inbound to Seattle.  He 
encountered a vessel overtaking his ship at high speed.  He was supposed to contact the other 
ship and if that failed, he was required to maneuver his ship to avoid a collision and allow for an 
obvious clearing distance between the two vessels for a safe passage.  From my display in the 
control room, it looked like there was a collision; however, the system did not register as such.  
In the interview I asked him about the encounter, and he felt that while he could have made the 
gap wider between the two vessels, he made an assumption that he had enough clearance. 
The third theme, reflecting (Kosowski & Roberts, 2003), occurred when participants 
were looking back and reflecting on what they did, either right or wrong, and how they could 
have improved.  The observations in this maritime study were in real time, in what could be 
considered an aggressive scenario, whereas the interviews in this study had the junior officers 
later describe their decision making during that adverse situation.  Subsequent to the 
observations occurring in real time, the interviews required reflection on what had already 
transpired.  With these reflections, most of the participants realized that there were moments they 
could have made better decisions. 
Chalko, Ebright, Patterson, and Urden (2004) conducted a study that identified the human 
performance factors that characterized novice registered nurses.  They identified nine themes.  
They were: (a) clinically focused critical thinking; (b) seeking assistance from experienced 
nurses; (c) knowledge of unit and workflow patterns; (d) first-time experiences; (e) time 
constraints; (f) hand-offs; (g) influence of peer pressure and social norms; (h) losing the big 
picture; and (i) novice assisting novice (Chalko et al., 2004).  Chalko et al.’s study focused more 
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on human performance than on decision making.  
Two of the themes in Chalko et al.’s (2004) study, time constraints and losing the big 
picture, were related to this study.  Like the theme workload in this study, time constraints dealt 
with an emerging event that caused the participant to feel overwhelmed.  Additionally, a similar 
occurrence was noted by this study’s workload and self-awareness factors when describing 
losing the big picture.  The participants in Chalko et al. (2004) were not able to describe what 
they were experiencing when they lost track of the larger picture, while the participants in this 
study did describe their decision making when they lost the big picture.  Some of the participants 
were able to make suggestions about what they could have done to remedy the situation.  
Furthermore, the participants who did succeed in their voyage plan described what they did to 
prevent losing the big picture.  The big picture is also considered in the maritime industry as 
situation awareness. 
Emotional Intelligence 
During this study, two themes became apparent that needed further explanation.  
Participants were expressing their inner thoughts and behaviors about why they did or did not 
make good decisions.  Even though the studies by Kong-Hee (2012) and Lakomski and Evers 
(2010) pointed to the right direction, their description of what was going on emotionally with 
decision making did not completely analyze what the participants were describing.  Goleman’s 
(1995) Emotional Intelligence model, however, featured five distinct constructs that were helpful 
in further analyzing decision making: self-awareness (knowing one’s emotions), managing 
emotions, motivating oneself, recognizing emotions in others, and handling relationships. 
Two constructs helped formulate the themes and explain what the participants were 
describing: self-awareness and self-motivation.  Self-awareness describes how much individuals 
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know or are aware of how they feel (Goleman, 1995).  While the participants were engaging in a 
situation, their inner self-talk was either talking them into a solution or telling them they were in 
dire straits.  The participants who were in control of the situation were feeling less stress and 
more confidence, and were able to convince themselves that they were doing the right thing.  
Those who were less than successful experienced conflicting thoughts and feelings, which many 
of the participants called being double minded.  Even though they were aware of their state of 
mind, they lacked the skill to dispel their mental anxiety.   
While self-awareness indicated how much participants were aware of their present 
emotion, self-motivation was how much individuals deal with and control their emotions.  
Having control over one’s emotion has shown that individuals can have more control of their 
decision making.  Motivating oneself is how individuals are able to direct their emotions in 
succeeding at a goal (Goleman, 1995).  The interviewees described the need for preparing for the 
simulation or indicating that they had wished they had used either a written or a mental checklist.  
Those participants who were able to complete their voyages successfully discussed how they had 
a proper voyage plan and how they felt their education, even as far back as their first year in 
school, benefited their ability to make competent decisions.  
Self-Efficacy 
Even though emotional intelligence has influence on a person’s ability to make a 
decision, other factors were found to have influence as well.  One part of this study was to 
investigate if self-efficacy had a role in individual ability to make a decision.  According to 
Bandura (1997), “Perceived self-efficacy refers to belief in one's agentive capabilities that one 
can produce given levels of attainment.  A self-efficacy belief, therefore, includes both an 
affirmation of a capability level and the strength of that belief” (p. 382).  Bandura (2006) 
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described self-efficacy as people’s belief in their own ability to succeed in specific situations.  If 
a person is considered to have high self-efficacy, then that person believes the task can be 
achieved (Bandura, 2006; Miller, 2011; Ponton & Rhea, 2006).   
It was noted in both National Transportation Safety Board reports (1990, 2008) that 
neither the Exxon Valdez nor the Empress of the North’s third officer notified the captain in a 
timely manner as required by the captain’s standing orders.  New deck officers, if they are 
following the standing orders or if they are in doubt of their situation, are required to notify the 
captain.  However, in previous research Feltz and Hepler (2012a) suggested that if new deck 
officers have low self-efficacy, do not believe in their own capabilities, and do not wish to look 
like ineffective watchstanders, they may not make the call to the captain.  
The General Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (GSE) was used in this study, not as a statistical 
measure, but to investigate how much self-efficacy has influence on the person’s decision 
making.  The assumption is if individuals have a high self-efficacy, then they should be able to 
make calls to the captain without fears of repercussions.  Feltz and Hepler (2012a) concluded 
that self-efficacy was a significant constant predictor of decision making and that it was beyond 
the influence of past performance.  The initial premise was to examine if someone with low self-
efficacy would not make the required calls to the captain as required by the standing orders.  
From the observations and the questionnaire, there were some surprising results.  
The GSE was administered prior to the interview (see Appendix E).  The results are 
shown in Table 2.  Schwarzer (2008) established the boundary for low self-efficacy as any 
number below 30 points on a scale of 40 points.  The scores in Table 2 indicated that six out of 
15 participants in this study scored below 30 points.  The scores of both high and low self-
efficacy were compared with participant actions observed during the simulations.  This included 
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comparing the questionnaire results both with the results of completion of the required passage  
Table 2  
General Self-Efficacy Questionnaire Results 
 
 
and with the number of times the participants made appropriate calls to the captain or others.  
The course syllabus in Appendix B provides different simulator exercises.  Even though 
not all participants did the same exercise, all were exposed to a nighttime scenario with the same 
amount of crossing traffic and overtaking traffic.  Each scenario had at least eight calls that were 
required by the standing orders and the scenario outline (see Appendix B).  Although the 
simulator situations posed similar challenges, allowing effective comparison, self-efficacy levels 
did not prove to be constant with the participants.  When counting the number of proper calls 
either to the captain, the chief engineer, or outside entities as required by the standing orders, 
those participants who scored high self-efficacy averaged a mean score of 7.78 calls.  Those who 
scored low self-efficacy averaged a mean score of 7.0 calls (see Table 3), suggesting no notable 
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relationship between the participants’ self-efficacy scores and number of calls to the captain.   
Table 3  
Number of Appropriate Calls Made 
 Self –Efficacy Number of    
Names Score Required Calls    
Alan 38 6    
Ben 36 5    
Carl 31 8    
Diane 24 9    
Edward 29 2    
Frank 35 3    
Gary 34 14    
Henry 28 9    
Ike 32 13    
Jason 28 9    
Ken 29 2    
Lamont 31 5    
Mark 30 4    
Nat 32 12    
Oscar 28 11    
      
Average calls made by participant with high self-efficacy 7.8 
 
Average calls made by participant with low self-efficacy 7.0 
 
Those who scored low on the self-efficacy scale did call the captain, and some who had 
high self-efficacy did not always make the required calls.  Participants like Diane and Oscar 
made considerable calls to the captain; even though Diane had the lowest GSE score and 
received scorn from the captain for her mistakes, she still made several calls.  The explanations 
provided in the interviews were that calls were required by the standing orders.  Diane’s actions 
corroborate Rasmussen (1983) and Price (2013) in their assertion that in crisis, people often 
depend on established rules to help guide their decisions. 
Another finding was that those who scored highly on the self-efficacy scale were more 
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likely to complete their voyage successfully.  Although I did not specifically seek this finding, it 
was not unexpected.  Prior to conducting the research, I was curious about the impact of self-
efficacy on decision making, which in this study was based on whether or not the participant 
called the captain when a situation deemed it necessary.  The premise of calling the captain was 
grounded on previous incidences that involved a third officer failing to make the required call.     
The issue of self-efficacy did manifest itself when participants were describing a situation 
and their subsequent decision.  Of particular interest was what they were feeling during the 
process of making a decision and whether the decision was a good one or not.  Nonetheless, 
eight of the nine participants with high self-efficacy and only one with low self-efficacy 
completed their voyage. These results could be indicating that junior officers with high self-
efficacy should be able to make reasonably good decisions and would more than likely have a 
successful watch.  
Five of the six participants who had low self-efficacy scores did not complete the 
required passage (see Table 4).  For participants to not complete a passage indicates one of the 
following: they had a collision or grounding, missed the turn going either in out of the harbor, or 
headed the wrong way.  Only one of the nine who had a high self-efficacy score did not complete 
the required passage plan, which suggests that the participants with lower self-efficacy scores 
performed poorer on the simulation task than those with higher self-efficacy scores. 
The GSE Questionnaire (see Appendix E) was not used as a statistical measure although seven of 
the participants did score high for self-efficacy.  Because the sample size of participants was 
small, it would be difficult to draw any conclusions from the numbers that are presented in this 
study.  However, triangulating the participants’ responses to certain GSE questions and my 
observation notes with their comments and reflections on their decision making during the 
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interviews helped shed insight into their decision-making process and key influencing factors. 
Table 4  
Factors in Decision-Making Themes: Self-Efficacy and Voyage Completion 
 
Cross referencing the information in Appendix E, showing the specific questions on the 
GSE, with Table 2, showing each participants’ score for each question on the GSE, and with 
Table 4, showing both participants’ individual self-efficacy levels and the status of their voyage 
completion provided helpful information.  For example, GSE Question 6, “I can solve most 
problems if I invest the necessary effort,” had the highest mean score 3.667 out of 4.  Most 
participants recognized the importance of preparation; even those who were not properly 
prepared understood that this lack of effort could have prevented them from succeeding, as 
revealed in their interview reflections on preparedness. 
GSE Question 7, “I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my 
coping abilities,” had an overall mean score 2.8 which was the second lowest score.  Three of the 
participants who scored low for self-efficacy indicated a low score in that particular question as 
well.  Additionally, those three participants had the greatest difficulty in the simulation.  When 
the situation became difficult and overwhelming, it was clear from the observations that those 
three participants were displaying signs of frustration.  Diane had problems with her navigator, 
who did not volunteer to participate in the interview or GSE parts of this study but who was 
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clearly unable to perform her job.  Diane was trying desperately to recover from this negative 
team work situation.  She was on the wrong side of the channel as a result of the lack of 
information coming from the navigator.  Eventually with some guidance from the instructor, she 
was able to get back on track, but her frustration was obvious.   
The lowest mean score, 2.553 out of 4, was from GSE Question 2, “If someone opposes 
me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.”  Alan scored the highest for self-efficacy, 
as well as for GSE Question 2.  He was also one of the few participants who had the least 
difficulty in the simulation.  As in Diane’s situation with her navigator, seven of the participants’ 
teams were not effective in assisting the participant in completing their voyage.  It was also 
observed that none of those participants challenged their teams when faced with difficulties, 
reflected by the low score responses to GSE Question 2.  
Feltz and Hepler (2012b) stated, “In other words, participants with low self-efficacy took 
longer to make their decisions than those confident in their decision-making capabilities” (p. 
160).  Eight participants completed their voyage and only one of those eight scored low for self-
efficacy.  Many of the participants expressed confidence as a factor in their decision making.  
However, Bandura (1997) cautioned that confidence was not to be confused with self-efficacy.  
Although many interchange those terms, Bandura considered confidence to be a colloquial term 
without strong meaning, whereas self-efficacy expressed the strength of one’s belief in the ability 
to achieve a goal.  An interview with Diane might suggest that Bandura’s belief about confidence 
may be correct.  She started off in the simulation with confidence, and she was knowledgeable 
about the captain’s standing orders, how to do navigation, and how to operate the radars.  
However, when the vessel was leaving the harbor, it was not up to the required speed set by the 
captain’s orders.  This got her in trouble with both the chief engineer and the captain. As soon as 
154 
 
the conditions became increasingly overwhelming, her low self-efficacy prevented her from 
successfully completing the voyage, regardless of her initial feeling of confidence. 
Table 5 indicates those most likely to have a successful voyage were those participants 
with high self-efficacy.  Those who were most likely to not complete their voyage had low self-
efficacy as well as workload issues as a factor in their decision making.  Even though confidence 
was described by most of the participants as a factor in good decision making, Table 5 indicates 
that it did not have any effect on the completion of a voyage.  
Two participants did not seem to follow the predicted pattern for success or failure. Carl, 
who had a high self-efficacy score and no workload issues, failed to have a successful voyage.  
Ken who had a low self-efficacy score and workload issues, managed to have a successful 
voyage.  But, there was one distinguishing item that may have made the difference in their 
success or failure, and that was teamwork.  Carl had poor team work, while Ken had good 
teamwork.  Even though the other participants seem to follow certain identified factors for their 
Table 5  
Factors in Decision-Making Themes 
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success or failure, Ken’s success could potentially be attributed to his team providing good 
recommendations as well as to him being receptive to those recommendations. 
Competency.  Even though competency was not directly addressed in the study, it 
became apparent as a factor in good decision making.  Competency is a difficult construct to 
define.  Most general definitions suggest it measures the success of one’s ability or knowledge.  
The STCW Code considers that the standard of competence:  
…means the level of proficiency to be achieved for the proper performance of functions 
on board ship in accordance with the internationally agreed criteria as set forth herein and 
incorporating prescribed standards or levels of knowledge, understanding and 
demonstrated skill. (International Maritime Organization, 2011, p. 4) 
For junior officers to be recognized as competent officers, they must demonstrate their 
knowledge of the rules of the road, the equipment on the bridge of the vessel, knowledge of 
navigation and proper watchstanding procedures.  Therefore, the eight participants who 
successfully completed their voyage would be considered competent.  
 Implications 
Maritime commerce has been a global occupation since ancient times.  Incidents are as 
old as recorded history.  When an incident occurs there is usually loss of lives, damage to the 
cargo or passengers, or damage or destruction to the vessel.  Each time these incidents occur, the 
cost of indemnification of the ship and crew rises, which affects all consumers up and down the 
economic chain (UK P&I Club, 1996).  The findings in this study about novice junior maritime 
officers has global implications for the industry and for maritime education.   
Maritime Educators 
Once mariners make the decision to become an officer, their training is crucial and must 
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benefit them when the time comes for them to stand alone on the bridge of a ship.  Some of the 
participants like Ken were not satisfied with just attending school and getting a degree.  They 
went to school with the sole intent of absorbing as much knowledge and experiences their 
education had to offer.  These individuals made the most of their summer training cruises and 
any hands-on or simulation activities the school had available.  They knew that this education 
was what was going to make them a successful and competent officer.  Maritime universities and 
other institutions should help the mariners from day one of their training to understand their 
obligations and responsibilities to their own education.  This emphasis should be ongoing 
throughout their training as they make their transition to becoming officers.  Students with a high 
sense of self-motivation typically take their studies seriously.  
Whether the mariner is seeking to become a junior officer through the traditional means 
of a four-year degree at a university or through a nontraditional license-only track, both mariners 
must meet the training requirements set forth in STCW Code, section and table A-II/1 for 
mandatory minimum requirements for certification of officers in charge of a navigational watch 
on ships of 500 gross tonnage or more (United States Coast Guard, 2014b).  For mariners in the 
United States (US), these required courses are also listed in 46 CFR §11.309.  Irrespective of the 
US legal requirements, the STCW is the international standard for a person’s training to become 
an officer, and the course’s curriculum comes from the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) model course 7.03, “Officer In Charge of a Navigational Watch” (IMO, 2014b). 
Regardless of the path a mariner takes to become a junior officer, the maritime educator 
instructs this individual to accomplish the goal of becoming a competent and qualified officer.  
Most educators utilize learning objectives when conducting a course of instruction.  Maritime 
educators who use the STCW for their instruction follow the Knowledge, Understanding and 
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Proficiency (KUP) of column 2 of the STCW tables to achieve the learning objectives of the 
class.  These KUPs or learning objectives are related to Bloom’s Taxonomy (Bloom, 1956).  
Benjamin Bloom (1956; Seaman, 2011) outlined three areas of learning domains: cognitive, 
affective, and psychomotor.  Much of maritime education curriculum focuses on learning 
objectives primarily from the cognitive and psychomotor domains.  Because this study suggested 
that emotional intelligence has a factor in decision making, educators may need to include more 
affective learning objectives.  Emotions have the ability to impact long-term memory either by 
acceptance or avoidance of a belief or behavior (Buchanan, 2007). 
Holden and Van Valkenburg (2004) described the benefits of addressing the affective 
domain in education.  They noted affective education develops critical thinking and professional 
judgment that stimulates excellence in one’s abilities.  Additionally, affective education inspires 
officers to preserve professional standards and ethics.  From the students’ perspective, affective 
education fosters self-awareness.  Self-awareness was an identified theme, which if properly 
cultivated, helps the students recognize when their emotions are getting in the way of their ability 
to reason, thus interrupting the process of emotional hijacking (Goleman, 1995). 
To facilitate this affective training, many of the courses put forth by the STCW should be 
combined or followed in sequential order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the learning 
objectives.  Courses like basic and advanced firefighting can stress the value of the training on 
the crew being their own fire department at sea, where calling 911 would not be possible.  Some 
courses may need to be combined, because a lower level course, like first aid, is prerequisite to 
medical care provider.  This is especially true in navigation in that terrestrial and coastal 
navigation is the base or prerequisite to radar, electronic navigation and electronic chart display, 
in information system courses.  Table 6 suggests which courses could be combined, if not 
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arranged in sequential order.  
Table 6 also suggests which affective learning objectives should be incorporated and 
which key words could be used in writing the course syllabus.  Training needs to include as 
much new technology, as possible as often as possible.  The participants discussed that their 
generation grew up around electronics and computers.  Instructors need to develop into their 
instruction, where appropriate, online simulation for homework, the use of virtual and artificial 
reality training systems, and desktop and full mock-up simulators (Dunleavy, Dede, & Mitchell, 
2009).  Along with the technology, the instructor should take every opportunity to reconstruct 
scenarios from case studies and let the students determine what they would do given similar 
conditions.  Furthermore, instructors can incorporate sites like YouTube and videos from the 
History Channel to dramatize actual shipboard incidents, discuss implications and what the 
decision makers could have done differently. 
Courses like terrestrial and coastal navigation are primarily hands-on learning 
experiences.  Just prior to the students taking their final exam, the course should include a series 
of practical assessments.  The students should as often as possible, conduct navigation exercises 
in a full bridge simulator, given inbound and outbound scenarios.  The team can be divided into 
various roles: a navigational aid bearing taker, a bearing recorder, a chart plotter, and a 
navigation evaluator.  These roles should be rotated with each scenario.  Upon completion of the 
exercise, both the students and the instructor should evaluate the team’s performance and make 
recommendations for self and group improvement.  This approach facilitates the incorporation of 
established affective education learning objectives, such as in responding, valuing, and 
organization, into maritime courses (Bloom, 1956; Holden & Van Valkenburg, 2004; Seaman, 
2011). 
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During the interviews, the participants presented an interesting point about the use of 
electronic aids on the bridge.  When asked about why they focused on one piece of gear over 
another, they said that it was based on how the instructor presented its importance and how to 
use it effectively.  Instructors are a significant part of affective education.  They are the role 
models that these new mariners will emulate.  It is important that the instructors do not portray 
an attitude of do as I say not as I do.  The instructors should include the following strategies in 
their instruction: be nonjudgmental and non-threating; emphasize events like how upcoming 
difficult exams are significant to the course, not merely as a part of the grade, but how it will 
relate to the success of the maritime endeavors; utilize quizzes and exams as a learning 
experience rather than a punitive device; use cooperative rather than competitive learning 
environments (Holden & Van Valkenburg, 2004).  
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Table 6  
Suggested STCW Course and Associated Affective Learning Objectives 
STCW Courses Affective Learning Objectives Affective Objectives Key Works 
Affective Education 
Methods 
Personal Safety and 
Social Responsibility 
(PSSR) 
Receiving,  
Responding, and  
Valuing 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes 
Role Play, Discussions 
that may include ethical 
dilemmas, Emphasize 
the significance of the 
class to actual 
shipboard experience. 
Basic and Advanced 
Firefighting. 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing, and 
Organization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, aids, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
Role Play, Case 
Studies, Discussions, 
Emphasize the 
significance of the class 
to actual shipboard 
experience. 
Personal Survival 
Techniques and 
Proficiency in Survival 
Craft. 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing, and 
Organization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, aids, conforms, discusses, 
labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
Role Play, Case 
Studies, Discussions, 
Emphasize the 
significance of the class 
to actual shipboard 
experience. 
First Aid / CPR and 
Medical Care 
Provider. 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing, and 
Organization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
Role Play, Identify 
problems and discuss 
solutions, Emphasize 
the significance of the 
class to actual 
shipboard experience. 
Seamanship (Able 
Seaman/Seafarer), 
Ship Construction & 
Basic Stability, and 
Cargo handling and 
Stowage. 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing, and 
Organization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
Case Studies, Identify 
problems and discuss 
solutions, Emphasize 
the significance of the 
class to actual 
shipboard experience. 
Terrestrial & Coastal 
Navigation, and 
Magnetic & Gyro 
Compass 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing, and 
Organization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, aids, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
Case Studies, 
Discussions, Role play 
in a simulation activity. 
Emphasize the 
significance of the class 
to actual shipboard 
experience. 
Radar, Automatic 
Radar Plotting Aid, 
Electronic Navigation, 
Electronic Chart 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing,  
Organization and 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
Role Play, Case 
Studies, Create 
challenging situations 
based on case studies, 
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This study also suggested that the curriculum at the earliest level should include frequent 
use of case studies, role playing, and videos to dramatize shipboard incidents and possible 
solutions.  There should be a frequent use of labs and exercises that require constant application 
of problem-solving skills.  Like a muscle or the use of the brain, frequent exercise of problem 
solving that uses the affective domain increases the new officer’s ability to rapidly build self-
awareness and confidence in making decisions.  Self-awareness is a skill of emotional 
intelligence that can be improved (Goleman, 1995).  The course entitled NAUT 416 
Display and 
Information System. 
Characterization appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
acts, discriminates, displays, influences, 
modifies, performs, qualifies, questions, 
revises, serves, solves, verifies 
Identify problems and 
discuss solutions, 
Emphasize the 
significance of the class 
to actual shipboard 
experience. 
Meteorology 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing, and 
Organization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
Case Studies, 
Discussions, Emphasize 
the significance of the 
class. 
Global Maritime 
Distress and Safety 
System (GMDSS) and 
Search and Rescue 
(SAR) 
Receiving,  
Responding,  
Valuing,  
Organization and 
Characterization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, aids, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
acts, discriminates, displays, influences, 
modifies, performs, qualifies, questions, 
revises, serves, solves, verifies 
Role Play, Case 
Studies, Create 
challenging situations 
based on case studies, 
Identify problems and 
discuss solutions, 
Emphasize the 
significance of the 
class. 
Basic Shiphandling, 
Rule of the Road, 
Emergency 
Procedures, Bridge 
Resource 
Management, and 
Watchkeeping. 
 
Receiving, 
Responding,  
Valuing,  
Organization and 
Characterization 
acknowledge, asks, attentive, listens, 
understands 
answers, assists, complies, conforms, 
discusses, labels, performs, presents, tells, 
appreciates, demonstrates, initiates, 
justifies, proposes, compares, relates, 
synthesizes 
acts, discriminates, displays, influences, 
modifies, performs, qualifies, questions, 
revises, solves, verifies 
Role Play, Case 
Studies, Create 
challenging situations 
based on case studies, 
Identify problems and 
discuss solutions, 
Emphasize the 
significance of the class 
as it applies to their 
upcoming occupation 
endeavors. 
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(watchkeeping) was a culmination of all the participants’ training.  Introducing application 
assignments earlier in their educational process prior to this culminating course may have 
benefitted the participants and their performance.  
The Maritime Industry 
Unless the mariner is a career third officer, most new junior officers reporting to the 
vessels may come for their first sea tour.  In a three-section watch rotation, many companies 
have the third officer stand the 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. (0800-1200) watch and again the 8 p.m. to 12 
midnight (2000-2400) watch.  This assignment is so the captain will be readily available for this 
inexperienced officer.  The captain, the chief officer and the second officer should be willing to 
assist in training the new officer.  Diane expressed the benefit of learning from other officers on 
the bridge.  This insight stemmed from her experience working with high school students where 
she was a mentor to students learning about safe boating.  She desired opportunities to walk 
around with more experienced officers to see how they conducted their watches, and wanted to 
be free to ask why they made one decision over another.  She wanted to learn from other officers 
the best solutions to difficult problems encountered on a ship.  Nevertheless, she expressed some 
apprehension that a senior officer may be unreceptive and less than cooperative due to her being 
new onboard the vessel.  
Shipboard organization is a hierarchy arrangement with the captain at the top having 
absolute authority.  Because of the limited size of ship crews, most ship’s crews have close-knit 
relationships, and it is generally assumed that all crew members are knowledgeable in their 
duties and are expected to work together as a team.  However, when new officers join the vessel, 
they normally do not have the experience or comprehensive knowledge that senior officers have 
already acquired over time.  Unfortunately, the result is that the other, more experienced officers 
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are not always accepting of the new junior officer as part of their team.  This lack of initial 
acceptance is because some senior officers have unrealistic expectations that juniors should be 
able to competently stand their watch alone, having already acquired the necessary knowledge 
and decision-making skills (Hetherington, Flin, & Mearns, 2006; Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel, 
& Baldauf, 2012).  
These unrealistic expectations are often based on the assumption that simply by virtue of 
being an officer, the new officer is fully knowledgeable and competent to stand the watch 
independently.  The standing orders state that when the captain is not on the bridge, the third 
officer is to call the captain either to keep him informed or to request assistance (Schröder-
Hinrichs et al., 2012).  It was noted from the interviews that junior officers may decide to not call 
the captain, because they think they should know what to do, they do not want to look 
incompetent, or they are afraid of upsetting the captain by calling him.  Several participants 
expressed this view of fear and inadequacy.  They suggested an alternative solution to alleviate 
their apprehensions, by having someone to help them get established and comfortable with their 
watch at least for the first several months onboard. 
The long-term solution is to educate intermediate and senior level officers about the 
benefits their operations gain by effectively mentoring new officers.  This would include 
teaching them how to mentor and educate the new junior officer.  Goldberg (2013) stated that 
70% of professional knowledge comes from informal training.  He suggested even though 
mentoring is an under-utilized practice in the maritime industry, the industry would benefit 
greatly from the practice of transferring knowledge from one generation of mariners to another.  
The IMO requires that captains and chief officers attend the leadership and managerial skills 
course that includes shipboard management and training.  Nevertheless, the curriculum for that 
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course does not specifically address how to help a new officer through the transition of becoming 
a functional independent watchstander, nor does it teach senior officers how to be a mentor for 
these new officers.  The curriculum addresses decision making, but has nothing to explain the 
degree of experience a person needs to make competent decisions (IMO, 2011).  
The curriculum for mentoring should first emphasize the importance of mentoring, which 
included its benefits to both the captain and the company by developing and retaining talent for 
the organization.  It is personally beneficial to the mentors by enhancing their skills from sharing 
their knowledge and experiences.  The relationship is not without conflicts.  For the protégés to 
reach their full potential, they will at times require some firmer guidance, which should include 
some constructive feedback as well.  By investing in the protégés, the mentors can develop long-
lasting relationships (Goldberg, 2013). 
Next the curriculum needs to emphasize to the mentor understands this relationship for 
developing new members may take several years, due to the complexity of watchstanding.  
Knowledge is not enough.  Experience is what helps the new officer to form competent 
decisions, which can be expedited by having the mentors find ways to challenge and coach their 
new officers though new experiences.  
An example of how this would be accomplished is in radio communication.  Most of the 
participants expressed their limited skills of talking on the radio.  The captain can take this 
opportunity to teach radio communication by giving the new officer a scenario such as a vessel 
off the port bow crossing to starboard and coming to a collision course.  The captain would 
instruct the officers to write down what they would say.  Then the captain would simulate the 
opposing vessel and have the new officer simulate calling the ship.  The captain would then 
evaluate whether proper or improper communication occurred.  This could be done several times 
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until a level of confidence develops within the junior officer.  
Next in the curriculum, the captain should let the new officers, under actual conditions, 
use the radio with the captain’s supervision.  Again the new officers should write down what 
they are going to say, review with the captain and then execute the actual call.  The captain 
should follow up with a discussion of the performance.  The following is a proposed addition to 
IMO model course 7.01 Master and Chief Mate, in Part C syllabus of the Leadership and 
Managerial Skills course (IMO, 2014a):  
1.0 Shipboard Personnel Management and Training 
Shipboard personnel management  
1.1 Principles of controlling subordinates and maintaining good relationships … 
1.1.12 Discusses theories on coaching individuals and teams to improve 
performance 
- Explain the benefits of mentoring junior officers: 
o Retention of highly qualified officers to the vessel and the company; 
o Mutually beneficial to both the protégé and the mentor by increasing their 
knowledge and abilities; 
o Long term relationship.  
- Discuss the relationship will encounter conflict and how to resolve it.  
- Demonstrate an example of instruction using radio communications: 
o Practice a scenario with the junior officers writing down what they are going 
to say and the captain critiquing the effectiveness of the proposed 
communication. 
o Coach an actual radio communication. 
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- Explain this is a long term process with a great return in investment.  
The temptation for most captains is to do things themselves due to time and experience.  
It takes discipline and patience for the captain to stop and teach someone less experienced to do 
the same job.  However, the rewards are not just for the individual, but also for the captain.  
Training someone new to do what the captain does strengthens the team by having one more 
experienced officer on the bridge.  It should be the practice of the shipping company and the 
other officers on the vessel to know that this person does not have the years of experience to 
draw from for reliable decision making.  These new officers require additional support both 
intellectually and emotionally rather than chastising for what they do not know or fail to do 
(Iordanoaia, 2010; Wang & Zhang, 2000).  
Limitations 
The study has addressed the details of the findings and their implications to the maritime 
world.  Yet, no study can be all-inclusive of the data, nor can it include the entire population that 
is being studied.  To ensure credibility of research, it is necessary for a researcher to address 
those limitations.  According to Galić, Lušić, and Pušić (2012), US maritime officers make up 
5% of the world’s maritime commercial trade.  With the exception of two, all the participants of 
this study were from the US.  Maximum variation sampling method was utilized when selecting 
participants.  Nevertheless, those from the Hispanic ethnic group made up 9.4% of the school’s 
population and none of the school’s Hispanic population volunteered for the study.  Additionally, 
only one female volunteered to participate.  Of the American population, all of the participants 
were from the east coast; there was no representation from the Gulf region, the Great Lakes, or 
the west coast.  Because of the small number of participants and the lack of diversity, the results 
of this study may not be generalizable to the entire population of the maritime community. 
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The study’s population utilized the traditional education path for becoming an officer 
from a four-university degree program.  Mariners can follow a non-traditional education path 
where they must complete three years of sea service, over 100 hands-on assessments, and five to 
six months of intense classroom training.  Mariners who follow this non-traditional path are 
known as Hawsepipers for those mariners working their way off the deck plates to the bridge.  
The hawsepipe is primarily known as a tube for which the anchor chain passes through the ship’s 
hull going out to the ship’s anchor.  None of these mariners were included in the study because 
of the convenience of the maritime university having a larger and more diverse population.  A 
class for watchkeeping may have 200 students attend in a year.  The hawsepiper usually attends 
one of the 250 Coast Guard approved training facilities, which typically have smaller class sizes 
of six students in a two-to-three week class, totaling about 60 students a year.  This gave the 
researcher less opportunity to study a diverse population, but is still an important part of the 
industry that should be studied. 
Another limitation within this study is the nature of the survey used.  The GSE is a self-
reporting instrument and has the potential for the participants to report false positives about 
themselves.  Even though a questionnaire for self-efficacy was included in the study, the results 
from the observation and the interviews suggest emotional intelligence and working memory 
were additional factors in decision making.  No instrument or measure for either emotional 
intelligence or working memory was adapted for comparison between the observation or the 
interviews.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Even though this phenomenological study investigated the decision making of novice 
decision makers in the maritime domain, future research should include other levels of 
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experience.  It has been suggested that a person is considered an expert in a field after 10,000 
hours or 10 years of engaged experience.  UK P&I Club (1990) suggested that second officers 
were twice as likely to be involved in a collision; therefore, additional studies should investigate 
decision makers at the intermediate level between three and 10 years of experience, and experts 
with 10 or more years, because the UK P&I Club report suggested that captains are involved in 
33% of the incidents.  
Furthermore, self-efficacy was used for descriptive purposes of the participants’ reaction 
to a situation.  Because the study was qualitative research, the sample size used was too small to 
determine any statistically significant findings.  To determine significance, a quantitative study 
should be used with a large sample size to determine if there is a correlation between completion 
of a voyage and self-efficacy scores.  Additionally, other factors should be included in the study, 
such as teamwork, communications, and level of workload. 
Because the results suggested that emotional intelligence was important to a person’s 
decision making and confidence, studies measuring this component would be recommended. 
Because this research was a qualitative study, a quantitative study in a similar population would 
be recommended that compares the GSE and either the Emotional Competency Inventory (ECI), 
or the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory (ESCI), Emotional and Social Competency - 
University Edition (ESCI-U), or an instrument to measure confidence.  By using three different 
measures, a researcher might determine if there is a correlation between self-efficacy, 
confidence, and emotional intelligence when it comes to determining success of an officer’s 
decision making in an adverse situation.  
The study’s participants were from a traditional education pathway to becoming junior 
officers.  Future studies should conduct similar research of mariners who follow a non-traditional 
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path; i.e., Hawsepipers.  The research should consider a facility that has a high-resolution full 
bridge simulator.  The training equivalent for NAUT 416 would utilize the Unites States Coast 
Guard (USCG) required watchkeeping course and the associated assessments.  Additionally, 
similar research should focus on other regions of the US and countries other than the US where 
the majority of the world shipping manpower comes from.  
This study focused on junior deck officers.  Additional studies should include junior 
engineering officers who stand as officer in charge of an engineering watch (OICEW).  Even 
though Giziakis, Goulielmos, and Lathouraki (2012) reported that engineering officers were 
involved in less than 5% of shipboard incidents, recent news events with Carnival cruise ships 
such as the Carnival Dream, Carnival Triumph, Carnival Elation, Carnival Legend and Carnival 
Ecstasy were a result of engineering failures and suggest additional studies in the engineering 
department may be required.  
Summary 
This research study described the maritime junior officer’s decision making.  In 
answering the three main questions, the study suggested three themes: the Decision-Making 
Process, Factors in Decision Making, and Motivations and Solutions to Decision Making.  Each 
theme had three key points or subthemes.  The Decision-Making Process was based on how well 
participants were prepared for the exercise, how well they knew themselves and their abilities, 
and whether or not they took the simulation seriously.  Factors in Decision Making included 
three subthemes: confidence, workload, and team cooperation.  Finally, Motivations and 
Solutions to Decision Making depended on rules, knowledge, and self-motivation.  Specifically, 
lacking in any of these key points posed barriers for junior officers taking advantage of 
techniques described in the literature as naturalistic decision making, specifically the 
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Recognition Primed Decision model (RPD) when encountering a complex and unfamiliar 
situation. 
Interestingly, many of the key points identified under the three main themes were related 
to the affective domain, an area often neglected in maritime education.  Maritime educators 
should begin all courses emphasizing the need for the students to be committed to their studies 
and to take advantage of those teaching aids that stimulate the affective domain.  By using the 
affective domain, the educator makes an appeal to the students’ emotions.  It is not enough to 
know intellectually how to make a decision.  Emotion has the ability to influence long-term 
retention of information.  
The maritime industry has realized that the traditional hierarchy with the captain as 
absolute authority may need to be updated.  The methods of Captain Bligh have proven to be 
ineffective; likewise, abusing and berating junior officers today is just as ineffective if not 
unethical.  For new junior officers to make better decisions, the industry should implement a 
mentoring program and make it policy or normal practice of shipping companies.  The 
curriculum for the leadership and managerial skills course should include the benefits of a 
mentoring program and how such a program could be implemented.  By taking the time to 
consider the proposed methods the maritime industry may help ensure a future of better prepared 
leaders and decision makers.  
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APPENDIX B 
Course Syllabus for Bridge Watchstanding NAUT 416 
(For the propose of this study, permission was by Captain Walter Nadolny, Department Chair of 
the Marine Transportation Department for the publishing and redistribute the syllabus) 
Course Objective:  To prepare the Cadet as a Watch Officer on a Merchant Vessel. To 
qualify the Cadet as per required SCTW assessments (attached). To expose the Cadet to various 
Simulator experiences in order to develop decision making skills as it applies to traffic and 
voyage planning situations, and to develop proper situational awareness. Practical application of 
Rules of the Road and development of correct bridge procedures will be emphasized. 
 
Course Policy:  Nav. 416 participants must pass both the lecture and the simulator 
portions of this course. Failure of either will result in a failure for both Lecture and Practicum. In 
accordance with STCW guidelines, a participant must achieve a minimum grade of 70% or better 
in each of these sections in order to pass the course. 
 
Attendance Policy: Class attendance is mandatory. Failure of the course will result from 
even one unauthorized absence. The Instructor must approve all Authorized Absences in 
advance. If you are going to be absent, you must call or e-mail prior to the class being missed 
and bring a photocopy of your authorized absence chit to your next class. Cadets will be allowed 
ONE Authorized Absence during the Semester, which will have to be made up. Vacations, job 
interviews, and airline reservations do not count as an authorized absence. If you miss one or 
more classes because of an unauthorized absence, you will earn an F. One absence of any kind 
will result in an F for the course. Cadets are expected to be on time and in uniform for all 
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lectures and simulations. Being late will result in loss of one letter grade, each time you are late. 
Repeated tardiness will result in an F for the course. No cell phones, food or drink allowed in 
class or the simulator. 
Contact: If you are unable to attend simulation e-mail me in advance @ 
wnadolny@sunymaritime.edu and call me at 718-409-7291 
 
Text: Watch Standing Guide for the Merchant Officer, CMP, by Robert Meurn 
 
Recommended Reading:  
Farwell’s Rules of the Nautical Road, 8th Edition, U.S. Naval Institute Press 
Shiphandling for the Mariner, CMP, MacElrevey, 4th Edition 
 
Prerequisites:  Naut 304 & 305          Practicum: As scheduled in the Simulator 
Project: Comprehensive Term Paper review of a recent major Maritime disaster  
Lecture Grade:  20% - Quizzes            30% - Project:  due on or before 9 April 
                          50% - Final Exam  
Final Lecture Grade: 50% Lecture Grade        50% Practicum Grade    
Note: There will be no make up or rewrites for quizzes, exams, or project 
Bridge Watchstanding NAUT 416(P) 
Course Objective:  To prepare the participant as a Watch Officer on a Merchant Vessel 
and satisfy the attached STCW assessments by exposing the participant to various Simulator 
experiences. To develop ship handling and decision making skills as they apply to traffic and 
voyage planning situations and to develop proper situational awareness. Practical application of 
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the Rules of the Road, navigational procedures and correct bridge procedures will be 
emphasized. 
Course Policy:  Nav. 416P participants must pass both the lecture and the simulator 
portions of this course. In accordance with STCW guidelines, a participant must achieve a 
minimum grade of 70% or better in each of these sections in order to pass the course 
Class Etiquette 
The class will be run as a professional bridge operation therefore the following rules 
apply: 
1. 90% of the class time will be spent in the simulator room 
2. Food and beverages are not allowed in the simulator room –EVER 
3. There will be no food, drink, or cell phones in class 
4. Fooling around or horseplay are not allowed 
5. As in real life you never miss a watch or show up late 
6. You will be treated like a professional therefore act like one. You are not a Cadet in 
this class. 
7. Observed Cell phone usage during an exercise will result in a failure of that 
exercise. 
 Attendance Policy: Class attendance is mandatory. Failure of the course will result from 
even one unauthorized absence. The Instructor must approve all Authorized Absences in 
advance. If you are going to be absent, you must call or e-mail prior to the class being missed 
and bring a photocopy of your authorized absence chit to your next class. Cadets will be allowed 
ONE Authorized Absence during the Semester, which will have to be made up. Vacations, job 
interviews, and airline reservations do not count as an authorized absence. If you miss one or 
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more classes because of an unauthorized absence, you will earn an F. One absence of any kind 
will result in an F for the course. Cadets are expected to be on time and in uniform for all 
lectures and simulations. Being late will result in loss of one letter grade, each time you are late. 
Repeated tardiness will result in an F for the course. No cell phones, food or drink allowed in 
class or the simulator. 
Contact: If you are unable to attend class e-mail me at wnadolny@sunymaritime.edu and 
call me at 718-409-7291. 
Equipment: Navigation Plotting Instruments 
Recommended Reading: Farwell’s Rules of the Nautical Road, 8th Edition, U.S. Naval 
Institute Press 
Shiphandling for the Master, CMP, MacElrevey, 4th Edition 
Naut 416 – Bridge Watchstanding 
DESCRIPTION 
This simulator-based course is designed to enhance the potential 
Third Mate’s decision-making skills as it applies to traffic and voyage 
planning situations and prepare the participant to take better advantage of 
the practical experience that will be afforded during SST III. Practical 
application of Rules of the Road and development of correct bridge 
procedures will be emphasized. Open sea and harbor conditions will be 
simulated for day as well as night using the simulator. Each watch team 
has 2 simulator hours and 1 class hour per week. A number of STCW 
required assessments relating to watch standing will be effected during this 
course. 
Ship Maneuvering and Handling, Knowledge of: 
.1 the effects of deadweight, draft, trim, speed and under-keel 
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clearance on turning circles and stopping distances 
2 the effects of wind and current on ship handling 
.3 maneuvers and procedures for the rescue of person overboard 
.4 squat, shallow water and similar effects 
.5 proper procedures for anchoring and mooring 
Thorough knowledge of the basic principles to be observed in 
keeping a navigational watch; Thorough knowledge of effective bridge 
team work procedures; The use of routing in accordance with the General 
Provisions on Ships' Routing 
Credits = 4 Schedule:  1 lecture hour and 2 simulator  hours per week for 14 weeks 
Co/Prerequisites: NAUT 315, NAV 312 
Course Materials: Text(s): 
Watch Standing Guide for the Merchant Marine Officer; 
Meurn, R.  
 Equipment: Navigation plotting instruments 
 References:  
 Other:  
Special Training 
Aids: 
Full Mission Bridge Simulator 
Grading Policy: 
Minimum passing grade of 70% (letter grade of C-), participants must 
complete all assessments 
Attendance Policy: 
Participants cannot miss more than 10% of lectures,  activities performed 
during simulator sessions MUST be made up 
KUP’s in TRB 10.1.2.2, 10.1.2.3, 10.1.2.4 
STCW Assessments Performed In Course 
OICNW-1-3B Chart selection 
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OICNW-1-3C Route planning 
OICNW-1-6A Steering gear test 
OICNW-1-6B Set weather controls 
OICNW-2-1D Determine risk of collision 
OICNW-2-1E Maneuver to avoid risk of collision – meeting 
OICNW-2-1F Maneuver to avoid risk of collision – overtaking 
OICNW-2-2A Watch relief 
OICNW-2-2B Keep a safe navigation watch 
OICNW-2-2C Notify Captain when appropriate 
OICNW-2-2D Keep a safe anchor watch 
OICNW-2-2E Navigate in restricted visibility 
OICNW-2-2F Turn over a watch 
OICNW-2-3A Voyage planning 
OICNW-2-3B Execute a voyage plan 
OICNW-2-3C Watch augmentation 
OICNW-2-3D BRM Condition III – collision avoidance 
OICNW-2-3E BRM Condition III – navigation 
OICNW-2-3F BRM Condition II or III – error trapping 
OICNW-2-3G BRM Condition II or III – navigation & collision avoidance 
OICNW-2-3H BRM Condition III – establish a bridge team 
OICNW-5-1A Maneuver for man overboard 
OICNW-5-1B Course change of more than 45° 
OICNW-5-1C Emergency stop 
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STANDING ORDERS 
 
The Watch Officer's primary duties when underway are the safe navigation of the vessel, 
collision avoidance, and maintenance of a good lookout. 
 
Nothing shall supersede, contradict, or violate the Rules of the Road. 
 
A proper lookout includes by sight and bearing as well as by all available means, 
including, but not limited to, the use of radar, binoculars, and information received by VHF radio 
either from shore or from another vessel. 
 
Ship’s position fixes shall be taken as often as necessary to insure the safe navigation of 
the vessel but, where possible, not less than once every hour. 
 
Danger bearings must be taken to ascertain the safe maneuvering limits of the course of 
the vessel. 
 
Positions should not be taken using floating objects such as buoys, lightships, etc. when 
fixed objects are available. 
 
Where general prudence, good seamanship, and rules and regulations require, the vessel 
shall use established sea lanes and traffic separation tracks. 
 
When the Watch Office turns Over the Conn or the watch to the Captain or another 
Watch  
 
Officer, the action must be clearly stated and acknowledged. 
 
When the Captain relieves the Watch Officer of the Conn this action must be clearly 
stated. 
 
The Watch Officer shall make full use of all navigational equipment to determine the 
vessel's position. 'This equipment shall be used in conjunction with, but not in lieu of, celestial 
navigation and piloting procedures. 
 
The Captain will keep the Watch Officer informed as to where he can be contacted at any 
time. In an emergency, the Watch Officer may use a short ring on the General Alarm m notify 
the Captain. 
 
Even though the Captain is on the Bridge, the Watch Officer has the Conn and perform 
his normal watch duties and responsibilities unless the Captain formally relieves him. 
 
Coordinate bridge-to-bridge ship to shore and station-to-station communications. 
 
Ensure proper execution of steering and engine orders. 
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Record all required entries in the bell book, course recorder chart, deck logbook and any 
other logs or report forms. 
 
Compare the standard compass to the gyrocompass each hour. Keep informed of the error 
of the compasses. 
 
Take an azimuth once every watch if the weather permits. 
 
Each half hour check that the vessel is being steered on the required course. 
 
After each course change-, check that the vessel is steering the required course and check 
the compasses, 
 
All orders to the helmsman shall indicate direction and amount of rudder to be used 
Courses shall be stated in three numerals. 
 
Running Lights are to be on continually while the vessel is at sea and checked at least 
once a watch. 
 
The Officer on Watch shall never leave the Bridge at any time unless properly relieved. 
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MATE 
 
NAME: ________________________  DATE: _______________  EXERCISE: _______ 
 
1. Prepared ___________________________________________________________________ 
2. Equipment setup _____________________________________________________________ 
3. Awareness _________________________________________________________________ 
4. Maneuvering _______________________________________________________________ 
5. Communications ____________________________________________________________ 
 
NAVIGATOR 
 
NAME: ________________________  
 
1. Prepared ___________________________________________________________________ 
2. Chart Setup _________________________________________________________________ 
3. DR’s ______________________________________________________________________ 
4. Positions ___________________________________________________________________ 
5. Awareness _________________________________________________________________ 
 
COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
 
NAME: ________________________  
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1. Prepared ___________________________________________________________________ 
2. Equipment setup _____________________________________________________________ 
3. Awareness _________________________________________________________________ 
4. Communications ____________________________________________________________ 
 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
NAME: ________________________  
 
1. Prepared ___________________________________________________________________ 
2. Awareness _________________________________________________________________ 
3. Communications ____________________________________________________________ 
4. Logbook/Bellbook ___________________________________________________________ 
 
HELM 
 
NAME: ________________________  
 
1. Prepared ___________________________________________________________________ 
2. Awareness _________________________________________________________________ 
3. Communications ____________________________________________________________ 
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NAVIGATOR: Range and bearing of anchor position arrived at 
from the planned anchor position RADAR OBS: 
HELM: TIME LET GO ⫝ 
  
EXECUTION APPRAISAL AND PLANNING 
Total 40 Points – 2 Points Per Item Total 30 Points – 2 Points Per Item 
01. Compliance of Captain / Standing Order  01. All relevant pubs studied  
02. Proper preparation for ARRIVAL  02. Satisfactory plan form  
03. Proper internal communications  03. Track & courses on chart  
04. proper VHF procedures  04. Danger and safety margins marked  
05. Captain / Engineroom kept informed  05. Tidal times and heights calculated  
06. ETA’s maintained   06.  sufficient under keel clearance / squat ascertained  
07. Proper orders given  07. Critical W/O marked correctly  
08. Frequency and method of position fixing  08. ETA’s and distance planned  
09. Margins of Safety maintained  09. VHF ch. Note and RP’s marked  
10. Optimum use of all navigational aids  10. Frequency & method of fixing planned  
11. Compliance with Port Regulation  11. Relevant Port Regulation considered  
12. Safe speed maintained at all times  12. Weather expectations and forecast  
13. Efficient visual lookout maintained  13. Ship’s maneuvering considered  
14. Anchoring properly prepared and 
executed 
 14. Contingency plans made  
15. Optimum use of bridge personnel  15. Effective anchoring plan made  
16. Bell Book properly maintained  
APPRAISAL & PLANNING SCORE  
17. Log Book properly maintained  
18. VHF log properly maintained    
19. Anchor in correct anchorage  ORGANIZATION & TEAMWORK  
20. Ship satisfactorily maneuvered  Total 10 Points – 5 Points Per Item  
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EXECUTION SCORE  
01. Watch Officer composure  
02. Teamwork  
  
ORGANIZATION & TEAMWORK SCORE  
MONITORING  
Total 20 Points – 2 Points Per Item  
SUMMARY  
01. Track (Charted fixed and PI)  
02. Depths  APPRAISAL AND PLANNING (30)  
03. Traffic  EXECUTION (40)  
04. VHF  MONITORING (20)  
05. Helm  ORGANIZATION & TEAMWORK (10)  
06. Instruments  TOTAL POINTS ( out of 100)  
07. Visibility / Weather  
AUTOMATIC DEDUCTIONS  
08. ETA’s  
09. Passing of information  1 Point for each minute late  
10. Watch Officer  15 Point for extremely poor navigation / grounding  
MONITORING SCORE  ADJUSTED (FINAL) SCORE  
 
COMMENTS: 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTOR: 
 
 
  
199 
 
EXERCISE 2 PUGET SOUND 
M/V VOYAGER    Call Sign: WEBE 
Date:  04 February, 2014 
Time: 1900 
D.R. Position: 
Lat 47-56N, Long 122-31W 
Course: 121 deg T Speed: 17.0 kts Charts: 18440 
Scenario: 
You are the Third Mate Inbound in Puget Sound approaching Point No Point bound for 
Seattle. 
Follow the Traffic Lanes and, when contacted by VTS, Tugs, or Agent, respond with the 
proper ETA to the “SG” buoy off of West Point Light. 
When abeam of the “SG” buoy, slow to half-ahead. 
At West Point Lighted buoy Number “3”, reduce to dead-slow ahead. 
  
M/V ENTERPRISE    Call Sign: KFOG 
 
Lat 47-37N, Long 122-25W 
 
Course: 324 deg T Speed: 12.0 kts Scenario: 
 
You are the Third Mate Outbound in Puget Sound departing Seattle. 
At West Point Lighted buoy Number “3”, increase to Full Ahead Maneuvering Speed 
Prior to the “SG” buoy, a/c to enter the Northbound Traffic Lanes. 
Follow the Traffic Lanes and, when contacted by VTS, Tugs, Pilot, or Agent, respond 
with the proper ETA to the Pilot Station at Port Angeles. 
 
Notes: 
An additional Mate will be on the radar to help with Collision Avoidance. The Captain 
will be in his cabin. 
Notify Captain & E/R 15 minutes prior to “SG” buoy and Port Angeles Pilot Station. The 
Helm will be relieved every 30 minutes 
Call the Captain any time if in doubt, particularly if an emergency arises 
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EXERCISE 3 PUGET SOUND 
M/V ENTERPRISE    Call Sign: KFOG 
Date: 11 February, 2014 
Time: 0600 
D.R. Position: 
Lat 47-56N, Long 122-31W 
Course: 121 deg T Speed: 17.0 kts Charts: 18440s 
Scenario: 
You are the Third Mate Inbound in Puget Sound approaching Point No Point bound for 
Seattle. 
Follow the Traffic Lanes and, when contacted by VTS, Tugs, or Agent, respond with the 
proper ETA to the “SG” buoy off of West Point Light. 
When abeam of the “SG” buoy, slow to half-ahead. 
At West Point Lighted buoy Number “3”, reduce to dead-slow ahead. 
 
M/V VOYAGER    Call Sign: WEBE 
Course: 324 deg T Speed: 12 kts  
Lat 47-37N Long 122-25W 
Scenario: 
You are the Third Mate Outbound in Puget Sound departing Seattle. 
At West Point Lighted buoy Number “3”, increase to Full Ahead Maneuvering Speed 
Prior to the “SG” buoy, a/c to enter the Northbound Traffic Lanes. 
Follow the Traffic Lanes and, when contacted by VTS, Tugs, Pilot, or Agent, respond 
with the proper ETA to the Pilot Station at Port Angeles. 
 
Notes: 
An additional Mate will be on the radar to help with Collision Avoidance. The Captain 
will be in his cabin. 
Notify Captain & E/R 15 minutes prior to “SG” buoy and Port Angeles Pilot Station The 
Helm will be relieved every 30 minutes 
Call the Captain any time if in doubt, particularly if an emergency arises  
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APPENDIX C 
Observational Protocol Form 
Observational Protocol 
Length of each exercise: 45 minutes   
Descriptive Notes Reflective Notes 
What are the initial behaviors of the 
participant(s) when being briefed on the 
assessment? 
 
What were the actions, discussions, and 
behaviors of the participant(s) leading up to 
the critical moment? 
 
What actions or inactions took place on 
missing the critical moment? 
 
What were the actions, discussions, and 
behaviors of the participant(s) after the critical 
moment? 
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APPENDIX D 
Consent Form 
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APPENDIX E 
The General Self-Efficacy Questionnaire 
The General Self-Efficacy Questionnaire  
English version by Ralf Schwarzer & Matthias Jerusalem, 1995 
Response 
1-4 
1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.  
2.  
If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I 
want. 
 
3.  It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.  
4.  I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.  
5.  
Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen 
situations. 
 
6.  I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.  
7.  
I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my 
coping abilities. 
 
8.  
When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several 
solutions. 
 
9.  If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.  
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way  
Response Format   
1 = Not at all true   2 = Hardly true   3 = Moderately true   4 = Exactly true  
(Schwarzer, 2008)  
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APPENDIX F 
Interview Questions 
1. Describe your experience in the simulator scenarios?  
2. Describe how you felt about the decision(s) you made in the simulator.  
3. What rule or procedure was in your thought process that led you to a particular decision?  
4. How confident were you in your decision making and why? 
5. Referring to other traffic that they made a maneuver for: Was the other ship’s action 
correct under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS)? If you disagree with what the other ship did, why do you think they did it?  
6. What alternatives did you have? 
7. If you missed a piece of useful information, why?  
8. Would you do it differently if faced with the same situation again? If so, what would you 
do and why?  
9. What do you think it means to miss a critical decision?  
10. What factors do you think contribute to a good or bad decision? 
11. Why do you think officers on the bridge make good or bad decisions? 
12. What do you think would help you make better decisions?  
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APPENDIX G 
Sample of Field Notes 
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